Corporate organisation and structural adjustment in Japan by Sheard, Paul
C O R P O R A T E  O R G A N IS A T IO N  A N D  STR U C T U R A L  
A D J U S T M E N T  IN J A P A N
By
Paul Sheard
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at the Australian National University.
April 1986
D ec la ra tio n
Except where otherwise indicated
this thesis is my own work.
April 1986
A ck n o w le d g m en ts
Many individuals and organisations contributed to this work. 1 owe a major debt to 
Peter Drysdale, Ben Smith, and Mike Taylor who as supervisors provided assistance, 
guidance and encouragement over a four year period. Peter Drysdale deserves special 
acknowledgment for his contribution at all levels of the research program. I would like to 
thank sincerely Professor Iwao Nakatani for his supervision and assistance in Japan and 
for encouraging me to begin the task of writing up the results of the research while at 
Osaka University. 1 am grateful to Nigel Thrift for his helpful supervision during the first 
half of the research program.
Colin McKenzie and James Jordan read and provided valuable comments on several 
chapters. Hayden Lesbirel energetically read the whole manuscript and provided a timely 
contribution to the final revision. They contributed less tangibly in the course of sundry 
workshop presentations, tea-room discussions and telephone conversations. Christopher 
Findlay provided helpful comments on one chapter. Thanks are due also to Professor 
Hiroshi Okumura, Mr Kazuo Matsui and other researchers at the Japan Securities 
Research Institute and to staff in the Faculty of Economics at Osaka University for 
helpful discussions and comments on the work. It hardly needs to be said, however, tha t  
any deficiencies or errors in the work are the sole responsibility of the author.
The research was made possible through the generous support of the Australian 
Government and the Australian National University. The author acknowledges gratefully 
also the support of Hamersley Iron Pty. Ltd., in providing the Saionji-Hamersley 
scholarship for one year’s research in Japan, and the Faculty of Economics of Osaka 
University where the author was Visiting Research Associate for the duration of the 
research in Japan.
The author is deeply grateful to Mr Hosai Hyuga, Chairman of the Kansai 
Economic Federation, and to his assistant Mr Takao Suzuki for their kindness in 
providing introductions to Japanese companies. I would like to record my thanks to the 
many Japanese businessmen who cooperated in the research. They gave generously of 
their time and thoughts in interviews which frequently lasted several hours and which for 
some informants extended over several meetings. Their contribution to the research was 
invaluable; however, because in some cases confidentiality is involved, acknowledgment
by name is not made. The Japan Aluminium Federation and the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry generously provided da ta  and information on the aluminium industry.
Many thanks to Bev Wagner and Janet Healey for typing the Figures and tables, 
and to Janet Healey and John McBride for helpful editorial advice. Marion May edited 
three chapters in the course of their publication by the Australia-Japan Research Centre. 
Thanks go to Herta Smith and all the staff at the Centre for their help in various ways.
The staff of the Orientalia division of the National Library of Australia and the 
staff of the Faculty Library and Gödö kenkyüsh itsu  a t the Faculty of Economics of 
Osaka University were most helpful. The staff of the Coombs Com puter Section a t the 
Australian National University provided assistance with computing and word-processing, 
and the Data Processing Unit typed a large da ta  set onto tape for the author.
My Final acknowledgment is to my wife, Yoshiko, for her love and support, and to 
Erniko and Yumiko, who always greeted daddy with excitement when he came home and 
never complained when he went off to ‘uni 1 again.
A b str a c t
A major feature of corporate organisation in Japan  is the existence of keiretsu or 
financial corporate groupings, centring on financial, shareholding, and trading links 
among ‘m ain1 banks, general trading companies and manufacturing firms. This study 
examines the economics of this form of corporate organisation and its role in Japan ’s 
structural adjustment since the early 1970s, previous analysis of which has focused on the 
role of government policy and assistance.
The financial corporate grouping can be viewed as a kind of internal capital market 
which allows firms, and indirectly their managements, to pool their risks and obtain 
insulation from the external market for corporate control. The main bank is a principal 
risk-insuring agent and functions as a screening, monitoring and management-sanctioning 
mechanism in the internal capital market. The general trading company performs an 
im portant risk-insuring role in the grouping as a financial intermediary in interfirm 
transactions and as a parent firm to manufacturing firms. The practice of engaging in 
corporate share interlocks is seen as a set-up which allows firms to pool risks and obtain 
mutual protection from the takeover market. The internal capital market, by enabling 
firms to share risks and obtain mutual protection from external takeover agents, is 
thought of as facilitating the operation of the ‘lifetime1 employment system for managers 
and other skilled workers in large firms.
This corporate organisation has played a major role in the process of corporate 
adjustment to changing competitiveness and in distributing the costs associated with the 
scrapping of capacity and other structural adjustment in Japan. The major banks have 
provided financial assistance to structurally depressed firms on a large scale and main- 
bank intervention in firms has been a major mechanism through which the reorganisation 
of corporate assets and management has been carried out in the face of rapidly changing 
competitive conditions. The general trading company has been a major corporate 
mechanism through which costs of adjustment have been borne. The disposal of shares 
held in related banks and business partners is identified as a major mechanism through 
w'hich firms have been able to offset their losses. Shares have been disposed of on a large 
scale, with the explicit purpose of offsetting structural change-related losses, and these 
share disposals have taken place in the negotiated intercorporate context of the internal 
capital market.
A significant part of the thesis is devoted to a case study of adjustment in the 
aluminium smelting industry, an industry which experienced a severe decline in 
international competitiveness in the 1970s and which has a group-dominated corporate 
organisation. The case study shows that, while there have been several important 
government assistance schemes, corporate organisation has played a major role in 
mediating adjustment in the industry, particularly in absorbing the costs of adjustment 
through internal cross-subsidisation mechanisms.
The results of the study suggest tha t  the importance of the role of the government, 
and MIT1 in particular, in bringing about structural adjustment in Japan has been 
overstated and th a t  this apparent effectiveness in promoting adjustm ent has rested in 
large part on the capacity of the private sector to absorb the costs of adjustment.
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1C o rp orate  o rg a n isa tio n  and  a d ju stm en t in Jap an
The prevalence of financial corporate groupings is a well-known feature of corporate 
organisation in Japan. Most large firms are affiliated to varying degrees with wider 
groupings of firms through lender-borrower, shareholding and trading relations. This 
study seeks to ask what role this kind of corporate organisation has played during recent 
s tructural adjustment in Japan.
The Japanese economy and industrial structure have undergone major structural 
change since the early 1970s and the apparent effectiveness in managing structural 
adjustm ent in Japan has attracted  widespread international interest.* A clear 
understanding of how Japan  manages its structural adjustment is important from a 
number of viewpoints. Japan  accounts for about 10 per cent of world GNP and structural 
adjustm ent in Japan has major impacts on Ja p an ’s trading partners and international 
competitors." It is widely argued tha t  the Japanese economy has performed well in 
comparison with other industrial nations, in spite of the impact of the oil shocks on its 
energy-intensive industrial structure, and that this favourable performance reflects the 
economy’s capacity to accomodate exogenous economic shocks and undergo structural
o
adjustment. Thus Ja p a n ’s experience with structural adjustment is looked upon as a 
model for other countries facing similar adjustment pressures.1*
Interest in J a p a n ’s structural adjustment to date has focused on the role of 
industrial adjustment policy and government assistance. The role played by the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry has received particular attention. The departure 
point of this study, however, is the argument that the role of the government needs to be 
set in the context of its interaction with the private sector and the role of the private 
sector itself. There is a need for a better understanding of how mechanisms in the private 
sector impinge upon the management of structural adjustment in Japan. The particular 
focus of a ttention in this study is on the corporate organisation of financial corporate 
grouping and its role in the structural adjustment process.5
2F IN A N C IA L  C O R P O R A T E  G R O U P IN G
Corporate organisation in the large firm sector in Japan is characterised by such 
phenomena as the main-bank system of close bank-firm relations, the existence of general 
trading companies, and widespread fractionalised interlocking shareholdings among firms. 
In this study, the term ‘financial corporate grouping1 is used to refer to this kind of
r»
corporate organisation. It is common to identify particular sets of firms, or ‘financial 
corporate groupings’, which have common main-bank associations, common close ties 
with one or more general trading company, a significant level of interlocking 
shareholdings, interlocking directorate ties and interfirm trading, and other corporate 
ties. There are six major groupings of this kind, namely the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, Fuyö (Fuji Bank), Sanwa, and Daiichi Kangin (Daiichi Kangyo Bank) groups,
•  7each centring on a major city bank. There are several other groupings of firms, which
Q
centre on other city banks and long-term credit banks.
According to the much-cited classification produced by the K eizai chösa kyökai 
publishing organisation, 87 per cent of the firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE) in 1982 belonged to a main-bank grouping and almost two-thirds 
were affiliated with one of the six major bank groupings (Table 1-1). In the case of the six 
major groupings, on average about 20 per cent of the shares of any one firm are held by 
other listed firms in the group and about 20 per cent of bank borrowings come from 
group-related financial institutions (Table 1-2). There is also a significant level of 
interlocking directorates among group firms. The presidents of the major firms in each 
grouping belong to a “presidents’ club” (shachökai) and there are a number of similar 
committees in which other senior executives participate.^
The corporate organisation of financial corporate grouping played an important 
part in resource allocation in the high growth period in Japan, in particular by helping to 
concentrate resources into heavy industrial sectors.1 *^ The main-bank system, which 
centred on the major bank in each grouping, underpinned the heavy reliance of firms on 
external bank borrowings to finance their high levels of investment. The general trading 
company, another central organ in the group structure, acted as a quasi-operating arm of 
the banks, and particularly its main bank (the group bank), in financing and providing 
intermediation in interfirm trade and industrial investment.11 Entry into new or 
expanding sectors often involved diversification by an established manufacturer in the 
grouping or the formation of a group joint venture, with the financial and organisational 
backing of the group main bank and trading company playing a key role.
The phenomenon of financial corporate grouping has a ttracted  much attention, but 
there has been almost no analysis of the effect of this kind of corporate organisation on 
how structural adjustm ent in Japan takes place. Most of the analysis of recent
Table 1.1: Classification of listed Japanese firms
into main-bank groupings
Proportion
assets
of total
Relative Relative Cumulative
Name of Number of
grouping firms
frequency
(%)
frequency
(%)
frequency
(%)
Mitsui 105 12.0 18.0
Mitsubishi 1 17 13.4 13.7
Sumitomo 108 12.4 14.4
Fuyo (Fuji) 105 12.0 10.3
Sanwa 51 5.8 7.6
Daiichi Kangin 71 8.1 9.7 73.7
Affiliation with one of 
above in state of flux 33 3.8 2.7 76.4
Seven other city banks 70 8.0 4.5 80.9
Industrial Bank of Japan 51 5.8 10.5 91 .4
Long-Term Credit Bank 16 1.8 0.4 91.8
Other financial 
institutions 33 3.8 1.0 92.8
Affiliated with 
non-financial firm 52 6.0 1.9 94.7
Affiliation unknown 61 7.0 5.3 100.0
Total 873 100.0 100.0 -
Note: a For the 873 non-financial firms listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange (First Section) in 1982. Group 
affiliation was d e t e r m i n e d  on the basis of 
shareholdings, borrowings, representation on boards of 
directors, and historical associations.
Source: Keizai chösa kyokai, 1983: Keiretsu no kenkyü: daiichibu
jojo kigyohen, pp.1-22.
Table 1.2: Financial and director ties between affiliated 
firms of the six major main-bank groupings
Name of group 
(number of 
firms)
Intra-group 
interlocking 
shareholdings 
(1981 )a
Intra-group 
financing 
(1981)b
Intra-group 
director 
despatches 
(1980)C
Mitsui (105) 18.5 17.0 4.1
Mitsubishi (117) 24.9 24.4 13.4
Sumitomo (108) 25.6 23.1 13.4
Fuyo (Fuji) (105) 19.1 21.6 4.3
Sanwa (51) 11.8 19.5 5.8
Daiichi Kangin (71) 15.1 15.5 8.9
Notes: a Proportion of affiliated firms' total shares held by- 
other listed firms of the same group.
b Proportion of affiliated firms' total bank borrowings 
(not including discounting of bills) supplied by 
financial institutions of same group.
c Proportion of total director positions in member firms 
of presidents' clubs occupied by directors who were 
formerly or concurrently executives in other member 
firms.
Sources: Keizai chosa kyokai, 1983: Keiretsu no kenkyu:
daiichibu jöjö kigyohen; Kigyö keiretsu söran,
Kigyo keiretsu soran.
1981:
5adjustm ent in Japan has focused on the role of government policies and assistance, in line 
with the strong policy orientation of the literature.*'' It is important to ask also what 
role corporate organisation has played in the adjustment process of structurally depressed 
firms and industries in Japan, and this is the aim of the study. Before addressing the 
main issues associated with the role of corporate organisation in adjustment, it may be 
helpful to explain what is meant by ‘structural ad justm ent’ and to review Japan’s recent 
experience with structural adjustment and the major government policies and assistance 
for adjustm ent in depressed industries.
S T R U C T U R A L  C H A N G E  A N D  A D J U S T M E N T
‘Structural adjustm ent’ can be defined as a process of re-allocation of capital, 
managerial, labour and other resources which occurs in response to changes in competitive 
circumstances in the economy and which results in an altered structure of production and 
output. This definition allows for the shift in competitiveness to be due to exogenous 
economic factors, such as a price ‘shock’ or technological innovation, or to changes in the 
policy and regulatory environment, such as the removal of a tariff or deregulation of an 
industry. The term ‘structural change’ has a t  least three common uses in the literature. It 
is often used to refer to a specific event or change in economic conditions, such as the 
1973 oil price hike, which alters relative prices and competitiveness and creates pressures 
for adjustment; it is frequently used as a synonym for ‘structural adjustm ent’ as defined 
above; and it is used to denote the overall process of economic change and resulting 
adjustment. In this study, the latter  usage is generally adopted. It is commonly observed 
tha t  structural change is a pervasive and ongoing process in any dynamic economy and is 
a normal part of economic growth and development.1  ^ Attention is focused in this study 
on large-scale structural change and adjustment, such as is associated with sudden, major 
and permanent shifts in international competitiveness in the economy.
J A P A N ’S S T R U C T U R A L  A D J U S T M E N T  SIN C E THE EARLY 1970S
The international competitiveness of Japanese industry underwent major changes in 
the 1970s. The two oil price hikes, the appreciation of the yen, the slowdown in economic 
growth and other events left many of the key heavy industrial sectors of the high-growth 
period in a s ta te  of structural depression, tha t  is, uncompetitive in international markets 
and with low operating rates and excess capacity. The Japanese industrial structure has 
undergone large-scale structural adjustm ent since the mid-1970s, centring on the 
scrapping of excess capacity and reduction of workforce in depressed industries.
The oil price hikes, or oil ‘shocks’ as they are known in Japan, in 1973 and 1979 led 
to a significant loss of international competitiveness for heavy industries such as steel,
6Table 1.3: Indicators of Japanese economic performance, 1970-82
Year
Economic indicator
Real 
growth 
rate of 
GNP
Whole­
sale
price
index
Consumer
price
index
Unemploy­
ment
rate
Number 
of corporate 
bankruptcies 
(% increase 
over previous 
year)a
Current 
balance 
of pay­
ments 
(US$
million)
1970 8.3 3.6 7.7 1.1 11,589 ( 8.7) 1,970
1971 5.3 -0.8 6.1 1.2 11,489 (-0.9) 5,797
1972 9.7 0.8 4.5 1.4 9,544( -16.9) 6,624
1973 5.3 15.7 11.7 1.2 10,862 (13.8) -136
1974 -0.2 31.6 24.5 1.4 13,605 (25.3) -4,693
1975 3.6 3.0 1 1.8 1.9 14,477 ( 6.4) -682
1976 5.1 5.0 9.3 2.0 16,842 (16.3) 3,680
1977 5.3 1.9 8.1 2.0 18,741 (11.3) 10,918
1978 5. 1 -2.6 3.8 2.2 15,526( -17.2) 16,534
1979 5.3 7.3 3.6 2.1 14,926 (-3.9) -8,754
1980 4.6 17.8 8.0 2.0 16,635 (11.4) -10,746
1981 3.5 1.4 4.9 2.2 15,683 (-5.7) 4,770
1982 3.3 1.8 2.7 2.4 14,824 (-5.5) 6,850
a Suspension of transactions by banks with firms having a capital level 
of 1 million yen or more.
Sources: Nihon Ginko, various editions: Keizai tokei nenpo; Sorifu, various
editions: Rödöryoku chösa.
7aluminium, petrochemicals and chemicals.1'’ These industries were energy-intensive, but 
more significantly their major energy input was imported oil. The quadrupling of the 
price of crude oil in 1973 and the further doubling of the price in 1979 had a major impact 
on the price competitiveness of these industries.
The appreciation of the yen offset some of the impact of the oil price hikes on the 
cost structures of energy-intensive and oil-importing industries, such as petrochemicals 
and aluminium. But the yen appreciation reduced the international competitiveness of 
these and other import-competing industries and of export industries, such as 
shipbuilding. Following the move to a floating exchange rate regime in 1973, the yen 
appreciated from 360 yen against the US dollar to about 201 yen by 1979.16 This 
represented a major s tructural change in the international competitiveness of Japanese 
industry. Increasing competitive pressure from newly industrialising countries such as 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore in the heavy industrial sectors, as well as in the more 
traditional textiles and light goods areas, was another factor contributing to the loss of 
relative international competitiveness in these export and import-competing industries.1^
The early 1970s marked the end of the high-growth period for the Japanese 
economy (Table 1-3).18 In the high-growth period from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, 
real gross national product grew at an average annual rate of about 10 per cent.19 Many 
of the sectors which lost their international competitiveness in the 1970s, such as 
aluminium, chemicals, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, and steel had experienced rapid 
increases in demand for their output in the 1960s and early 1970s and were making large- 
scale investments in new capacity in anticipation of continued high growth in demand. 
Thus in many industries a major loss of international competitiveness was accompanied 
by a sudden slowdown in the rate of growth in demand for output and this was reflected 
in low operating rates and financial losses for the firms concerned.
The impact on shipbuilding, one of J a p an ’s major export industries during the high 
growth period, and aluminium smelting, a key basic-materials industry, was particularly 
severe. At the time of the first oil shock in 1973, Japan accounted for half of the world’s 
shipbuilding capacity. The international shipping recession which followed the oil shock 
resulted in a major drop in new orders in the Japanese shipbuilding industry and the 
cancellation of existing orders on a large s c a l e . N o t  only was the industry left with a 
large amount of excess capacity as a result, but the industry, which exported some 60 to 
80 per cent of its ou tput,  found itself increasingly unable to compete with the shipyards of 
newly industrialising nations such as South Korea and Taiwan, with their lower labour 
costs. J a p an ’s aluminium smelting industry relied on imported heavy oil for about 70 
per cent of its electricity inputs and the oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979 completely 
undermined its international competitiveness.
8At the firm level, the impact of structural change was reflected in an increase in the 
number of bankruptcies, particularly among small firms, and in a sharp deterioration in 
the financial performance of the major corporations. There were 10,862 bankruptcies in 
1973, but by 1977 the number had risen to 18,741 (Table 1-3). There were relatively few 
large-scale bankruptcies, but many of the leading firms in the economy experienced major 
financial setbacks, as they struggled to adjust their production, employment and financial 
systems to the low-growth era. In the 1975 financial year (FY), the 813 non-financial 
firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange registered a drop in 
operating profits of 54.5 per cent over the previous year, while profits of manufacturing 
firms fell by 66.7 per c e n t /  One in five listed firms registered operating losses and the 
following industrial sectors in aggregate recorded losses: mining, textiles, pulp and paper, 
petroleum and coal products, steel, non-ferrous metals, shipping, and air transport.
According to the Bank of J a p an ’s annual survey of more than 500 of the largest 
firms in Japan, the proportion of manufacturing firms registering losses increased from 5 
per cent in 1973 to 41 per cent in 1975. The proportion declined to below 10 per cent in 
1979 and 1980, but with the impact of the second oil crisis and the international recession 
in 1981 one in five large firms again recorded operating losses.2'^  In 1977, one in five of the 
1584 listed firms in Japan showed accumulated net losses in their balance sheets, and for 
a substantial number of firms the level of accumulated losses exceeded their capital 
level.2 *
T H E  ROLE OF G O V E R N M E N T  A S S IS T A N C E
The government has played an important part  in facilitating structural adjustment 
of manufacturing industry in Japan, by providing a public policy framework and financial 
assistance.
In 1978, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) introduced the 
Temporary Law for Stabilisation of Specified Depressed Industries (Tokutei fu ky ö  sangyö 
antei n n j i  sochiho) which provided a legislative framework for the management of large- 
scale adjustment in structurally depressed industries. The details of adjustment under this 
law are presented in Table 1-4. The law covered a period of five years and allowed firms 
in a designated industry to form a scrapping cartel for the reduction of capacity according 
to a ‘basic stabilisation plan’ (kihon antei ke ikaku ) approved by MITI or the relevant
o r
ministry. Fourteen industries were designated under the law and the scrapping of 
about 22 per cent of the total capacity of the industries was carried out within the 
framework of the law.
Three other pieces of legislation were put in place in 1978 with the aim of providing 
assistance over a five-year period to displaced workers in structurally depressed industries 
or regions and to small firms in depressed regions. These are summarised in Table 1-5.
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When the Depressed Industries Law expired in 1983, the economy still faced major 
adjustment problems. There was a need for further adjustment in capacity levels, as the 
second oil price hike had undermined the underlying premises of the program regarding 
the levels of capacity which would be sustainable in the international marketplace. Most 
of the designated industries were still in a s tate  of structural depression, with some, such 
as aluminium, in a worse plight than had been the case in 1978. In 1983 the Temporary 
Law for Structural Improvement of Specified Industries (Tokutei sangyö közö kaizen rin ji  
sochihö) was introduced in order to extend the government-sponsored adjustment 
program for another five years. The other laws were also renewed in a slightly 
restructured form. Thus by 1988 a significant portion of Ja p an ’s manufacturing industry 
will have undergone a decade of adjustment within a public policy framework.
The details of the 1983 program are given in Table 1-6. Eleven of the fourteen 
industries designated under the Depressed Industries Law continued their adjustment 
under the auspices of the new law. In addition, eleven industries were newly 
designated, bringing the total number covered by the law to twenty-two.
As well as providing a legislative and policy framework, the government 
implemented a number of financial assistance measures and the major assistance measures 
are summarised in Table 1-7. It is clear tha t  a considerable array of measures have been 
employed, although they are of three major types: low-interest finance, subsidies, and tax- 
relief measures. All involve a transfer of part of the financial burden of adjustment from 
the private sector to the public sector.
Three features of the government’s financial assistance are worthy of note. Firstly, 
it appears tha t  government assistance has been used to promote adjustment rather than 
to protect uncompetitive industries. Thus most of the assistance has been contingent on 
adjustment taking place. The centrepiece of the Depressed Industries Law, for instance, 
was the creation of a fund, the Specified Industries Credit Fund (Tokutei sangyö sh in 'yö  
k ik in ), to provide loan guarantees to facilitate the scrapping of capacity. The Japan 
Development Bank, a government financial institution, contributed 10 billion yen to the 
Fund and the private sector 2 billion yen. Government subsidies have been directed 
towards subsidies to displaced workers and subsidies for firms entering new business 
areas, rather than towards the protection of uncompetitive industries. The government 
policy response to structural depression in the manufacturing sector has been to facilitate 
adjustment in the industrial structure in line with the altered economic conditions rather
9 7than try to protect industry against the tide of international competitive pressure.
Secondly, while the level of government assistance is considerable, it does not 
appear to be particularly high, when judged in relation to the magnitude of the 
adjustment program involved. It is modest also in relation to the level of government
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assistance in the agricultural sector or compared with the level of subsidy which was
O  Q
given to the coal industry in Japan in an earlier structural adjustment p ro g ra m / It 
appears tha t ,  while playing an important role, the government has not assumed the 
major, or even a very large, share of the adjustment cost b u rd e n /  The record of the 
Depressed Industries Fund supports this view. The Fund was established with 12 billion 
yen (US$ 48 million) and was authorised to provide up to 100 billion yen (US$ 400 
million) in loan guarantees. But at the time of the expiry of the Depressed Industries Law 
in 1983 the cumulated level of guarantees was only 23.2 billion yen (US$ 93 million) and 
a t  least Five of the fourteen designated industries had received no guarantees from the 
Fund (Table 1-4).30 This Figure appears to be very modest when compared to the 
reported Figure for United States government loan guarantees outstanding to ailing Firms 
of $US 123 billion  in 1981.3*
A third feature of government assistance is that it has been directed more towards 
small and medium-sized Firms and displaced workers than to the large corporate sector. 
Thus for instance most of the government outlays have been made under the laws which 
were aimed at assisting small Firms and displaced workers in structurally depressed 
industries and regions (Table 1-7). ^
TH E  M A IN  ISSU E S
It is in the nature of structural change and adjustment tha t  particular industries, 
Firms and individuals incur short-term losses and costs, and invariably government 
policies towards adjustm ent problems have implications for how these losses are 
distributed. It is clear from the discussion above tha t  the issue of how the costs of 
adjustm ent are borne has been central to government initiatives towards coping with 
structural adjustment in Japan. This study approaches the issue of structural adjustment 
from a different angle, namely tha t  of the private sector. A major analytical interest is in 
the role of corporate organisation in helping to distribute the costs of structural 
adjustm ent in the economy.
A feature of J a p a n ’s recent adjustment is tha t  mechanisms and instruments have 
been devised which aim to redistribute the costs of adjustment from the parties directly 
concerned to the government or to other private sector parties. Some have been general 
policy instruments applying, or capable of being applied, to any designated depressed 
industry. These include the establishment of the SpeciFied Industries Credit Fund, the 
provision of government subsidies and low-interest Finance, and the use of special tax- 
relief measures, as described above.
Other mechanisms have been employed in speciFic sectors. In the case of 
shipbuilding, a scheme was devised whereby Firms remaining in the industry bore a
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portion of the adjustment costs of firms leaving the industry. The Specific Shipbuilding 
Industry Stabilisation Operation Association (Tokutei senpnku seizögyö antei jigyö  
kyöka i) was established to buy up excess capacity and land, using funds provided by the 
government, private financial institutions and the industry, and funds generated by
o o
appropriating a fraction of the value of new orders of firms remaining in the industry. 0 
In the aluminium smelting industry user firms helped to finance the scrapping of capacity
o i
by diverting part of the tariff on imports to a scrapping fund. 4 In the polyvinyl-chloride, 
compound fertilizer and paper industries, a system of adjustment funds has been used, 
with firms with more efficient plant subsidising the scrapping of the less efficient plant of
o r
other firms. In the polyolefine and polyvinyl-chloride pipe industries, joint sales 
companies have been established with the stated aim of reducing costs, but having a 
possible implicit cross-subsidisation effect by increasing seller concentration and raising 
price for consumer firms.0® In the electric-furnace steel industry, a government-industry
orr
credit insurance fund was set up to promote the scrapping of excess capacity.0 '
An im portan t question concerns how corporate organisation in the private sector 
affects the way in which the costs of structural adjustment are borne in Japan. A recent 
study by Nakatani of the performance of group-affiliated and non-affiliated firms in the
90
1971-80 period is relevant to this question.0 N akatan i’s study shows that while group 
firms tended to exhibit lower profit and growth rates than independent firms the 
variability across the samples and over time for both measures was significantly lower for 
group firms. At the same time, group firms were observed to pay higher interest rates to 
banks and higher wages to employees and to exhibit higher and more stable leverage 
ratios. Nakatani used these findings to interpret the financial corporate grouping as an 
“implicit mutual insurance scheme” for firms and their managements, which developed as 
an “ingenious solution to the problem of the non-existence of contingent markets for 
‘m anagement failure’” . Nakatani argues tha t  these risk-sharing mechanisms have 
facilitated recent s tructural adjustment in Japan:"*®
because of implicit mutual insurance mechanisms which are presumed to exist 
among group affiliated firms and banks, shocks to a particular firm or industry 
are not only borne by the firm itself, but are also absorbed by other sectors of 
the economy. Costs incurred by such shocks which strike a particular firm are 
borne in varying degrees by the other member firms and banks. ... The relatively 
high capacity of the Japanese economy for adjustment to changed market 
conditions may thus be closely related to the industrial organization in Japan as 
characterized by group formation.
Much of the thesis is about these risk-sharing and market-insulating mechanisms: the 
thesis a t tem p ts  to identify the mechanisms, to explain how they operate and to examine 
and evaluate their role in structural adjustment.
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An im portan t interest in the study centres on the relation of financial corporate 
grouping to the Japanese employment, management and industrial relations system. The 
Japanese employment system, characterised by such practices as ‘lifetime’ employment, 
seniority-based wages and enterprise unions, has received much attention in recent years, 
particularly in the context of a ttem pts to ‘explain’ Ja p an ’s economic success. A common 
claim is th a t  the employment system has facilitated structural adjustment and the 
accomodation of external economic shocks such as the oil price rises in Japan. Abegglen, 
for instance, argues tha t  the Japanese employment system facilitates labour mobility 
during times of structural change, particularly within the company, and tha t  it reduces 
worker resistance to technological innovation.4* In a similar vein, Shimada suggests 
th a t :42
Japanese enterprise organizations and industrial relations appear to assure 
flexible organizational adaptability to changes in external conditions and 
efficient allocation of resources while at the same time maintaining high morale 
and comm itm ent on the part of workers.
It is im portant, however, to ask how the labour market aspects of corporate organisation 
-- the employment, managerial and industrial relations system -- relate to corporate 
organisation in the capital market, as characterised by the main-bank system, general 
trading companies and interlocking shareholdings. A major theme of this study is that 
corporate organisation in the capital market in Japan is closely related to corporate 
organisation in the managerial and labour markets. It is generally held that how 
structural adjustm ent occurs in an economy is influenced by the nature of the various 
markets and other institutions which exist for allocating resources and distributing risks; 
this suggests an im portant interest in examining the implications of corporate 
organisation in the capital and labour market in Japan  for structural adjustment in the 
economy.
O U T L IN E  OF T H E  T H E SIS
Chapter 2 analyses the financial corporate grouping as a kind of internal capital 
market, which allows firms to pool their risks and obtain insulation from external capital 
market forces, particularly the competitive market for corporate control. The internal 
capital market is identified as being closely related to the operation of the internal 
managerial and labour markets which operate through the ‘lifetime’ employment system 
in large firms in Japan: corporate risk-sharing provides an indirect means of pooling the 
human-capital risks of permanent employees, while the internal capital market supplants 
the external control mechanisms of the capital market, such as takeover and corporate­
raiding, with internal monitoring and intervention mechanisms of a kind conducive to the
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operation of a ‘lifetime’ managerial-employment system. The operation of this corporate 
system is identified as an important aspect of the process of structural adjustment, 
involving the transmission of changes in competitiveness through the capital, managerial 
and labour markets, and the bearing of the costs of adjustment in the economy.
Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the role of the main-bank system. Chapter 3 identifies the 
main bank as a major risk-sharing agent and important instrument of corporate 
screening, monitoring and intervention in the internal capital market. Case studies of 
main-bank assistance and intervention in Chapter 4 illustrate and provide evidence on the 
im portant role of the main bank in managing the rationalisation of ailing or financially- 
distressed firms. An important finding is tha t  the main bank appears to produce many of 
the results commonly attributed to the takeover market — the reorganisation of corporate 
assets to improve efficiency and the displacement of ineffective management — but via a 
very different set of mechanisms.
Chapter 5 examines the economic function of, and presents empirical evidence on, 
another im portant aspect of corporate organisation, the general trading company. The 
general trading company is shown to be an im portant risk-diversifying agent, particularly 
in providing a mechanism for the implicit insurance of default risk associated with the 
extensive use of interfirm trade credit in Japan. The role of the general trading company 
in helping to cushion the impact of structural adjustment on depressed firms and 
industries is illustrated using corporate accounting data  and case study examples.
Chapter 6 examines the phenomenon of interlocking shareholdings among related 
banks and firms. The interlocking shareholding is identified as an institutional mechanism 
which allows firms to pool their risks and insulate one another from the threat of external 
takeover. An im portant finding is tha t  the disposal of shareholdings in a negotiated 
intercorporate context has been a major mechanism enabling firms to offset losses during 
the course of structural adjustment.
The next three chapters present a case study of adjustment in the aluminium 
smelting industry, one of the sectors to experience a major loss of international 
competitiveness in the 1970s. The aluminium industry has scrapped some 80 per cent of 
its smelting capacity since 1978 and Chapter 7 examines the role of government policy 
and assistance in this large-scale program of adjustment. Government assistance is found 
to have been relatively modest in magnitude, to have been directed towards facilitating 
adjustm ent in the direction of competitive pressures, and to have had the explicit aim of 
helping to spread the costs of adjustment.
Corporate organisation in the aluminium industry centres on close links between the 
smelting companies and their affiliated corporate groupings. Chapter 8 focuses on the role 
of this corporate organisation and show's tha t  internal adjustment and assistance
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mechanisms have played a major part in the industry’s adjustment. Chapter 9 takes a 
closer look a t the role of corporate organisation through a case study of aluminium 
adjustment in the Sumitomo group. The case study adds weight to the conclusion that 
corporate organisation, operating through internal adjustment and assistance 
mechanisms, has been more important in quantita tive  terms than external government 
assistance in absorbing the costs of structural adjustment in the industry.
A final chapter summarises the major conclusions of the thesis, discusses some of 
the implications of the results and suggests some directions for further research.
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C o rp o ra te  organ isa tion  and  in tern a l ca p ita l m ark ets
A financial corporate grouping can be viewed as an internal capital market which is 
formed by ‘m ain-bank’ financing, interlocking ‘stable’ shareholdings and general trading 
company operations. Internal capital markets in Japan  have two major functions: they 
enable firms, as opposed to individual investors, to diversify their risks and they provide 
insulation for the management of firms from external capital market forces, particularly 
from the ‘market for corporate control’.
The functions of the internal capital market are closely related to the Japanese 
employment system in large firms. The ‘lifetime’ employment system can be analysed in 
terms of the large firm in Japan operating an internal managerial and labour market.* 
The internal capital market operates ‘back to back' with the internal labour market in 
providing conditions in the capital market — risk diversification and insulation from the 
market for corporate control — which help to sustain the viability of the Japanese 
managerial, employment and industrial relations system.
An examination of the economics of financial corporate grouping can make an 
im portan t contribution to an understanding of the role of the private sector in Ja p an ’s 
structural adjustment. There is considerable reason to believe that this kind of corporate 
organisation forms an important component of the institutional framework through which 
the allocation of resources and the reduction and shifting of risk takes place in the 
Japanese economy. This suggests tha t  the way in which the institutional mechanisms of 
financial corporate grouping operate may have an im portant bearing on how adjustment 
of the economic structure takes place and how the costs of adjustment are borne.
C O R P O R A T E  O R G A N IS A T IO N  A N D  S T R U C T U R A L  A D J U S T M E N T
The analytical interest in the role of corporate organisation in the process of 
s tructural adjustm ent centres on the fact tha t  corporate organisation is an important 
aspect of resource allocation. The term ‘corporate organisation’ is a shorthand way of 
referring to the institutional mechanisms and arrangements which characterise the 
economic organisation of firms. The internal organisation of firms has become highly 
extensive and complex in modern capitalist economies. The internal organisation of a
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large multidivisional or conglomerate business organisation in Europe or the United 
States, for instance, may include such component parts as a general staff headquarters, 
one or more holding companies, variously constituted operating divisions, and a large 
number of subsidiary, affiliated or associated companies. In large business organisations, 
capital, managerial, labour, and intermediate product and service markets are internalised
o
to varying degrees. Complex patterns of interfirm organisation are also observed 
involving such phenomena as joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements, long­
term contracts, subcontracting, franchising, interlocking directorates and interlocking 
shareholdings.^ An important body of literature has developed focusing on the economics 
of the internal organisation of the firm.*’ Interest in the corporate organisation of financial 
corporate groupings in Japan is set in the context of this literature.
The major feature of the literature on economic organisation is tha t  the firm is 
viewed, not just  as an agent of production as in the traditional approach, but as a 
mechanism for allocating resources. Rather than conceptualising firms and markets as 
distinct types of institution, they can be viewed as representing alternative resource 
allocation mechanisms .6 It follows that the nature of corporate organisation in an 
economy may be an im portant aspect of resource allocation and important in the re­
allocation of resources which occurs during a period of structural adjustment.
In serving as an institutional device for allocating resources, the firm also plays an
im portan t role in shifting risk in the economy, suggesting tha t  corporate organisation
may be im portan t in determining how the costs of structural adjustment are borne. The
role of corporate organisation in risk-bearing, as well as in resource allocation, is
highlighted by the ‘nexus of contracts’ approach to the firm. In this approach, the firm is
viewed as an institutional device which serves as the nexus for a set of, mainly implicit,
Tcontractual relations between factors of production and consumers of the firm’s output.
o
As Jensen and Meckling put it,
the private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which 
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized 
by the existence o f  divisible residual c la im s on the assets and cash flows o f  
the organization which can generally be sold without the permission o f  other 
contracting individuals. ... Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to 
distinguish those things which are “inside” the firm (or any other organization) 
from those things which are “outside” of it. There is in a very real sense only a 
m ultitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the 
firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of 
output.
This “m ultitude of complex relationships” , reflected in the form that corporate 
organisation takes on in an economy, is thus a significant element governing how 
resources are allocated and how the risk, which in an uncertain world necessarily attaches
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to th a t  resource allocation, is distributed. In the conventional formulation, the 
shareholders are the owners of the firm and the residual risk-bearers. As Fama asserts, 
however ,0
ownership of capital should not be confused with ownership of the firm. Each 
factor in a firm is owned by somebody. The firm is just the set of contracts 
covering the way inputs are joined to create outputs and the way receipts from 
outpu ts  are shared among inputs. In this “nexus of contracts” perspective, 
ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept. Dispelling the tenacious notion 
th a t  a firm is owned by its security holders is important because it is a first step 
toward understanding tha t  control over a firm’s decisions is not necessarily the 
province of security holders.
As the quotation from Fam a implies, by varying the nature of the contracts which 
go to make up the firm, risk can be shifted between the various participants in the firm. 
In the neoclassical theory of the firm, labour, as with other factors of production, is paid 
its marginal product. Although the shareholders are said to be the residual risk-bearers in 
any single period, in the neoclassical theory workers bear the full risk of fluctuation in 
their marginal product over time. Recent developments in implicit contract theory, 
however, have focused on the employment risk of workers and on the importance of the 
implicit long-term labour contract in shifting risk from workers to the firm. The difference 
in corporate organisation between the neoclassical firm and the implicit contract firm 
rests on a difference in contractual arrangement regarding how labour is supplied — one- 
period spot-market contracts versus long-term contracts — and reflects a different kind of 
distribution of risk between the participants in the firm.
The conceptualisation of risk in the organisation of the nexus of contracts in the 
firm is relevant to the structural adjustment issue. Structural change imposes large-scale 
losses and costs on the economy and these losses and costs are typically concentrated on 
particular industries, regions, firms and individuals. The losses and costs which occur 
during structural change and adjustment include losses suffered by economic agents on 
past investments in physical and human capital which depreciates in value as a result of 
the change in economic circumstances; costs incurred in the process of adjustment of 
resource allocation; and other social costs. In a depressed or declining industry, physical 
capital equipment may have to be scrapped, the accumulated skills and knowledge of 
workers may become redundant, and displaced workers may experience unemployment. 
For expositional simplicity, all of these kinds of losses and costs will be subsumed under 
the term ‘costs of s tructural ad justm ent’.
It is clearly the question of how the costs of adjustment are borne which lies at the 
heart of the structural adjustment issue and which underpins public policy approaches to 
the structural adjustment ‘problem’. As Australia’s Industries Assistance Commission 
notes , 10
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economic growth improves personal living standards by expanding the 
productive base of the economy. In spite of such general gains, however, there 
are usually some groups in the community who find their well-being affected 
adversely, either absolutely or relatively, by changes in the economic structure.
In seeking to preserve their position these groups advocate resistance to change, 
and it is this conflict of interests between the potential losers and the potential 
gainers which makes structural change a contentious issue.
Thus government assistance and protection for depressed firms and industries is typically 
justified on the basis of an a ttem pt to counter-balance the distributional effects of 
s tructural change and spread the costs of adjustment more evenly in the economy. In this 
regard, Corden observes tha t  the protectionist policies adopted by governments around 
the world appear to reflect an underlying “conservative social welfare function” , the aim 
of which is to prevent “any significant absolute reductions in real incomes of any 
significant section of the community” .** This means tha t  in times of large-scale 
structural change “a government will generally intervene to prevent sudden or large and 
unexpected income losses” , suggesting to Corden tha t  “the conservative social welfare 
function is part of a social insurance system”.VL A more explicitly political economy 
interpretation might be tha t  economic agents, faced with the prospect of having to bear 
costs as a result of structural adjustment, a ttem pt to avoid these costs or shift them onto 
other agents and th a t  government intervention reflects the outcome of this form of ‘rent-
I  o
seeking’ in reverse . 1 0  Whichever interpretation is adopted, it is clearly the issue of how 
the costs of adjustm ent are borne which drives the political economy of structural 
adjustment.
It is possible to view the costs of structural adjustment as ex post manifestations of 
what, ex ante, represented risks to the economic agents concerned. This conceptualisation 
suggests tha t  the nature  of risk-bearing in an economy is important in determining how 
the costs of adjustment are borne. As the nexus of contracts approach shows, corporate 
organisation plays an important role in risk-bearing, which suggests tha t  corporate 
organisation may be im portan t in influencing how the costs of adjustment in the economy 
are borne. Whereas to date  analysis and discussion of structural adjustment in Japan has 
dealt almost exclusively with the role of external government policy and assistance 
(Corden’s ‘social insurance system’), the focus in this study is on one aspect of the 
internal private sector mechanisms for bearing the costs of structural adjustment (the 
‘private insurance system ’).
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F IN A N C IA L  C O R P O R A T E  G R O U P IN G  AND IN T E R N A L  C A PIT A L  M A R K E T S
It is possible to analyse the phenomenon of financial corporate grouping in Japan  in 
terms of the operation of an internalised capital market.*'* If the external or competitive 
capital market of finance theory is taken as the theoretical benchmark, an internal capital 
m arket can be defined as one in which capital market functions, such as the allocation of 
capital, the allocation of risk, the screening, monitoring and sanctioning of management, 
and the reorganisation of assets, are carried out within a single business organisation or 
within an economic organisation formed by a number of related firms.15 In Japan, the 
internal capital market centres on a major bank and other related financial institutions, 
one or more large general trading companies, and a large number of manufacturing firms, 
all of which are connected through a complex arrangement of bank and trading company 
financing, interlocking corporate shareholdings, interlocking directorates and other 
managerial ties, and supplier-purchaser relations.
The internal capital market in Japan performs two important functions. It allows 
firms, as opposed to individual investors, to diversify their risks, and it affords the 
m anagement of firms insulation from the external capital market, particularly from the 
market for corporate control.
The rationale for corporate risk diversification and capital market insulation 
through financial corporate grouping relates to the structure of capital and labour 
m arkets in postwar Japan. From the capital market side, the financial corporate 
grouping can be viewed as an institutional response to the need for risk diversification and 
capital market screening, monitoring and management-sanctioning in the absence of a 
well-developed capital market, particularly stock and bond markets, in postwar Japan.
In order to be able to allocate scarce capital resources effectively, a capital market 
needs to be able to evaluate investment proposals and monitor corporate activities and, 
when necessary, to be able to sanction management and effect changes in the 
management of corporate assets. In short, a capital market needs screening, monitoring 
and management-sanctioning mechanisms. In economics, it is common to assume, or even 
assert, th a t  the capital market is competitive and well-functioning, and tha t  these 
functions are performed costlessly through the price mechanism and as agents pursue 
arbitrage opportunities in the corporate takeover market. Similarly, in finance theory, 
risk diversification by firms is held to be unnecessary, from the viewpoint of individual 
investors, if capital markets are well-developed, because investors are able to diversify 
risks on their own account by holding diversified portfolios of securities. Fama and Miller, 
for instance, s tate  t h a t . '
optimal investment decisions imply no incentive for the firm to diversify. ...
In a perfect market consumers can combine the shares of different firms and
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obtain efficient portfolios with no transactions costs, so tha t  in itself 
diversification on the part of an individual firm is of no particular value to them.
However, when capital markets are highly regulated, segmented and under-developed, as 
has been the case in postwar Japan until recently, particular devices may evolve for 
carrying out screening, monitoring and sanctioning and for diversifying risk. More 
generally, it is to be expected tha t  capital markets will develop various mechanisms for 
shifting and allocating risks and monitoring corporate activities according to their state of 
development and their institutional setting. In this sense, financial corporate groupings 
can be viewed as incorporating a set of mechanisms which facilitated risk diversification 
and monitoring in the under-developed capital market of postwar Japan; and the high 
level of investment-based growth which took place around these banking and corporate 
structures provides indirect support for this interpreta tion . 1 0
From the labour market side, the financial corporate grouping can be viewed as 
providing a set of conditions or mechanisms in the capital market conducive to firms 
implementing permanent or ‘lifetime’ employment systems. The management, 
employment and industrial relations system in large firms has been the focus of much 
atten tion  in both academic and popular discussion of Ja p an ’s economic insti tu tions .^  
There has been very little consideration, however, of how capital market institutions in 
Japan  relate to labour market institutions. It is as if the Japanese employment system 
existed in isolation from the other features of corporate organisation. On the other hand, 
it is well known that Japanese firms relied largely on bank borrowings and became highly
o n
levered in the course of their rapid postwar g ro w th /  In the Western business world, 
other things being equal, high financial leverage normally implies financial and 
managerial insecurity, a fact which appears to be at odds with the internal security 
implicit in most descriptions of the employment system in Japan. For instance, for 
managers and employees to have permanent or lifetime employment it is necessary that 
the firm does not fail or go bankrupt or, particularly in the case of senior managers, that 
it does not become the victim of an unfriendly corporate takeover, with resultant 
disruption to managerial tenure within the firm. With only a small amount of share 
capital and heavy dependence on bank borrowings, however, it might be expected a priori 
th a t  the large firm in Japan would be susceptible to bankruptcy or corporate takeover. As 
is argued below, the financial corporate grouping provides conditions in the capital 
market which allow the firm to obtain a measure of insurance against corporate failure or 
bankruptcy and which mitigate against the operation of an active takeover market.
As mentioned earlier, recent literature has emphasised the importance of the firm as 
a nexus of contracts and as a institution connecting the capital market on the one hand 
and managerial and labour markets on the o th e r .^  There are two strands to this
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literature, one in labour economics and the other in finance theory. The implicit contract 
theory in labour economics highlights the firm as a vehicle which, via the devices of the 
implicit long-term labour contract and Financial securities, connects the labour and 
capital m arket and facilitates the shifting of risk between the two .22 The literature on the 
market for corporate control and on optimal managerial contracts brings out the 
importance of institutions in the capital market which provide incentives for managers 
and which monitor and sanction managerial performance and which allow the capital 
market to intervene in the management of corporate assets .23 Although the capital 
market aspects and the managerial and labour market aspects of corporate organisation 
in Japan  have been treated separately in the literature, they can be analysed in this more 
general economic framework.
The key analytical notion is tha t  the internal capital market in Japan both 
facilitates and reflects the operation of internal managerial and labour markets. On the 
one hand, the insulation from external capital market forces provided by the financial 
corporate grouping provides the management of large Japanese firms with the autonomy 
and security of tenure necessary in order to operate a lifetime managerial-employment 
system. In effect, the grouping represents a kind of implicit managerial cartel which 
internalises the market for corporate control. Mechanisms exist for the monitoring and 
sanctioning of management and for the reorganisation of corporate assets, but they 
operate in such a wray as to minimise opportunism in the capital market and to prevent 
disruption to the internal stability on which the Japanese managerial system is based.2“*
On the other hand, the risk diversification which the internal capital market 
facilitates is important in allowing firms to sustain an employment and industrial 
relations system based on ex ante guarantees of long-term employment security for 
managers and a section of the blue-collar workforce.23 The most striking feature of the 
employment system in large firms in Japan is the ex ante  guarantee by the firm, and 
expectation on the part of the employee, of a ‘lifetime’ or long-term association between 
the firm and the employee. This is reflected in the lifetime employment practice of hiring 
upon graduation with an implicit guarantee of continuity of employment until the 
m andatory retirement age, in the seniority-based wage system wrhereby wages follow an 
S-curve with age rather than being tied to individual performance, and in the system of 
enterprise unionism whereby each firm has its own union which covers all of the non­
executive permanent or regular workforce.2^
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C A P IT A L  M A R K E T  IN S U L A T IO N
A major feature of the internal capital market formed by financial groupings of 
firms is th a t  it provides insulation from the market for corporate control. In effect, the 
grouping represents an implicit managerial cartel which serves to internalise the market 
for corporate control in the grouping. Internalisation of the market for corporate control 
implies a different set of mechanisms from those in other economies for monitoring and 
disciplining managers and for bringing about the reorganisation of corporate assets. An 
im portant interest in this study is in analysing how these capital and managerial market 
mechanisms function in Japan during a period of large-scale structural adjustment.
A fundamental assumption in economics is tha t  the firm maximises its profits or its 
market value. Even when there is a separation of ownership from control, it is held tha t  
the takeover market or the ‘market for corporate control’ will constrain managers to 
operate the firm in the interests of its owners/ 0 Jensen and Ruback define the market for 
corporate control as “a market in which alternative managerial teams compete for the 
rights to manage corporate resources” . Implicit in this definition is the notion tha t  in a 
competitive capital market there can be no such thing as ‘perm anent’ managerial tenure: 
the operation of an active market for corporate control implies tha t  individual managers 
or entire managerial teams can be displaced from the firm at any time. In this view, 
managers who deviate from profit maximisation as their goal face displacement from the 
firm as a result of corporate takeover as other agents in the capital market seek to obtain 
the potential arbitrage gains.
The managements of large firms in Japan have largely succeeded in blocking the 
formation of an active market for corporate control by ‘stabilising’ sizeable portions of 
the stock of their firms in friendly corporate hands and by maintaining close ‘main-bank’ 
relations with a particular bank. The insulation from external capital market forces which 
these activities facilitate appears to be important in sustaining the viability of internal 
management systems. At an analytical level, the ‘perm anent’ employment tenure which 
the lifetime employment system for managers in Japan  implies appears to be inconsistent 
with the notion of a competitive market for corporate control.
The existence of an active market for corporate control seems to imply th a t  an 
active external managerial market will also exist. However, the existence of internal 
managerial markets such as exist in Japan requires th a t  the market for corporate control 
will also be internalised in some way. One of the implications of there being an active 
takeover market is that significant displacement of executives at various stages of their 
career can be expected to occur as the management of target firms is rationalised and as 
corporate units undergo reorganisation. In economies where active external managerial 
markets exist and the professional orientation of executives is strong and backed up by
31
appropriate  accreditation mechanisms, such as in the United States, this managerial 
displacement can be accomodated in the external managerial market. This is not the 
case, however, in Japan. In Japan it is generally the case tha t  firms hire managers upon 
graduation, provide substantial in-house training and promote internally. Active or 
external secondary markets in well-defined managerial professions such as ‘accountant’, 
‘lawyer’, ‘comptroller’ and ‘engineer’ effectively have not existed in Japan to date. The 
possibility of displacement from the firm in mid-career because of the operation of an 
active m arket for corporate control would mitigate against the viability of this type of 
managerial system.
It is possible, however, for managers to obtain a measure of autonomy and security
O A
from the takeover market by using various ‘management insulation devices’. u The 
internal capital market in Japan incorporates a number of such devices which, together 
with regulatory support from the relevant government agencies, has virtually blocked the 
formation of an external market for corporate control to date. The formation of a 
financial corporate grouping can be seen then as one way in which permanent managers 
and management teams obtain insulation from the control mechanisms of the external 
capital market. Just as, a t  an analytical level, the existence of an active external capital 
market seems to imply an active external managerial market, so it appears from the 
Japanese experience tha t  an internal managerial market can function effectively only 
when set back-to-back with some kind of internal capital market.
C O R P O R A T E  R ISK -SH A R IN G
The financial corporate grouping has a number of mechanisms which allow firms to 
pool and diversify their r i s k s . T h e s e  mechanisms include the main-bank system, general 
trading company intermediation and interlocking shareholdings. The focus in this 
discussion is on the economic rationale for corporate risk diversification in Japan, while 
an analysis of the mechanisms and of their role in recent structural adjustment is left to 
later chapters.
The Japanese employment system can be analysed in terms of implicit long-term 
labour contract theory.°2 In this theory, the long-term labour contract serves as a device 
by which employees shift some of their employment risk to the firm. Workers supply 
labour services to the firm, and jointly invest in human capital with the firm, under an 
implicit long-term contract with a wage schedule which fluctuates less than the worker’s 
value of marginal product. As Azariadis puts i t :*53
at least part of the risk an uncertain income stream creates for its recipient 
can be shifted to third parties by employee intermediation, tha t  is, by the tacit 
or open commitment of the firm to guarantee its personnel tha t  their wage rates,
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hours worked, employment status, or a combination of all such factors, will be in 
some degree independent of the vicissitudes of the business cycle. The risk is 
thereby transferred from wages to profits and, via the capital market, to the 
income streams of the firm’s owners and creditors.
T hat is, “labour services are traded for an insurance contract tha t  protects workers from 
random, publicly observed fluctuations in their marginal revenue product” and, because 
of moral hazard and the costs of monitoring and enforcement, which block the formation 
of external labour insurance markets, “workers can purchase insurance only from their
O A
employers, not from third parties” . This and other recent literature highlights the 
nature of the firm as an institution which connects the labour market (including the 
managerial labour market) and the capital market, and which facilitates the shifting of
o r
risks between them. 0
The operation of the internal capital market in Japan, formed by groupings of firms, 
in facilitating the internal managerial and labour market can be viewed in this more 
general analytical framework. In this framework, the grouping can be viewed as an 
institutional response to the need for firms to have some means of offsetting the risk-costs 
associated with operating an employment system based on permanent employment 
guarantees and a high level of intra-firm investment in human capital. For employees of 
Japanese firms who are covered by permanent employment practices, the implicit labour 
contract represents the device by which they not only supply labour services to the firm 
but also jointly invest in their human capital with the firm and diversify their human- 
capital risks.
The capacity of the firm to insure employees against their human-capital risks, 
however, is constrained by the capacity of the firm to diversify its own risks. In this 
regard, it is important to remember th a t  the large firm in Japan is typically highly 
specialised in a particular industry and set of products or services, implying a high 
correlation of managerial and worker risks within the firm.*^ For instance, Goto’s study 
of the largest 124 manufacturing firms in Japan showed that on average 73 per cent of a 
firm’s sales came from a single two-digit commodity and that diversification was limited 
to a narrow range of related areas.’*'
In Japan, an im portan t way in which firms diversify their risks, and hence enhance 
their capacity to guarantee their workers long-term employment security, is by pooling 
their risks with other firms and banks in an internal capital market. In this way, firms 
obtain part of the co-insurance effect of finance theory without actually merging into a
00
conglomerate business organisation. 0 Thus, a two-tier implicit insurance system exists, 
with firms absorbing employment risks a t one level and then offsetting these risks in a 
diversified grouping of firms at another. The internal capital market then can be
33
regarded as a mechanism which, in the absence of external markets for diversifying
OQ
human-capital risks, allows employees to diversify these risks indirectly."
A major feature of the Japanese employment system in large firms is the high level 
of firm-specific investment in human capital which o ccu rs .^  The high level of firm- 
specific human capital is a result of such institutional practices as the hiring of employees 
upon graduation and provision of in-firm training, the enterprise as opposed to craft- 
based union system and the practice of encouraging job rotation and skill accumulation 
within the firm, the company as opposed to professional orientation of managers and 
technical personnel, and in the decision-making system and organisational sociology of 
Japanese firms (for instance, the importance of interpersonal relations, participatory or 
‘bo ttom -up’ decision-making as opposed to individual responsibility, and the fostering of a 
distinctive corporate culture, all of which imply the existence of a highly firm-specific 
communication code).'** The high level of firm-specific skill and knowledge of managers 
and workers, other things being equal, tends to make insiders more efficient than 
outsiders in functioning in the firm, resulting in what Aoki terms “organisational rent” 
accruing within the firm.*^
This high level of firm-specific investment in, and accumulation of, human capital 
may be an important factor in understanding why firms engage in risk sharing through 
the main-bank system, interlocking shareholdings, affiliation with general trading 
companies and other instruments of the financial corporate grouping. In an uncertain 
world, investment in firm-specific human capital, while perhaps increasing output or 
generating significant organisational rent, has risk associated with it. The organisational 
rent is dissipated, for instance, if unexpected events force the firm into bankruptcy. We 
would expect, a priori, th a t  firms setting up employment systems in which the 
accumulation of firm-specific skills and knowledge was to be important would devote 
resources to the reduction of risk, particularly the risk of unexpected bankruptcy. The 
internal capital market can be viewed as providing a mechanism for part of the 
organisational rent to be used as insurance against the realisation of adverse 
contingencies.-*0
S U M M A R Y
The analysis has sought to explain the phenomenon of financial corporate grouping 
among large firms and banks in Japan in terms of corporate organisation in the capital 
m arket. The financial corporate grouping can be viewed as a internal capital market, 
formed by ‘main-bank’-corporate borrower ties, extensive interlocking ‘stab le’ 
shareholdings and the operation of general trading companies. The internal capital 
market is viewed as having two major functions: the pooling of firm risks and the
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insulation of the firm’s management from the market for corporate control. It is argued 
th a t  these functions represent important capital market analogues to the internal 
managerial and labour markets operating within firms through the Japanese 
management, employment and industrial relations system.
The role of corporate organisation in structural adjustment can be analysed in 
terms of the resource allocation and risk-bearing functions of corporate organisation. How 
the internal capital market operates, and how it relates to the operation of internal 
managerial and labour markets, is an important aspect of the structural adjustment 
process, as structural adjustment by definition involves the re-allocation of capital, 
managerial and labour resources. Attention now switches to an analysis of the major 
institutional features of the financial corporate grouping: the main-bank system, general 
trading companies and interlocking shareholdings. The focus is on clarifying their role in 
the internal capital market and, drawing on case-study and other evidence, on examining 
their role in re-allocating resources and absorbing the costs of adjustment during recent 
structural adjustment in Japan.
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T he m ain -b an k  sy stem
The main-bank system is an important dimension of the corporate organisation of 
internal capital markets in Japan. The term ‘main-bank system’ refers to the system of 
close relations between a particular bank and corporate borrower; most large firms in 
Japan have a close association with a particular city or long-term credit bank and this 
bank is known in the parlance of Japanese business as the ‘main bank’ of the firm.* The 
purpose of this and the next chapter is to examine the economics of the main-bank system 
in Japan and, through a number of case studies, to illustrate the role of the main bank as 
a mechanism in the private sector which has been important in mediating the process of 
structural adjustm ent in Japan. Understanding the economic rationale for the main-bank 
system is an im portant part  of the analysis of the role of main banks in the structural 
adjustment process. It is also an important task in its own right as little analysis of the 
main-bank system has occurred to date.'* In the previous chapter, it was argued tha t  the 
financial corporate grouping can be viewed as an internal capital market, in which firms 
pool their risk and obtain mutual insulation from the market for corporate control. It is 
argued tha t  the main bank performs two interrelated functions in the internal capital 
market: the main bank is an instrument of corporate screening, monitoring and 
intervention on the one hand and an agent of corporate risk-insurance on the other.
M A IN  B A N K S AND IN T E R N A L  C A PIT A L  M A R K E T S
It is a feature of corporate organisation in Japan tha t  most listed firms have a 
‘main-bank’ relationship with a particular bank. This main-bank system can be analysed 
as one aspect of the internal capital market formed by financing, shareholding and 
trading relations among major banks and related manufacturing and commercial firms. 
According to published listings of group affiliation based largely on main-bank 
associations, 87 per cent of the firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE) in 1982 belonged to a main-bank grouping and almost two-thirds were 
affiliated with one of the six major bank groupings (Table 1-1, p.3).
The main bank is distinguished by the fact tha t  it maintains the largest single share 
among private financial institutions of the borrowings of the firm concerned. In the case
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of the six major groupings, the main bank, which is the respective city bank, has an 
average loan share of about 20 per cent, taken together with the group trust bank and 
insurance companies (Table 1-2, p.4). The main bank is also usually a major shareholder 
in the firm. The main bank for first-section TSE firms with bank borrowings in 1980 was 
the number one or number two shareholder in 39 per cent of cases and among the top five 
shareholders in 72 per cent of cases (Table 3-1). The significance of the main bank, 
however, lies not so much in its nominal loan share and shareholding as in the important 
role it appears to play as a risk-sharing agent and as an instrument of corporate 
screening, monitoring and intervention in the internal capital market.
C orp orate  r isk -in su ran ce
The main-bank system can be viewed, within the general framework developed in 
Chapter 2, as an im portant mechanism by which firms, operating managerial, 
employment and industrial relations systems based on ex ante  guarantees of ‘lifetime’ 
employment, pool their risks; the main bank provides one important channel by which 
risk is shifted from the internal labour market to the internal capital market.
The role of the main bank can be modelled in terms of the bank ‘selling’ insurance 
to the firm via the terms of the bank loan contract, in a way analogous to the firm 
‘selling’ insurance to its employees via the terms of an implicit labour contract.^ As was 
argued in the previous chapter, this risk-sharing in the capital market can be viewed as 
facilitating risk-sharing in the internal managerial and labour market; the main bank 
indirectly insures the workforce of the firm against their employment risks. In the 
literature, the notion of banks selling insurance to firms via the loan contract has been 
presented as an analogy or similar type of economic arrangement to that of the firm 
selling insurance to workers via the labour contract, but to the au thor’s knowledge the 
two institutional mechanisms have not been viewed as being interrelated aspects of a 
single implicit insurance system.'* The phenomena of the main-bank system (and more 
generally financial corporate grouping) and the lifetime employment system in Japan can 
be viewed as an example of implicit insurance in the capital market operating alongside 
and facilitating impicit insurance in the labour market.
The capacity of the bank to perform a corporate risk-insuring role stems from the 
fact tha t  it holds a diversified portfolio of group securities, in the form of bank loans and 
shareholdings. The main-bank relation can be modelled as one of the firm paying an 
insurance premium to the bank in normal times in the expectation of receiving assistance 
in times of corporate dow nturn .5 In a conventional capital market, the shareholders are 
the residual risk-bearers, but in the internal capital markets which have characterised 
Ja p a n ’s indirect financing system the main bank’s corporate-insuring role gives it the 
character of what could be termed a quasi-residual risk-bearer.
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Table 3.1: Analysis of listed Japanese firms according to rank
of main bank as shareholder in 1980 and as source 
of borrowings in 1971
Breakdown of listed firms
Rank of main bank as> Rank of main bank as
shareholder, 1980 source of borrowings, 1971
Rank
No. of 
firms
Relative 
frequency(%)
No. of 
firms
Relative 
frequency(%)
1 124 16.4 489 67.3
2 172 22.7 125 17.2
3 113 14.9 47 6.5
4 84 11.1 17 2.3
5 52 6.9 14 1.9
6 34 4.5 7 1.0
7 20 2.6 10 1 .4
8 13 1.7 7 1.0
9 15 2.0 2 0.3
10 or 
more
131a 17.3 9 1.2
Total 758b 100.0 727c 100.0
Notes: a Includes 86 not among top twenty shareholders.
b Forty-four of the 809 firms examined had no borrowings 
in 1981, and for seven relevant information was not 
obtainable.
c Sixty-nine of the 809 firms examined had no borrowings 
in either or both 1980 and 1971, and for another 
thirteen information was not obtainable.
Sources: Compiled from Keizai chösa kyökai, 1973: Keiretsu no
kenkyü: daiichibu jöjö kigyöhen; Kigyö keiretsu söran,
1981: Kigyö keiretsu soran.
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Viewing the main bank as an institutional mechanism through which the capital 
market is able to insure firms against adverse contingencies is a more analytical way of 
characterising what it is that bankers and businessmen in Japan say the main bank does, 
and what case-study evidence suggests tha t  it does. In the conventional business wisdom 
in Japan , the main bank assumes implicit responsibility for the welfare and survival of the 
firm, particularly by standing ready to render financial and managerial assistance in times 
of corporate crisis, whether because of structural problems or managerial failure. This 
essential feature of the main bank is captured in the familiar business dictum in Japan 
th a t  “the main bank will look after the firm when anything goes wrong” .^ Bank 
executives often publicly affirm their corporate-insuring role as main banks in the 
Japanese financial system. The former president of Sumitomo Bank, Isoda Ichiro, for 
instance, is quoted as saying tha t  “we are always prepared to help out whenever group 
member companies are in trouble. We won’t allow any group member companies to go
n
into business failure” .
The corporate-insuring role of the main bank is manifest in a number of ways. It is 
common for banks to give interest reductions or exemptions and other forms of financial 
assistance to crisis-stricken firms, and the main bank typically shoulders a greater than 
proportionate burden. The main bank may be the only bank to give interest reductions or 
it may give a larger reduction than other banks; or in cases where other banks give 
reductions in interest on only a subset of loans, the main bank may extend the measure to 
all classes of loan.^ Similarly, the loan share of the main bank will typically rise during a 
period of bank assistance for a firm’s adjustment, reflecting the main bank’s principial 
role in the risk-sharing arrangements. To quote just a few examples, Fuji’s loan share in 
affiliated shipbuilder Hakodate Dockyard rose from 12 per cent in 1975 to 40 per cent 
before de-listing in 1980 and if the loan share of the other main bank, Hokkaido 
Takushoku, is included from 22 to 64 per cent; Sanwa’s share in Daisue Construction 
from 14 per cent in 1975 to 50 per cent in 1982; the Long-Term Credit Bank’s share in 
Hoko Fishing from 20 per cent in 1975 to 42 per cent in 1982; Daiichi Kangyo’s share in 
Nisseki House from 10 per cent in 1976 to 45 per cent in 1982, and so on.^
In a similar fashion, in serious cases of bankruptcy or major reorganisation, the 
main bank will typically absorb a share of any losses much greater than its loan share. In 
Japan  in recent years there have been some notable instances, which have highlighted the 
special role of the main bank in corporate affairs. In some cases the main bank has even 
been known to absorb large losses on account of a corporate failure, while the 
shareholders — the residual risk-bearers in conventional theory — have avoided substantial 
losses. In the case of Ataka & Co., examined in detail in the next chapter, Sumitomo 
Bank and Kyowa Bank incurred enormous losses on account of the general trading
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company’s failure, yet the company did not go bankrupt or undergo formal reorganisation 
in any legal sense. Rather, Ataka merged with C.ltoh under terms which enabled A taka’s 
shareholders to obtain one share of the larger general trading company for every five 
Ataka shares th a t  they held. As the case study reveals, under normal business practices 
Ataka shares would have been worthless pieces of paper, as evidenced by the fact th a t  the 
banks as creditors suffered major losses.
A similar case of residual risk-bearing was the buying up by the main banks of 
outstanding bonds on the occasion of the bankruptcies of Kojin, a large textiles trader, 
and Eidai Sangyo, a large plywood maker. When Kojin went bankrupt in August 1975 
with debts of 150 billion yen, Daiichi Kangyo Bank, the main bank, bought up all 
outstanding normal and convertible bonds, totalling 879 million yen (US$ 3.5 million), at 
face value plus the accrued interest equivalent.*® This led to the curious phenomenon of 
the quoted price of Kojin’s convertible bonds rising two yen to one hundred yen (face 
value) the day after the company applied for bankruptcy, while its stock price 
plummetted to 20 yen (30 yen below face value).** In the case of Eidai Sangyo, which 
went bankrupt in February 1978 with 190 billion yen in debts, the five main banks 
bought up all outstanding normal, convertible and eurodollar bonds, totalling some 2,973 
million yen (US$ 11.9 million).*2 Daiwa Bank, as the principal main bank, assumed the 
largest share of the five banks, buying up 60 per cent of the domestic bonds and 50 per 
cent of the eurodollar bonds. The Japanese financial daily, the N ih o n  kcizai s h in b u n , 
criticised this move by the main banks as rendering meaningless the risk-bearing role of 
investors in holding corporate bonds.*0
M ain -b an k  m o n ito r in g  and in terv en tio n
A major role of the main bank is as an instrument of screening, monitoring and 
intervention in the internal capital market. This aspect of the main bank is related to its 
risk-sharing role because, as with any insurance market, the insuring agent, in this case 
the main bank, needs to be able to monitor the insuree, in this case the firm and its 
management team, in order to overcome problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.*'*
The main bank is responsible for screening and monitoring its affiliated firms, and 
plays an important role in signalling information about the firm to the capital market. In 
the postwar high growth period, firms relied mainly on bank loans for their financing, and 
well-functioning stock and bonds markets did not exist.*® Under this indirect financing 
system, the main-bank system provided a mechanism for economising on screening, 
monitoring and enforcement costs in the capital market, a fact tha t  was not missed by 
the government policy-makers who helped fashion the system.*®
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Implicit in the Nihon keizai shinbun's  criticism of the action of the main banks in 
buying up the outstanding bonds of Kojin and Eidai Sangyo, noted above, was a 
recognition of the role of the main bank as a capital market monitor and risk-bearing 
agent in the absence of a American-style stock and bond market, with its active takeover 
mechanism and well-established bond-rating in sti tu tions :^
The current Eidai Sangyo and the 1975 Kojin case are not the only examples 
in the postwar period of principal and interest on corporate bonds becoming 
irredeemable. But in all cases investors have avoided incurring damage by virtue 
of measures such as the current one, based on the underwriting bank’s “moral 
obligation” . The city bank, as underwriter, is deeply involved in the issuing of 
the bonds as a member of the bond floating group, and in the process of floating 
the issue carries out qualitative selections [of suitable companies] (based on the 
standards of appropriateness for issuing bonds). It is thought that this type of 
s ta te  of affairs lies behind the practice of [the bank] bearing “moral obligation” 
in the name of protection for investors.
It is common in economic analysis to assume tha t  capital markets are perfect and 
tha t  information is costlessly available. Recent literature on the other hand has modelled 
situations of asymmetric information between participants in the capital market, such as 
shareholders and managers.1 It can be claimed tha t  the main-bank system operates as 
part of a capital market in which there are significant asymmetries in the availability of 
information. Because of the special relationship between the main bank and the firm, the 
main bank has privileged access to the internal information of the firm, much of which is 
not available, or available only at high cost, to the external capital market. In this regard 
it is im portant to note that historically accounting practices in Japan have been 
extremely poor by international standards: for instance, until recently there has been 
almost no consolidated accounting or external auditing and assets are valued in the 
balance sheet at book rather than current v a lu e .^  The firm draws up its business and 
finance plans in close consultation with its main bank and provides regular reports to the 
bank on its performance and prospects. In many cases, the main bank has representation 
on the board of directors, which in Japan means involvement in the top-level management 
of the firm, giving the bank strategic access to the firm's internal information and 
decision-making processes. For instance, in 1982 the 1,773 listed firms in Japan had a 
total of 1,676 directors on their boards who were formerly or concurrently bank executives 
(6 per cent of total directorships).^  As Table 3-2 shows, in 1980 about half of first- 
section TSE firms with bank borrowings had on their board at least one representative 
from their main bank.
The decision of the main bank regarding any aspect of the firm’s activities becomes 
a signal to other participants in the capital m a r k e t . T h e  main bank can be viewed as a 
particular example of Diamond’s “delegated monitor” : the signal of the main bank
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Table 3.2: Analysis of outside directors of
listed Japanese firms, 19803
Breakdown of firms according to number of directors 
formerly or concurrently from:
Number of 
directors
Outside 
the firm
Largest
shareholder
Largest source 
of borrowings 
(main bank)
Civil service 
or
government
1 96 (11.9) 156 (19.3) 252 (33.1) 145 (17.9)
2 102 (12.6) 90 (11.1) 89 (11.7) 48 (5.3)
3 89 (11.0) 52 (6.4) 26 (3.4) 29 (3.6)
4 95 (11.7) 27 (3.3) 5 (0.7) 20 (2.5)
5 82 (10.1) 19. (2.3) 3 (0.4) 14 (1.7)
6 67 (8.3) 24 (3.0) - 7 (0.9)
7 48 (5.9) 18 (2.2) - 2 (0.2)
8 43 (5.3) 13 (1.6) - 2 (0.2)
9 36 (4.4) 10 (1.2) - 1 (0.1)
10 28 (3.5) 5 (0.6) - 2 (0.2)
11 14 (1.7) 6 (0.7) - 1 (0.1)
12 8 (1.0) 3 (0.4) - 1 (0.1)
13 6 (0.7) 2 (0.2) - -
14 6 (0.7) 2 (0.2) - -
15 4 (0.5) - - -
16 3 (0.4) - - -
17 2 (0.2) - - -
18 1 (0.1) - - -
19 2 (0.2) 1 (0.1) - -
None 77 (9.5) 381 (47.1 ) 386 (50.7) 537 (66.4)
Total 809 (100.0) 809 (100.0) 761 b (100.0) 809 ( 1 00.0 )
Notes: a All firms were listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (First 
Section) in 1980.
b Forty-three firms had no borrowings in 1980, and for 
five firms the largest source of borrowings could not 
be identified.
Source: Compiled from Kigyo keiretsu soran, 1981: Kigyo keiretsu
söran.
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provides a low cost way of collecting information about the firm and its management and 
transm itting  it to other banks .22 The signal of the main bank may take the form of 
direct approaches to other banks, but in normal times is typically indirect in th a t  the firm 
approaches other banks only after having received the approval of its main bank for its
n o
plans and these banks then normally readily agree to the p lan / 0 This screening procedure 
allows a degree of direct ex ante  intervention by the capital market in tha t  the main bank
0  Amay effect modifications in the firm’s plans at the initial screening s ta g e /
The main bank provides an analogous mechanism in the internal capital market to 
the takeover market of a more competitive capital market. One function of an active 
takeover market or market for corporate control is to provide the capital market with the 
means to intervene in the internal affairs of firms. When managers are not performing 
well, a mechanism exists for the capital market to displace them and bring the assets of 
the firm under more efficient management. In Japan, an active takeover market has not 
operated; when a firm is performing badly, it will not become the target of a corporate 
raider hoping to obtain the assets of the firm at a discount or make a profit by 
reorganising the firm’s assets. However, the main bank may intervene and, in providing 
the firm with financial and managerial assistance, it may produce many of the results 
commonly attr ibu ted  to the market for corporate control, such as the displacement of 
poor managers and the reorganisation of the firm’s assets.
The screening, monitoring and intervention aspects of the main bank’s role are 
closely related to its role in insuring firms against risks and indirectly in insuring the 
management of the firm against employment risk. The nature of managerial tasks and 
managerial risks is important in understanding the interconnections between the main 
bank’s risk-sharing and monitoring roles. A major source of risk for managers lies in the 
way in which managerial human capital is valued in real-world capital and managerial 
markets. Externalities a ttach to the valuation of managerial capital because of the 
difficulties associated with the measurement of managerial output. An externality 
problem exists at two levels. At one level, discounting of the value of a specific m anager’s 
human capital as a result of poor firm performance may occur because of mistakes or 
incompetence of other members of the team. This is because the highly idiosyncratic and 
team nature of many managerial tasks makes it extremely difficult to measure accurately 
the inputs and outputs of individual managers.2^
On another level, managerial human capital may be discounted because of 
exogenous factors beyond the control of the management team as a whole which have 
caused a poor firm result / 0 Real-world capital and managerial markets are limited in 
their capacity to distinguish accurately what portion of a poor firm outcome is due to 
endogenous managerial factors such as incompetence, shirking or deviation from
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maximising behavior and what portion to exogenous factors beyond the control of 
management. Although managers are supposed, in theory, to maximise ex ante 
shareholder wealth, they operate in capital and managerial markets which value 
managerial capital on the basis of realised firm outcomes, such as are reflected in stock 
prices. As Farna sta tes,2^
the firm’s security holders provide important but indirect assistance to the 
managerial labor market in its task of valuing the firm’s management ... 
Although an individual security holder may not have a strong interest in directly 
overseeing the management of a particular firm, he has a strong interest in the 
existence of a capital market which efficiently prices the firm’s securities. The 
signals provided by an efficient capital market about the values of a firm’s 
securities are likely to be im portant for the managerial labour m arket’s 
revaluations of the firm’s management.
Thus, because the managerial market cannot distinguish what portion of a poor firm 
outcome to a ttr ibute  to endogenous managerial factors and what portion to a ttr ibu te  to 
exogenous factors beyond the control of management, and where managerial factors are 
involved what portion to attr ibute  to individual members of the team, there is a risk for 
managers tha t  the market will discount the value of their human capital when realised 
outcomes of the firm are unfavourable, even though the decisions and actions taken by 
the managers may have been, ex ante , to maximise shareholder wealth.
It might be claimed that the risks associated with these managerial externalities 
would be particularly acute in Japan where managerial tasks assume an even more 
idiosyncratic and team aspect than elsewhere. Such institutions as w'ell-defined professions 
and external auditing can reduce managerial measurement costs, but in Japan these are
no
poorly developed / 0  However, main-bank monitoring and intervention in internalised 
capital and managerial markets can be thought of serving to reduce these managerial 
externalities in Japan.
Because the main bank screens and monitors the firm on the basis of access to 
internal information and ex ante involvement in decision-making, it might be claimed 
tha t  the main bank is better able to distinguish between endogenous managerial and 
exogenous factors in variations of ex post firm outcomes from ex ante expected ones. 
Similarly, a mechanism exists in the form of direct bank intervention for the bank to 
displace top managers whose incompetence is placing at risk the viability of the entire 
team, including the blue-collar workforce.
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M A IN  B A N K S  A N D  S T R U C T U R A L  A D J U S T M E N T
The chapter has argued tha t  the main bank is an important economic institution 
underpinning the operation of internal capital, managerial and labour markets in Japan. 
The focus in this section is on the role of the main bank in mediating structural 
adjustm ent in Japan since the early 1970s.
As argued in the previous chapter, the course of structural change and adjustment 
in an economy reflects the nature and operation of capital, labour and other markets in 
th a t  economy, since structural adjustment involves the reallocation of capital, labour and 
other resources in response to changing economic circumstances and conditions. In this 
context, an examination of the process of adjustment involving internal capital, 
managerial and labour markets in Japan and the role of the main bank in that process is 
relevant. The role of the main bank in helping to absorb the costs of structural 
adjustment is of particular importance.
I n te r e s t  r e d u c t io n s  a n d  f in a n c ia l  a s s i s ta n c e
Main banks have played an important role in assisting large firms in Japan during 
the period of structural adjustment since the early 1970s. Main banks have taken the 
lead in providing various forms of financial assistance to their affiliated firms, thus 
allowing the firms to absorb the impact of large-scale structural change and to implement 
rationalisation strategies over an extended period of adjustment to altered competitive 
conditions.
As pointed out in the opening chapter, the oil crises and other structural changes of 
the 1970s left a large segment of the corporate economy uncompetitive and in a severe 
financial state. By the end of the decade it was only support from main banks and other 
group business partners that was saving many large firms from bankruptcy and their 
workforces from possible unemployment.
Despite the impact of external shocks and structural change, there have been 
relatively few bankruptcies of listed firms in Japan since the early 1970s. To a large 
extent this reflects the fact that the major banks, in their capacity as main banks, have 
provided the financial and other back-up necessary to save affiliated firms from financial 
failure. A reading of the business press reveals that for many large firms support from 
main banks has been the critical factor in preventing what otherwise would have been 
their certain collapse.
In contrast, the failure rate in the small and medium-size firm sector, where the 
permanent employment system and the main-bank system operate to a much less extent, 
has been high. Even not counting firms with less than one million yen capital (US$ 4000), 
more than 1000 bankruptcies continue to occur in Japan every month. The number of
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bankruptcies rose steadily after the oil crisis from 10,862 in 1973 to 18,741 in 1977, 
reflecting the worsened economic conditions (Table 1-3, p.6).
Those bankruptcies of listed firms which have occurred have invariably involved 
firms which were independent or which had maintained only tenuous links with a main 
bank. For instance, in the case of Kojin and Eidai Sangyo, until the bankruptcy of 
Sanko Steamship in 1985 the two largest postwar bankruptcies, relations with the 
respective main banks had been poor. In both cases, the firm had been controlled by a 
founder-owner who had pursued an independent managerial line and had kept the main 
bank at a rm ’s length. Kojin’s failure was precipitated by over-investment in land during 
the 1971-72 real estate boom. It is significant tha t  Kojin is reported to have resisted the 
advice of its main bank Daiichi Kangyo Bank (DKB) not to undertake these investments 
and to have sought finance from other banks instead.30 The comment of one DKB 
director highlights the importance of access to inside information and monitoring in the 
main bank’s risk-insuring role: “It is really mortifying to be called main bank at this
stage, when Kojin did not even bring us the necessary managerial information” .0^
Eidai Sangyo was typical of firms employing a ‘high share-price managerial 
s tra tegy’ (kokabuka keiei), tha t  is, raising funds on the stock market by issuing shares at 
market price and correspondingly reducing its requirements for bank borrowings at a time 
when offering shares at par to existing shareholders and relying heavily on bank 
borrowings was the normal practice. In the context of the internal capital market, Eidai's 
corporate behavior was tan tam ount to not paying insurance premiums to the main bank 
in favourable times against the risk of possible failure in the future. At the same time, 
Eidai, whose owner was renowned in business circles for his independence and dislike of 
banks, had kept the major city banks at a rm ’s length, changing its main bank from 
Kangyo (now DKB) to Tokyo to Daiwa Bank.3"* It appears tha t  these were important 
factors behind the more ‘business-like’ a ttitude of the main banks in limiting the extent of 
financial assistance that they gave Eidai and Kojin.00
The failure in 1984 of the trading company J. Osawa, together with its 
manufacturing affiliate Mamiya Camera, and sewing-machine maker Rikkar, the third 
and fourth largest bankruptcies in the postwar period at the time, reveal a similar 
picture. Both firms were without sound main-bank r e l a t i o n s . T h e  Nihon keizai 
shinbun  analysed J. Osawa’s bankruptcy under the heading “The weakness of not having 
a main bank” , pointing out tha t  although the trading company had borrowings from 
some seventy banks it did not have a main bank on which it could rely for support in 
time of corporate crisis.33 Indicative of the absence of a main bank, the composition of 
bank lending to J. Osawa changed radically over the two years prior to the bankruptcy, 
with many banks withdrawing finance completely.36
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In contrast to the failures of listed firms which did not have strong main-bank 
connections, a large number of firms facing similar financial, structural or managerial 
problems have been able to avert bankruptcy with the assistance of their main banks. For 
instance, Chori, Kanematsu-Gosho, Keisei Electric Railway, Daisue Construction, Nippon 
Light Metal, Toyo Pulp, Mitsui Toatsu Chemical, Fuji Kosan, Japan Line, Unitika, and 
Yamazen, to name just a few, have obtained financial and managerial assistance from 
their main banks over a period of long-term adjustment to structural change.
The financial assistance given by main banks in such cases takes a number of forms. 
At one level, the main bank provides an expansion of finance or rolls-over existing loan 
obligations to allow the firm to survive a short-term cash flow crisis. In more serious 
cases, the main bank will typically provide some form of interest rate reduction. In more 
serious cases still, the main bank may directly absorb losses by writing off loans as bad 
debts or agreeing to a share-capital reduction. All of these forms of bank assistance can be 
interpreted as aspects of the main bank’s corporate-insuring role and as important in 
allowing costs of structural adjustm ent to be absorbed through the risk-sharing channels 
of the internal capital market.
The most common form of bank assistance is the granting of interest reductions or 
exemptions on bank borrowings for a specified period. Table 3-3 outlines some of the 
major cases of interest reductions tha t  have been reported in the financial press in recent 
years. No official da ta  on financial assistance of this nature exists and banks are under no 
obligation to reveal publicly to what extent and to which firms they are providing interest 
reductions. Only major cases are reported in the financial press, which suggests tha t  the 
examples presented in Table 3-3 may be just the tip of the iceberg of bank assistance 
towards struggling firms in Japan  in recent years.
Several features of the interest reductions can be rioted. First, a transition of 
interest reduction measures is in evidence, with banks progressively increasing the amount 
of assistance as the plight of the firm worsens. Initially, the bank may reduce the 
nominal interest rate from the quasi-prime to prime rate or the rate on all borrowings 
may be reduced to the short-term prime rate. A further reduction in the effective interest 
rate is often given by reducing or completely releasing the so-called ‘compulsory deposits’ 
(kösoku yokin ) held by the firm a t  the bank.’’^
It appears that compulsory deposits play an important part in the set of risk- 
insuring arrangements between banks and their group-affi.iated firms. The effective 
interest rate for corporate borrowers in Japan is substantia ly higher than the nominal 
rate because of the widespread practice of firms holding a proportion of their bank 
borrowings in the form of deposits (said to be typically 40 per cent for short-term and 20 
per cent for long-term borrowings).38 The practice of compulsory deposits is usually
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explained as an institutional device for raising the effective interest rate and rationing 
credit in the regulated capital market environment of postwar J a p a n . O n e  way tha t  
group-affiliated firms appear to make surrogate insurance payments to banks during 
normal business times is by maintaining a high level of bank deposits, particularly with 
the main bank, thus serving to raise the effective interest rate.4 *^ In times of corporate 
crisis the release of these deposits and corresponding reduction of long-term borrowings, 
together with possible further reductions in nominal interest rates, is one form of 
assistance tha t  the banks appear to give.
A further interest reduction occurs when banks shelve or exempt interest payments 
completely for a specified reconstruction period, such as three or five years. In doing so, it 
is common for the banks to arrange for particular problem assets associated with the 
borrowings, such as depreciated real estate or excess production capacity, to be 
transferred to a subsidiary or to a paper company set up for the purpose. This has the 
effect of improving the balance sheet position of the parent firm, because a special profit 
can often be registered on the ‘sale’ of the assets and because the bank borrowings, a 
balance sheet item, can be converted to a non-balance sheet item, a loan guarantee, given 
the lack of established consolidated accounting practices in Japan. Examples of asset 
transfers in the context of bank assistance are Daisue Construction's transfer of real 
estate to Suebiro Real Estate with Sanwa Bank’s assistance; a similar action by Yamazen 
with the assistance of its main banks, Daiwa and Fuji; the transfer of loss-making tankers 
by Japan Line and Sanko Steamship to paper companies with the aid of their main banks; 
and the transfer of surplus capacity by aluminium smelters to paper companies as part of 
the contraction of capacity in tha t  industry.4*
A second feature of the financial assistance by banks is the role played by the main 
bank both directly in providing assistance and indirectly in securing the cooperation of 
other banks in implementing similar measures. Press reports of financial assistance by 
banks almost always cite the main bank as the bank which is providing the assistance. 
The main bank’s expression of support for a struggling firm is critical in securing similar 
support from other banks, and appears to amount to an implicit partial guarantee.42 The 
main bank signals its support for the firm to other banks and creditors in a number of 
ways. In the early stages of assistance, the main bank’s agreement to expand or roll-over 
its loans serves as a signal to the other banks that they can do likewise at low risk. The 
main bank will typically despatch a director to the board of the firm receiving assistance. 
For instance, a survey by Töyo keizai shm posha  of the 323 listed non-financial firms in 
1977 with accumulated losses revealed a high level of representation by main banks on the 
boards of the firms (Table 3-4). At the same time as improving the main bank’s capacity 
to monitor and intervene in the firm’s internal affairs, the despatch of a senior bank
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Table 3.4: Deficit' firms by main-bank affiliation and
director representations by the banks, 1977
Name of main bank
Number of firms 
in sample of 320 
listed firms with 
accumulated losses
Total number of 
director repre­
sentations by the 
bank on the boards 
of the firms
Outstanding 
borrowings 
from main 
bank
(million yen)
Industrial Bank 56 32 133,900
of Japan
Long-Term Credit 40 7 60,100
Bank of Japan
Nippon Credit Bank 31 3 46,300
Daiichi Kangyo 34 24 93,100
Hokkaido Takushoku 2 - -
Tokyo 5 6 21,500
Mitsui 20 13 54,300
Mitsubishi 24 23 79,400
Fu j i 29 14 44,100
Sumitomo 24 8 40,400
Daiwa 20 28 95,900
Sanwa 25 9 78,200
Tokai 23 17 50,600
Kyowa 22 12 13,800
Taiyo—Kobe 12 10 12,700
Saitama 9 9 20,300
Source: Toyo keizai shinposha, 1978: Tokei nenpo, 38(4) (inside
cover).
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executive serves as a strong signal to other banks of the main bank’s intention to assist 
the firm in its recovery efforts. In other cases, the main bank may signal its support for a 
struggling firm by issuing a press statement or by holding a press conference. It is not 
unusual for the main bank to make a strong expression of continued support for a firm 
through the financial press, when rumours of a credit crisis in a particular firm are 
circulating in stock- or money-market circles. The main bank may also give direct 
assurances to other banks, particularly when organising a cooperative financing group 
(kyöchö yüsh idan ) to assist the firm.
In keeping with the risk-sharing role of the main bank and its role as corporate 
monitor, the main bank or banks will normally shoulder a proportionally larger share of 
the assistance burden. At one level, this reflects the fact tha t  the main bank is the 
principal insuring agent and hence the largest recipient of previous insurance premiums or 
cross-payments from the firm. It is thought th a t  firms pay insurance premiums to the 
main bank, not so much by paying a higher nominal interest on loans, as by paying a 
higher effective interest rate. This occurs through such means as maintaining a higher 
and more stable level of borrowings and bank deposits and by the preferential allocation 
of financial business to the main bank in the form of foreign exchange transactions, 
designation of the main bank as place of settlement of bills of payment issued by the firm, 
and the financing of affiliates and consumer-related sales.
At another level, tha t  the main bank assumes a greater than proportionate share of 
the assistance burden reflects the responsibility tha t  the main bank assumes for the 
signals tha t  it despatches to other banks in its capacity as principal screening and 
monitoring agent over its affiliated firms. The main bank benefits in various direct and 
indirect ways from its status as a main bank: it has the largest loan share in a number of 
the nation’s leading firms; it receives corporate-insurance premiums as described above; 
and it receives favoured treatm ent from the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. 
But a t  the same time it must bear the costs of sending what ex post turn out to be ‘poor’ 
signals to the capital market. More formally, the convention whereby the main bank 
assumes a disproportionately large share of the assistance burden or bank losses may be 
part of an incentive structure in the capital market which reduces the agency costs of
i  o
delegated monitoring by main banks. That is, the main bank has an incentive not to 
shirk in its capacity as delegated monitor because it will be liable to bear extra costs if it 
does and the firm subsequently fails.
A third feature to note regarding the bank assistance is tha t  it is often substantial 
in magnitude. As revealed in Table 3-3, the interest subsidies are often in the order of 
hundreds of million or even billions of yen per year (one billion yen equals about US$ 4 
million) and often continue for several years. Thus, interest reductions by banks can be
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identified as an important channel by which the costs of structural adjustment incurred 
by firms have been absorbed in the private sector in Japan.
Other forms of financial assistance by main banks to struggling firms are also 
common. These often comprise parts of a package of assistance measures given within an 
agreed corporate rationalisation program, devised largely by the main bank. The bank 
may directly absorb losses by writing off loans as irredeemable. While this is most likely 
to occur in cases of bankruptcy such as occurred with Kojin and Eidai Sangyo, examined 
above, it sometimes occurs without the firm going bankrupt. The debts may, for 
instance, be hived off from the parent firm with' the related assets and at a later date 
written off as losses by the banks. Daisue Construction is an example. Daisue’s 
unprofitable real estate holdings were transferred to a subsidiary with Sanwa Bank’s 
backing in 1977 and interest was shelved on some 35 billion yen of borrowings until the 
subsidiary was dissolved in 1982, when Sanwa incurred a loss of 30.4 billion yen on the 
outstanding l o a n s . T h e  Daisue case illustrates the role of the main bank as a  quasi­
residual risk-bearer, as the amount of losses eventually absorbed by Sanwa exceeded its 
total loans to Daisue prior to the transfer of a s se ts .^
The main bank may also help to shift losses out of the firm by organising an 
injection of capital through a special third-party share issue or an issue to existing 
shareholders, with the suppliers of capital typically being related group firms and business 
partners (including the main bank). This is particularly likely to occur when the level of 
the firm’s accumulated losses is approaching or is likely to exceed the existing capital 
level, and is often preceded by a share reduction, which has the effect of reducing the level 
of accumulated losses in the balance sheet by the amount of the capital reduction.
In this context, it is important to remember that the main bank is also typically a 
major shareholder in the firm (Table 3-1, p.40). It appears that the main bank plays an 
analogous role in securing the agreement of other corporate shareholders in such cases as 
it does vis-a-vis other banks in the corporate loans context. The agreement of the main 
bank to a share reduction and /or  new issue will often be the key factor in obtaining the 
agreement and participation of other group and business partners, which are usually 
fractional shareholders in the firm. Indeed, as is explained below, the main bank is likely 
to be in command of the management of the firm and the measure just one of a series of 
assistance and rationalisation measures which it is implementing.
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B an k  in terv en tio n  and m anagerial a ss ista n ce
Financial assistance by the main bank is given in the context of the main bank’s 
role as instrument of monitoring and intervention in the internal capital market. Main- 
bank intervention in the internal affairs of firms with managerial or structural adjustment 
problems has been an important means of bringing about reorganisation of assets and 
transfers of capital and labour resources, in the absence of more competitive external 
capital market forces such as takeovers, acquisitions and bankruptcy.46
The main bank supervises or intervenes in the management of a struggling firm in a 
number of ways. The bank may monitor and influence rationalisation from the sidelines, 
by making various kinds of assistance contingent on the submission of detailed 
rationalisation proposals and on the implementation of measures which the bank 
considers necessary. The critical position of the main bank in influencing the a ttitude  of 
the other creditors increases its leverage over the internal decision-making process of the 
firm. When the main bank provides financial assistance to a struggling firm it normally 
requires tha t  the firm submit a recovery plan giving details of the rationalisation and 
cost-cutting measures to be taken. Thus, assistance is tied to certain internal adjustment 
measures, such as reductions in the workforce, rationalisation of affiliate networks, and 
disposal of assets to generate a cash flow and to offset losses in the firm’s accounts. The 
bank will also require estimates of expected accounting results at the end of the 
rationalisation period, which is typically three years initially. The plan is usually drawn 
up in close consultation with the main bank, and in some cases by the bank itself. The 
approval of the plan by the main bank provides an im portant signal to other banks and 
related business partners, which are then likely to cooperate or provide assistance on the 
basis of the main bank’s implicit guarantee. Conversely, if the main bank does not 
sanction a particular course of action it is unlikely tha t  other banks or business partners 
will provide the necessary financial assistance. This capacity to deliver a wider degree of 
assistance than it directly provides constitutes an im portant basis of the main bank’s 
institutional, as opposed to judicial, power to intervene.
The structural changes of the 1970s resulted in most large firms’ undertaking large- 
scale rationalisations under the banner of ‘streamlining management’ (genryö keiei), 
centring on reductions in labour force and industrial capacity, reorganisation of subsidiary 
and affiliate networks, and asset disposals. In their capacity as main banks, the major 
banks in Japan have played an important role in monitoring and assisting these corporate 
rationalisations and in many cases in directly managing the process.
It is important to note tha t  the effect of the permanent employment system, and 
the capital market arrangements which operate in tandem with it, is not to prevent 
labour adjustment from taking place, but rather to alter how it takes place and how long
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it takes. A major implication of the permanent employment system is that large firms do 
not lay-off their excess regular workforce with cyclical fluctuations in demand and do so
a n
only as a last resort measure when faced with long-term structural problems. The 
pooling of risks in an internal capital market is important in allowing firms to absorb the 
costs of this ‘labour hoarding’. But when the excess workforce becomes structural in 
nature, such as when there is excess capacity to be scrapped, the firm must reduce the 
size of its permanent workforce in order to remain a viable economic entity. In such cases, 
typically the firm adjusts its workforce using a variety of mechanisms including 
reductions in working hours, temporary transfers, and ‘voluntary retirement’ schemes, the 
effect of which is to cushion the impact, and cost, of structural adjustment on the
a o
workforce. 0 A voluntary retirement scheme is implemented after consultation and 
negotiation with the enterprise union and a key element of the scheme is the a ttem pt to 
find alternative employment for the workforce in related firms.
In making assistance contingent on the implementation of rationalisations by the 
firm, including and often centring on reductions in the workforce, the effect of the main 
bank appears to be to push the response of the firm in the same direction as the external 
competitive forces. Thus, for instance, Shimada found tha t  Japanese firms implement the 
same amount of labour adjustment as United States’ firms but tha t  it takes place over a 
longer time; a level of adjustment which took large American firms from several months 
to a year to effect took four to five years in the case of Japanese f irm s .^
Similarly, in the case of capital resources, the main bank appears to cushion 
structural adjustment by providing insulation from market forces but at the same time 
facilitates rationalisations in the direction of competitive market pressures. The disposal 
of assets to generate a cash flow and to offset operating losses has been a major 
component of corporate rationalisation and has been an important aspect of the re­
allocation of capital resources during structural adjustment. Under Japanese accounting 
practices, assets are registered in the balance sheet at book value rather than current 
market value and firms are not permitted to directly revalue their assets to reflect current 
market values. In the early 1970s most firms had considerable ‘hidden wealth’ 
( fukumi-ek i)  in their balance sheets, primarily because of shareholdings and real estate 
holdings which had appreciated greatly in the high growth period, but which were still 
registered in the balance sheet a t  the purchase value. In the course of rationalisation since 
the mid-1970s, firms have disposed of these assets on a large scale and the special profits 
[tokubetsu rieki) and cashflow's generated have played a major role in offsetting corporate 
losses and in reducing bank borrowings. This can be gauged from Table 3-5: in 1975, for 
instance, the level of special profits from the disposal of real estate, shares and other 
assets exceeded tha t  of net after-tax profits for the sample of listed firms and since 1975 
firms have continued to register a high level of special profits (Table 3-5).
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Table 3.5: Accounting profits registered by a sample of 350 listed
Japanese manufacturing firms from the disposal of 
assets and securities, 1974-81 (million yen)
Special profit registered 
from disposal of:
Net
profits
Year
current
assets
fixed
assets
securities
securities
Sub-total
(1)
after tax 
(2) (1 )/(2 ) (% )
1974 58,282 132,043 79,762 270,087 813,641 33.2
1975 144,223 332,162 233,322 709,717 537,386 132.1
1976 114,682 240,142 86,898 441,722 880,279 50.2
1977 219,820 254,857 96,728 571,405 933,469 61.2
1978 126,803 249,557 53,086 429,446 1,136,307 37.8
1979 94,715 233,438 49,260 377,413 1,719,214 22.0
1980 106,857 178,768 39,633 325,258 1,893,682 17.2
1981 141,925 294,578 73,567 510,070 1,508,320 33.8
Source: Nihon Ginko, various editions: Shuyo kigyo keiei
bunseki.
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In some cases, asset disposals have been cosmetic accounting measures, designed to 
register special profits and reduce the level of accumulated losses of the parent firm, but 
not entailing any real net cash flow. This occurs when assets are transferred to unlisted 
and unconsolidated affiliates. The details of a number of asset transfers are shown in 
Table 3-6 and it is clear that they require the close cooperation of the main bank. Indeed, 
a close examination of asset transfers invariably reveals tha t  they are instituted in the 
context of assistance by banks or larger parent firms for the firm’s revival. In the case of 
Mitsubishi Oil, for instance, the measure was implemented as part of a series of group 
assistance measures led by Mitsubishi Bank after the oil refiner suffered a massive oil-spill 
accident. Similarly, in the case of share disposals, the main bank will typically arrange for 
the firm to dispose of a portion of its shareholding in the main bank in a direct sale 
outside the stock market to other associated firms.
A more direct form of intervention comes when the main bank sends in one or more 
executives as top level management in the firm. The despatch of bank executives in this 
way can have various implications, depending on the relationship with the firm and the 
nature of its plight. In some cases the executive is despatched in a ‘watch-dog’ capacity, 
to improve the access of the bank to internal information of the firm, to monitor bank 
assistance and to monitor and influence the nature of rationalisations. Thus, almost 
without exception, the announcement of main-bank assistance for a struggling firm is 
accompanied by the despatch of a bank director to the board.
The Nihon keizai shinbun  described a recent case under the headline “Mitsubishi 
Bank sends in former Senior Managing Director as director to Daimaru as ‘watch-dog’ 
over managerial reconstruction” as follows:'^
In accepting Mr Kanai as part-time director Daimaru’s aim was, in addition 
to obtaining ideas from outside the company on how to overcome its managerial 
difficulties, to secure the assistance of Mitsubishi Bank for its managerial 
reconstruction. On the other hand, by sending in a ‘watch-dog’ director to 
Daimaru, Mitsubishi obtains a thicker pipeline into the company and is hoping 
th a t  Mr Kanai can provide the same type of strict managerial check function as 
Mitsui Bank’s Advisor Koyama Gorö did as outside director in the president’s 
sacking affair a t  Mitsukoshi [a rival department store].
In other cases, the main bank may send in executives to supervise or implement 
internal rationalisations or executives initially despatched in a monitoring role may 
assume this task. Japanese businessmen refer to this practice as ‘bank m anagement’ 
(ginkö kanri), while Pascale and Rohlen, in a case study of an episode involving Toyo 
Kogyo, accurately describe it as a process whereby “ [the bank puts] the company in a
ro
quasi-receivership status, but without any involvement from courts or lawyers” .
Table 3-7 summarises some of the major instances in which main banks have placed
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struggling firms under their management. In some cases, a form of ‘crisis management’ is 
employed by the bank. A common pattern is for the bank to remove the president — 
often an owner-founder figure — and install its own management team and then set about 
implementing an internal rationalisation program centring on cost-cutting measures, 
labour rationalisation, asset disposals and loan repayments, and management and 
organisational innovations. In cases where the primary cause of the failure was managerial 
but the prospects in the industry concerned are good, intervention by the bank may result 
in the firm’s return to profitability in two or three years; the bank will then typically 
withdraw its management but in such a way as to leave it with closer relations than had 
previously been the case, such as by retaining a senior director link. A common scenario 
is for the main bank to arrange a business tie-up between the firm and another of the 
bank’s affiliated firms to assure its long-term viability. Thus, it appears tha t  one of the 
results of having a competitive takeover mechanism, the reorganisation of corporate 
assets to improve efficiency, is achieved through main-bank intermediation.
It has more often been the case, however, th a t  the firms coming under bank 
management are in depressed industries. In these cases, assistance and management of the 
internal rationalisation process may continue for several years. Fuji Bank’s management 
of shipbuilder Hakodate Dockyard, Sanwa’s back-up of petroleum-refiner Maruzen Oil 
and textile-maker Unitika, and the Industrial Bank of Ja p an ’s assistance for shipping 
company Japan Line, chemicals maker Toyo Soda, and petroleum-refiner Daikyo Oil are 
just a few of the many examples tha t  could be given. Assistance is then likely to be given 
in tandem  with an industry-wide adjustment program, perhaps involving some 
government assistance, as has been the case in such sectors as aluminium, shipbuilding, 
and chemicals. The four case studies which are presented next illustrate the role of the 
main bank in a variety of corporate and structural adjustment settings.
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N o t e s
1. In Japanese, mein banku  or shuryoku ginkö. The terms ‘lead bank’ and ‘principal 
bank’ are also used in English.
2. But for a recent analysis, see Hodder and Tschoegl (1985). Hodder and Tschoegl’s 
interpretation of the m ain-bank’s role is close to th a t  developed here; but whereas they 
see the main-bank system as resulting principally from the government regulation of 
financial markets in postwar Japan, my analysis examines the main bank from the 
viewpoint of its role in the ‘nexus of contracts’ which underpin corporate organisation in 
Japan.
3. Nakatani (1983, 1984). See also W akita (1981, 1983) on long-term contracts 
between banks and firms with the possibility of insurance over the business cycle, and 
Osano and Tsutsui (1983, 1985) for empirical verification of implicit contracts in the bank 
loan market in Japan. More generally, Fried and Howitt (1980, 472) argue tha t
credit rationing exists as part of an equilibrium risk-sharing arrangement 
between a bank and its customers. A borrower and lender can benefit not only 
from trading loan contracts now, but also from an “understanding” or “implicit 
contract” concerning amounts they will be willing to trade, and at what prices, 
under various conditions in the future. By means of such arrangements banks 
and their customers can share the risks associated with an uncertain future.
4. Fried and Howitt (1980). Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983, 19) note the importance 
of looking at the role of the stock market in the operation of implicit labour contracts.
5. Nakatani (1982, 29, 47-8; 1984).
6. In Japanese, the phrase is “m em  banku wa iza to iu toki ni mendö o m iruv .
7. The Oriental Economist  (1981a, 19).
8. As an example, when four banks agreed to reduce the interest rate on long-term 
borrowings of the petroleum-refining company Fuji Kosan from the long-term prime rate 
(then 7.9 per cent) to the short-term prime rate (then 5.5 per cent) as an assistance 
measure, it was reported tha t  Tokyo Bank, as the company’s main bank, would give a 
further 1 per cent interest rate reduction. See “Fuji Kösan o kin’yü shien (Financial 
assistance for Fuji Kosan)” , N K S , 28 Apr 1984, p .l.
9. The figures on loan shares are taken from Kigyo keiretsu söran (various 
editions).
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10. “Köjin-sai: Daiichi Kangin ga kaitoru (DKB to buy up Kojin bonds)” , N K S , 28 
Aug 1975, p.13. In the case of the convertible bonds (693 million yen outstanding), it was 
reported tha t  Mitsubishi Trust & Banking and Mitsui T rust &; Banking would also buy 
up a portion of the bonds, having been underwriting banks in the issue. See “Jika tenkan 
shasai fukumu Köjin-sai: ju taku  ginkö ga kaitori e (Underwriting banks to buy up Kojin 
bonds, including market-price convertible bonds)” , N K S , 27 Aug 1975, p.15.
11. “Hyakuen de öakanai: Köjin no tenkan shasai (Big movement of Kojin’s
convertible bonds at a hundred yen)” , N K S , 29 Aug 1975, p.15.
12. “Eidaisan no shasai tenkan shasai: Daiwagin kaitori happyö (Daiwa Bank
announces it will buy up Eidai Sangyo’s bonds and convertible bonds)” , N K S , 21 Feb 
1978, p.15.
13. “Toshi no jiko sekinin kakuritsu o: Eidai Sangyö shasai no kaitori ([Daiwa’s] 
buying up of Eidai Sangyo’s bonds: [need for] investors to take own responsibility)” , 
NKS,  21 Feb 1978, p.15.
14. On the main bank as a monitoring agent see also Nakatani (1984a), Roehl 
(1983) and Tatsumi (1983). ‘Moral hazard’ refers to the inherent incentive problem in 
selling insurance, in that, once insured, agents have an incentive to behave in a way which 
increases the probability of the insured event occurring. ‘Adverse selection’ refers to the 
fact tha t ,  because of asymmetric information between the insurer and insuree and the 
tendency for insurees to understate their risks, insurers will tend to over-insure some 
agents and under-insure others. See Arrow (1971).
15. See Suzuki (1980, part  I).
16. See Johnson (1982, 200-5), Okumura (1978a, 48-50).
17. “Töshi no jiko sekinin kakuritsu o: Eidai Sangyö shasai no kaitori ([Daiwa’s] 
buying up of Eidai Sangyo’s bonds: [need for] investors to take own responsibility)” , 
N K S , 21 Feb 1978, p.15.
18. For instance, the notion of informational asymmetries has been applied to the 
explanation of dividends (Ross, 1977; Miller and Rock, 1985), financial intermediation 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984), and optimal managerial contracts (Beck and 
Zorn, 1982; Shavell, 1979).
19. See Ballon, Tom ita and Usami (1976) and Katsuyama (1976). The direction of 
the causality is not entirely clear. The main-bank system can be viewed as a capital- 
managerial market mechanism for overcoming the monitoring and incentive problems 
associated with the poor accounting practices and disclosure requirements; on the other 
hand, in a capital market characterised by indirect or bank financing the existence of the 
main-bank system may have lessened the need for United States-style accounting and 
disclosure practices, or represented a lower cost way of achieving the same results.
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20. Kigyö keiretsu söran (1983, -18).
21. On signalling and managerial incentives in the capital market in a general 
framework, see Ross (1977).
22. Diamond (1984).
23. It might be thought th a t  there is a free-rider problem in this bank-monitoring 
set-up. Among the major city and long-term credit banks there is not likely to be a free­
rider problem as each bank has a set of firms which it monitors ( that is, for which it is 
the main bank). Under the joint system of main-bank financing (keiretsu yxishi) and 
cooperative financing (kyöchö yxishi), each main bank has a relatively large loan share in 
its affiliates and a relatively minor share in the affiliates of other main banks. This allows 
economising on monitoring costs and a degree of pooling of risk among banks (that is, 
between the various internal capital markets). There may, however, be free-riding on 
main-bank monitoring by the smaller city and regional banks and other financial 
institutions such as insurance companies, which have fractional loan shares in main-bank- 
affiliated firms. There are two possible hypotheses regarding how this apparent free-rider 
problem is reconciled. One hypothesis is th a t  the smaller banks may pay for the 
monitoring indirectly by receiving a lower effective interest rate than the main banks. 
There is a certain amount of anecdotal evidence tha t  this is the case (see for instance 
Washio [1974]). Another hypothesis is that the major banks, as main banks, are able to 
deliver a public good, ‘corporate monitoring’, because of their privileged position in the 
regulated and segmented financial system of postwar Japan; in this regard it is 
noteworthy that the city banks, the major ‘main banks’, were the only banks able to 
borrow in large amounts directly from the Bank of Japan.
24. One aspect of this screening role is tha t  the main bank adjudicates when 
conflicts arise between member firms of the financial corporate grouping.
25. On measurement costs and markets in general see Barzel (1982), and in labour 
markets see Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Williamson, Wächter and Harris (1975).
26. The problem is explicitly treated in the principal-agent literature on the 
separation of ownership and control (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lee, 1979) 
and the design of optimal managerial contracts (Beck and Zorn, 1982; Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1982; Shavell, 1979).
27. Fam a (1980, 292).
28. On external auditing as an institutional innovation which economises on 
management-monitoring costs see W atts  and Zimmerman (1983).
29. The distinction between ‘group’ and ‘independent’ firms is to a certain extent a 
simplification. In reality, the strength of main-bank-firm affiliation varies along a 
spectrum, ranging from firms which are members of the presidents’ clubs of the former
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zaibatsu  groups on the one hand to owner-dominated firms which have purposefully 
avoided establishing a main-bank relation with any particular bank on the other.
30. Ekonomisuto  (1975, 11-12).
31. “Homan keiei o mikagiru: Köjin-muke yUshi no teishiki ni ([Banks] desert 
wasteful management: opportunity to stop financing Kojin)” , N K S ,  27 Aug 1975, p.3.
32. See Moriyama (1978, 120).
33. The bankruptcy of Sanko Steamship in 1985 presents a similar, if not slightly 
more complex, picture. See Kara (1985) and K i n ’yTi zaisei j i j ö  (1985). Sanko had at 
best only a tenuous main-bank relation (with Daiwa Bank). Sanko was renowned as an 
independent firm: it resisted the Ministry of T ransport’s a ttem pts  to have it participate 
in industry rationalisation in 1964; it was one of the first firms to reduce its reliance on 
bank borrowings by issuing market-price shares; and it tried to corner the shares of its 
major rival, Japan Line, in 1971, all of which made it somewhat of a corporate maverick 
in Japanese business. The demise of Sanko, despite its strong political connections, 
presents a stark contrast to the experience of Japan Line, assisted by its close main-bank 
connection with the Industrial Bank of Japan, examined in the next chapter.
34. On J. Osawa see the following: “Osawa Shökai ga jijitsujö tösan (J. Osawa 
effectively bankrupt)” , N K S  evening, 29 Feb 1984, p .l;  “Osawa shachö Tösan’ no ben 
(President Osawa talks about bankruptcy)” , N K S , 1 Mar 1984, p.9; “Kawaru ginkö-kigyö 
kankei (The changing bank-firm relationship)” , N K S , 2 Mar 1984, p.3. On Rikkar see 
the following: “Wagi shinsei wa igai Mitsuigin Chögin kenkai (Filing for reconciliation 
unexpected: Mitsui Bank and LTC B ’s view)” , N K S , 24 July 1984, p.l; “Wagi shinsei no 
Rikkä: ginkögawa keiri ni fuman (Rikkar filing for reconciliation: banks unhappy with 
m anagem ent)” , N K S , 24 July 1984, p.9; “Rikkä no gosan ge (Rikkar’s miscalculation, 
part 2)” , N K S , 25 July 1984, p.9; “Rikkä fushin tsuyomaru: kin’yil kikan ni seishiki 
setsumei nashi (Distrust of Rikkar growing stronger: no formal explanation to financial 
institutions)” , N K S , 26 July 1984, p.10; Inaba (1984).
35. “Mein banku no nai yowami (The weakness of not having a main bank)” , N K S  
evening, 29 Feb 1984, p.l.
36. “Osawashö torihikikö no kötai medatsu (Shift [in loan shares] of J. Osawa’s 
bankers conspicuous)” , N K S , 16 Mar 1984, p.16.
37. Interviews with Japanese banks and manufacturing firms, 1983-84.
38. Interviews with Japanese manufacturing firms, 1983-84.
39. See Ikeo (1983); Royarna (1982, ch.4).
40. See Washio (1974, 79-81).
41. The aluminium industry case is treated in detail in Chapters 8 and 9.
42. See Okumura (1978a, 50-1).
72
43. In this principal-agent explanation, non-main banks are the principals, and main 
banks the agents. For a review of the growing principal-agent literature, see the 
collection of essays in P ra t t  and Zeckhauser (1985).
44. “Ote kin’yü kikan furyö saiken 6200 okuen ni mo (Bad debts of large financial 
institutions up to 620 billion yen)” , Asahi sh in b u n , 1 May 1984, p .l;  “Sanwagin 300 oku 
kogetsuki (Sanwa Bank loses 30 billion yen)” , N K S , 31 May 1984, p.3; Shükan toy'd 
keizai  (1983).
45. The real estate was transferred in 1977; a t  the beginning of 1977 Daisue had 
bank borrowings totalling 81.7 billion yen, of which 25.1 billion was from Sanwa Bank 
(K igyö  keiretsu söran , 1977, 56).
46. For an account of bank intervention in the United States see Mintz and 
Schwartz (1985, ch.4).
47. The brunt of short-run labour adjustm ent is likely to fall on the ‘non-regular’ 
workforce, tha t  is, workers outside the ambit of the permanent employment system, such 
as ‘tem porary’ (r in j ikö ), seasonal (k ise tsukö ), part-time (generally female workers many 
of whom work more than 35 hours a week) (Inoki, 1983, 22-3), and ‘outside’ or 
subcontract workers (shagaikö). For instance, in the case of shipbuilding, which 
experienced a sharp decline in demand following the first oil shock in 1973, the number of 
regular workers fell only slightly between March 1975 and December 1976 from 69,370 to 
68,527, while the number of direct outside workers ( tha t is, workers who work inside the 
shipyards but without the status of regular employee of the company) fell from 43,016 to 
25,127 [Kaigin chösa , 1982, 79).
48. See Christainsen and Hogendorn (1983), Rohlen (1979), Shimada (1977, 1977a), 
Tsüshö sangyöshö sangyö seisakukyoku kigyö ködöka (1981). To take the example of 
shipbuilding again, Kaigin chösa (1982, 79) cites eight medium-sized shipbuilders as 
having announced voluntary retirement schemes between September 1977 and March 
1978 aimed at retrenching 3040 of their 17,154 regular employees.
49. Quoted in Shimada (1984, 34).
50. See Matsui (1977, 1979, 1979a) and the discussion in Sheard (1984). Share 
disposals are examined in more detail in Chapter 6.
51. “Yakuin ni Mitsubishigin moto jömu: Daimaru keiei saiken e ‘metsukeyaku’ 
(Mitsubishi Bank [sends in] former Senior Managing Director as director to Daimaru as 
‘watch-dog’ over managerial reconstruction)” , N K S , 23 Apr 1984, p . l l .
52. Pascale and Rohlen (1983, 229).
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4
C ase stu d ie s  o f th e  m ain  bank
The importance of the main-bank system in mediating structural adjustment in 
Japan  can be seen in the case of the general trading company Ataka Co., the au to­
maker Toyo Kogyo, the paper manufacturer Daishowa, and the overseas shipping firm 
Japan  Line. The case studies illustrate the role of the main bank in absorbing the costs of 
s tructural adjustment, a reflection of its risk-sharing role, and in intervening in the 
management of failing companies, a reflection of the role of the main bank as an 
instrument of capital market intervention. The main bank involved in the first three case 
studies is Sumitomo Bank, while in the fourth it is the Industrial Bank of Japan.
The case studies provide insights into different aspects of the main bank’s role. The 
Ataka case illustrates the close relation between the general trading company and its 
main bank or banks and highlights the role of the main bank in managing what was 
effectively the total reorganisation of the company. In the Toyo Kogyo case, the role of 
the main bank in restoring managerial efficiency to a firm in a prosperous industry is 
examined. The Daishowa case provides a similar case of the main bank’s restoring of 
managerial efficiency to a poorly-run firm, but it occurs in a designated depressed 
industry. The case study gives an im portant insight into the mechanisms at work on the 
private sector side of the industrial adjustment equation. The overseas shipping industry 
has been regulated and protected by government policy; the Japan Line case again brings 
out the im portant role played by corporate organisation in the adjustment of this key 
firm. Taken together the case studies provide an important insight into the main bank as 
a mechanism which brings about the kind of managerial, organisational and asset 
reorganisation usually attr ibu ted  to the bankruptcy and takeover mechanisms in more 
competitive capital market settings such as the United States.
A T A K A  & C O .1
An examination of the role of Sumitomo Bank in the reorganisation of Ataka Co., 
one of J a p an ’s general trading companies, in the mid-1970s illustrates the importance of 
the role of the main bank in mediating structural adjustment in Japan. Sumitomo Bank, 
in its capacity as main bank, took over the management of the failed general trading 
company, reorganised it, and absorbed losses on its account far in excess of its loan share.
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At the time of its failure in late 1975, Ataka ranked number nine by sales among 
Ja p a n ’s ten general trading companies. Ataka handled sales totalling 2000 billion yen 
(US$ 8 billion) and had about 1000 billion yen of debt obligations. The company had 
3700 direct employees, virtually all managerial staff, or about 20,000 employees if related 
companies are included. Ataka had 106 affiliates, including 25 overseas affiliates, and had 
transactions with some 35,000 firms.
The direct cause of A taka ’s failure was the accumulation of about US$ 330 million 
in bad debts by A taka’s wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary Ataka America on a Canadian 
petroleum-refining company. This was equivalent to about 100 billion yen at the exchange 
rate of the time and represented almost nine times A taka’s capital level of 11.7 billion 
yen. The bad debts resulted from a combination of managerial failure and the impact of 
the oil crisis. Eager to consolidate its position as a general trading company with 
participation in a large-scale overseas project, A taka agreed to supply crude oil to the 
Newfoundland Refining Company (NRC) on disadvantageous terms. The project’s 
profitability was premised on the fact that crude oil from the Middle East was to be used, 
which at US$ 1-2 per barrel was half the price of North American oil, but the refinery 
commenced operations in December 1973, a t  the very time tha t  Middle East crude oil 
quadrupled in price.
The NRC bad debts, however, represented just the tip of the iceberg of A taka’s 
financial and managerial problems. Like other general trading companies, A taka’s 
financial position was tied closely to that of thousands of affiliates and customer firms, to 
which it supplied trade credit or whose investments it financed, in its capacity as 
transactional and financial intermediary or as parent firm. Many of these firms were 
adversely affected by the oil crisis and the subsequent recession, meaning that general 
trading companies incurred large bad debts and investment losses. A taka’s position was 
particularly severe as it had pursued an aggressive strategy in the early 1970s, 
diversifying into real estate and leisure facilities such as golf courses. Of Ataka’s 71 major 
affiliates only 26 were paying dividends at the time of the failure. Thus, in addition to the 
100 billion yen NRC loss, A taka  was said to be carrying about 200-300 billion yen of 
losses.
The Ataka reorganisation highlights the role of the main bank in risk-sharing and 
corporate monitoring and intervention in the context of an internal capital market. 
Despite massive losses Ataka did not go bankrupt or undergo reorganisation in the legal 
sense; there were no formal bankruptcy, reorganisation or liquidation procedures, no 
receivers were appointed, and there was no settlement of claims on the firm in court. Nor 
did the government bail out Ataka, although the Bank of Japan, the Ministry of Finance, 
and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry were critical in supporting and
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adjudicating among the key private sector parties. Rather, Sumitomo Bank managed the 
entire process of reorganisation in its capacity as main bank.
Sumitomo Bank’s role was twofold. The bank intervened a t  the time of the crisis, 
placing the company under its direct management, and embarked on a process of internal 
reorganisation in preparation for the eventual absorption of Ataka by a number of other 
companies. This reflects the role of the main bank as an instrument of intervention in the 
internal capital market. Sumitomo also absorbed a share of A taka’s losses, far in excess 
of its loan share, reflecting the importance of the main bank in the nexus of risk-sharing 
relations underpinning corporate organisation in Japan.
News of the NRC-related bad debts of Ataka America broke in the Japanese press 
on 7 December 1975. Sumitomo claims tha t  the first it knew of A taka’s predicament was 
in September 1975 when Ataka asked Sumitomo and four other banks to roll-over trust 
receipts. A taka America purchased crude oil from British Petroleum Trading for supply 
to NRC using trust receipts from the New York branches of the Sumitomo, Kyowa, 
Tokyo, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Tokai Banks. Ataka America supplied the oil to NRC on 
150-day credit, with almost no collateral, and with the impact of the oil crisis sales to the 
targeted market of the U.S. became virtually impossible and NR C’s financial position and 
ability to settle its payments to Ataka deteriorated rapidly. By the end of September 
1975, A taka ’s claims on NRC totalled US$ 330 million, with virtually no prospect of 
recovery.
Initially Sumitomo’s efforts centred on taking steps to ensure tha t  Ataka did not 
collapse; these efforts involved at one level reorganisation of its finances and at another 
level ensuring through its expression of strong support as main bank th a t  the confidence 
of creditors and customer firms in Ataka was maintained. On the day th a t  the news broke 
in the press, the vice-president of Sumitomo Bank and the president of Kyowa Bank, 
A taka’s two main banks, held a joint press conference at the Bank of Japan at which they 
affirmed publicly their support for Ataka. This was followed by a press conference by a 
director of the Bank of Japan. As Hasegawa notes, “this amounted to a formal 
declaration by both the official and private banking authorities tha t  if A taka America 
suffered an untoward financial loss due to bad debts, it would be assured of adequate
o
funds to cover such a loss” /
At the same time Sumitomo set about establishing the internal organisational 
structure  necessary to undertake the management and reorganisation of Ataka, a task 
which was to continue for more than a decade. In December 1975 the bank set up a 
special team to handle the A taka affair under Vice-President Isoda Ichiro (later president 
and then chairman). The first measure taken was to isolate the NRC bad debts from 
A taka America, in order to prevent bankruptcy. This was done by arranging for Ataka
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to set up a paper company, Atlantic Trading (Delaware) Corporation (ATC), to which 
only the loans of five banks were transferred. The company was set up on 18 December 
1975 and the transfer of debts was completed by 30 January 1976, when Ataka America’s 
books were due to close. On 30 April 1976, ATC had the following borrowings, which for 
the banks concerned represented certain losses:
Sumitomo Bank US$ 140,228,095 (41%)
Kyowa Bank 96,099,584 (29)
Mitsubishi Bank 40,838,717 (12)
Tokyo Bank 34,555,876 (10)
Mitsui Bank 24,649,444 (7)
Total US$ 336,371,715 (100%)
Sumitomo then moved to find another general trading company to take over Ataka. 
On 12 January  1976 Ataka, Sumitomo Bank, Kyowa Bank, and C.Itoh held a joint press 
conference at the Keidanren headquarters in Tokyo to announce an ‘administrative tie-up’ 
{gyömu teikei)  between C.Itoh and Ataka, as the first step in the selective absorption of 
Ataka by the fourth largest general trading company. The agreement was signed on 14 
February and in April C.Itoh despatched eleven managers to Ataka, including Matsui 
Yanosuke as advisor-director. The takeover did not occur, however, for almost two years 
as resistance to the merger on the part of A taka employees grew and as negotiations 
between the key parties were held on how much of Ataka C.Itoh was to absorb and on 
what terms, and on how the final losses of Ataka were to be split up among the banks.
In June 1976 Sumitomo’s low-key behind-the-scenes role in A taka’s management 
became more visible. Sumitomo replaced seventeen of the incumbent Ataka director- 
managers with a new management team centring on Komatsu Yasushi, Senior Managing 
Director (J ö m u ) from Sumitomo Bank as president, Tanaka Hidetaka, Senior Managing 
Director from Kyowa Bank as vice-president, and Matsui from C.Itoh as chairman. 
Twelve directors on the new board were Ataka managers, including nine managers who 
had served on the previous board, but all the key figures associated with A taka’s demise 
including Takagi Shigeo, President of Ataka America at the time of the NRC project, 
were displaced from Ataka. At the same time Sumitomo upgraded its Ataka team into 
an official section of the bank, the Number Three Loans Section (Yiishi daisanbu ), with 
about ten managers and headed by the General Manager of the Number Two 
Investigative Division (Chdsa dainibu), Mornose Yuji.
Sumitomo Bank’s reorganisation of Ataka centred on placing what parts  of the 
trading company it could with other trading or manufacturing firms and disposing of 
what assets of Ataka it could to minimise the losses of the firm. Those assets which could 
not be disposed of in this way, such as shares in affiliates, real estate and precious items, 
were transferred to a liquidation company, AC Industry Co., set up by Sumitomo for the
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purpose. C.Itoh took the largest portion, but by no means all, of Ataka. After making a 
thorough investigation of A taka’s customer firms, C.Itoh absorbed those divisions which 
best suited its own business needs. The absorption of Ataka, with its strong steel and 
machinery interests, provided the opportunity for C.Itoh further to diversify away from 
its traditional textile area. Thus C.Itoh absorbed some or all of Ataka’s steel, non-ferrous 
metals, nuclear fuels, chemicals, pulp and paper, machinery, and agricultural and marine 
products divisions. These operations represented about 600 billion yen in annual sales 
turnover and 1058 employees a t  the time of the absorption, less than a third of the 
com pany’s 2000 billion yen sales and 3700 employees a t the time of the crisis in 1975. 
Itoman, a textile trader with strong Sumitomo connections, absorbed most of A taka’s 
textile division; Sumitomo Forestry took a large portion of A taka’s overseas lumber 
operations; and Okura Shöji took A taka’s machine-tool imports. Several parts of Ataka 
were set up as separate companies, namely parts of the lumber, construction, agricultural 
and marine products, real estate, machinery, and textile divisions; the last two were 
established as independent firms and AC Industry became the parent firm in the other 
cases.
A major aspect of A taka’s reorganisation was how to absorb the losses of the 
company and Sumitomo Bank played a major role in this process also. The 100 billion 
yen loss on NRC was not A taka’s only loss. Ataka also had immense losses in the form of 
such balance sheet items as shares in affiliates, loans, accounts and bills receivable, and 
real estate holdings. Some of these losses resulted from reckless investments in the 
speculation boom of 1971-72, while others represented the effect of close involvement with 
industries left structurally depressed by the oil crisis. At the closing of books in March 
1977, six months before the merger with C.Itoh, Ataka recorded a loss of 133 billion yen, 
bringing its accumulated losses to 139 billion yen or 127 billion more than the company’s 
own capital. These figures are exclusive of the NRC losses. The loss for the year included 
special losses not related to current operations of 102 billion yen including 74 billion yen 
written off as bad debts on affiliates.
The Ataka losses were cleared in the following way. Losses outstanding at the time 
of the absorption of Ataka by C.Itoh, including NRC-related losses, totalled 197.8 billion. 
Sumitomo, as main bank, absorbed 113.2 billion yen or 57 per cent of the total; Kyowa, 
as second-line main bank, absorbed 47.5 billion or 24 per cent; and four banks, Sumitomo 
T rust  Banking and the three other banks which financed A taka’s NRC dealings, 
Tokyo, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui Banks, 17 per cent; and ten other major banks 2 per cent. 
A further 299.3 billion yen of losses in the form of assets which were worthless or difficult 
to recover were transferred to AC Industry, for disposal and absorption of residual losses 
over a seven-year period. The six banks, the two ‘mains’ and the four ‘sub-mains’ listed
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above, financed AC Industry with seven-year interest-free loans, with a large amount of 
the loans being written off as losses by the banks over the seven-year period. Sumitomo 
provided 169.1 billion yen or 57 per cent of AC Industry’s finance, Kyowa some 28 per 
cent, and the other four banks 15 per cent. Sumitomo wrote off 69.7 billion yen of its 
loans to AC Industry as losses over seven years, bringing its total direct losses on A taka’s 
account to a t  least 182.9 billion yen.**
It is instructive to contrast the share of the two main banks in absorbing A taka’s 
losses with their share in total bank loans to Ataka. In March 1975 Sumitomo provided 
14.6 per cent of A taka’s borrowings and Kyowa 7.8 per cent, yet they absorbed at least 57 
and 24 per cent of A taka’s residual losses respectively or 81 per cent together. The four 
‘sub-m ain’ banks accounted for 19.2 per cent of loans and absorbed some 17 per cent of 
losses. In the conventional world of finance it is the shareholders who are the residual 
risk-bearers in the firm and, should a firm go bankrupt, creditors may incur losses on 
some of their claims on the firm. In the Ataka case, however, a few large creditors bore 
enormous losses (much larger than their initial claims) without the company ever going 
bankrupt in the legal sense. In contrast, the shareholders were able to salvage capital 
from the firm through the merger with C.Itoh, which allowed them to obtain one share in 
the larger general trading company for every five Ataka shares tha t  they held.
TO Y O  K O G Y O 4
Sumitomo Bank’s intervention in the management of the failed automobile maker, 
Toyo Kogyo (maker of Mazda), is an im portant case study of the role of the main bank in 
restoring competitiveness to a poorly managed company. In this case, the effect of main- 
bank intervention parallels tha t  normally ascribed to the takeover mechanism of the 
external capital market, namely to increase the efficiency with which assets are managed. 
Following the oil crisis in 1973 the competitiveness of Toyo Kogyo deteriorated sharply 
and by 1975 Japan ’s third largest automobile maker faced bankruptcy. Sumitomo Bank, 
as Toyo Kogyo’s main bank, provided the necessary financial assistance to stave off 
bankruptcy and a t  the same time virtually took over the management of the company. 
Sumitomo set about restoring Toyo Kogyo’s competitiveness by reorganising and 
streamlining its operations, and then arranged a capital tie-up w'ith Ford to secure the 
com pany’s long-term future.
The immediate cause of Toyo Kogyo’s failure was the oil crisis in 1973 and the 
subsequent fall in demand for its output, particularly in its major market, the United 
States. The external shocks also exposed serious managerial weaknesses in the company. 
Prior to the oil crisis Toyo Kogyo had enjoyed considerable success with its rotary engine. 
The rotary engine had a reputation for being low on pollution, which proved a major
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selling point in the U.S. where strict anti-emission controls had been introduced. With 
this success behind it, Toyo Kogyo embarked on a major expansion. As with A taka’s 
petroleum-refining venture it could not have been timed worse; following the oil crisis and 
the ensuing recession worldwide demand for automobiles declined, with demand in the 
U.S. in 1974 being 20 per cent lower than in the previous year. But more importantly, 
with fuel economy now a major sales point Toyo Kogyo could not compete in fuel 
efficiency with other Japanese makers. Fuel efficiency tests by the Environment 
Protection Agency in the United States showed the fuel consumption of Toyo Kogyo’s 
main-line rotary engine to be 50 per cent higher than tha t  of comparable Toyota and 
Nissan models. This caused Toyo Kogyo’s sales in the U.S. to drop suddenly from May 
1974 to less than half of their previous level. Stock levels in the U.S. rose to about 86,000, 
or the equivalent of two years’ sales, and from August 1974 the company was forced to 
suspend exports to the United States.
Toyo Kogyo’s postion was exacerbated by the production strategy it adopted after 
the oil crisis. Whereas other makers in Japan immediately scaled down output, Toyo 
Kogyo continued full-scale production, in an a ttem p t to cover the domestic downturn in 
sales with an increase in exports. Faced with mounting stocks and increasing debt, Toyo 
Kogyo moved to reduce output by 15 per cent in January 1975, a year after other makers 
had done so. But the response of Toyo Kogyo’s management was a case of ‘too little, too 
late’: the company faced imminent bankruptcy. Toyo Kogyo’s United States sales
subsidiary, Mazda Motors of America, registered a loss of US$ 740 million, or 23 billion 
yen at the exchange rate of the time, at the April 1975 closing of books, while Toyo 
Kogyo sustained an operating loss of 17.3 billion yen in the year ending October 1975.
It is instructive to speculate on the possible scenarios for a large company facing 
bankruptcy as Toyo Kogyo was in early 1975. First, the company might indeed go 
bankrupt, perhaps leading to the appointment of receivers to manage it and the 
settlement of claims on the firm in court. Given the nature of interfirm organisation in 
the Japanese automobile industry, the result would almost certainly have been ‘domino’ 
bankruptcies among related suppliers and subcontractors and large-scale loss of 
employment for both the direct and the related workforce.^ In 1974, Toyo Kogyo had 
annual sales of 520 billion yen, debts in the form of bank borrowings and payments owing 
to suppliers totalling 500 billion yen (US$ 2 billion), and about 1500 suppliers and 
subcontractors. The company employed 37,000 workers directly, but about 80,000 if 
subcontractors and dealers are included.
A second possible scenario is tha t  the government might step in with assistance to 
bail out the company. The possible disruption and social costs of a large-scale 
bankruptcy are often used as justification for such government assistance, a notable
80
example being the parallel case of Chrysler in the United States.6 In Toyo Kogyo’s case, 
the au to-m aker’s critical position in the regional economy might have offered further 
justification for government assistance: all of Toyo Kogyo’s output was produced in 
Hiroshima City and accounted for 20 per cent of Hiroshima Prefecture’s industrial 
shipments, 35 per cent of its overseas exports, and 17 per cent of its manufacturing 
workforce.
A third scenario is for the company to raise from the capital market the additional 
finance necessary to tide itself over the crisis. But the term ‘bankruptcy’ implies precisely 
this inability to raise finance. The poor financial state  of the company means that it is 
unable to offer collateral on the additional finance and tha t  external creditors are not 
willing to take on the extra risks of the investment.
W hat occurred in the Toyo Kogyo case, and has occurred in many other cases in 
Japan , differs from all of the above scenarios. Reflecting the existence of an internal 
capital market among related firms, Sumitomo Bank intervened with financial and 
managerial assistance to restore the company to corporate health.
Sumitomo Bank’s first move was to have two executives despatched to Toyo Kogyo 
as directors in early 1974, Hanaoka Shinpei, General Manager of Bank Administration at 
Sumitomo Bank, and Nakam ura Kazuo, General Manager of Corporate Trust Banking at 
Sumitomo Trust &; Banking. This served two purposes: it improved the capacity of the 
bank to monitor the company and influence as necessary decision-making from the inside, 
and it provided a signal to other banks and creditors tha t  Sumitomo was prepared to 
support Toyo Kogyo. By early 1975 Toyo Kogyo was effectively under Sumitomo Bank’s 
direct management. In January  1975 Sumitomo despatched its former president, Asai 
Köji, as advisor-director to Toyo Kogyo and a t  the same time arranged for Nagano 
Shigeo, who was Chairman of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and was also born in 
Hiroshima, to enter Toyo Kogyo in a similar capacity.
At the same time Sumitomo Bank set up a special department, the Number Two 
Loans Department (Yushi da in ibu ), to handle the Toyo Kogyo rescue. The auto-maker’s 
finances were at their worst in the months of February to April 1975 when mounting 
losses resulted in a large capital shortfall. Sumitomo Bank arranged for Toyo Kogyo to 
dispose of its Osaka and Tokyo offices, raising 26 billion yen, and its shares in Sumitomo 
Bank and Sumitomo Trust &; Banking, which raised a further 6 billion yen. Despite these 
moves, a capital shortfall of 34 billion yen remained. The two Sumitomo banks provided 
24 billion yen, or some 70 per cent of the shortfall, in the form of emergency finance, thus 
ensuring tha t  the auto-maker was saved from collapse.
Sumitomo Bank then set about reorganising Toyo Kogyo’s financial, management, 
and production structures. Initial efforts centred on rectifying the position of the United
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States sales subsidiary of Toyo Kogyo. Mazda Motors of America was split into two 
parts, seventeen central and twelve western states and eighteen eastern states, and taken 
over by Sumitomo Corporation and C.Itoh respectively.
In late 1975, Sumitomo sent in a team of nine managers with Murai Tsutomu, 
General Manager of Sumitomo’s Tokyo head-office and a director of the bank, as vice- 
president. Sumitomo also arranged for directors from Sumitomo Trust &; Banking and 
from Sumitomo Corporation to join the management team. M atsuda Köhei, the founder’s 
grandson who assumed the presidency from his father in 1970, remained president albeit 
in a nominal role, but other senior executives were displaced from the management team. 
A basic cause of Toyo Kogyo’s failure was managerial and organisational weakness 
because it had been a family-dominated firm. Under Murai, the Sumitomo management 
team instituted major organisational changes aimed at streamlining the decision-making 
structure and making it more broadly based. The defunct inner board of senior managing 
directors (jö m u k a i) was resurrected and made the central decision-making body of the 
company, and in April 1977 a “president’s office” (shachösh itsu ) was established to 
coordinate company-wide functions.
The Sumitomo managers made changes across the whole company aimed at 
improving efficiency and cutting costs, and established a cost-control department to 
oversee cost reduction efforts. The production system was revamped and value-added 
engineering and productivity campaigns were introduced. A thorough rationalisation of 
the subcontracting network was carried out to bring it into line with the cost-efficient 
systems of the other Japanese auto-makers.
An important aspect of the cost-cutting program involved reduction in the 
workforce. As was argued in the previous chapter, the guarantee of permanent 
employment by the Japanese company to a section of its workforce does not prevent 
labour adjustment from occurring; it just changes its form. As well as reducing the 
workforce by not replacing retiring workers, surplus employees were transferred to the 
sales and distribution network under a scheme whereby the dealers and Toyo Kogyo 
shared costs. In the first stage of the scheme from 1975, from 1500 to 1800 workers were 
in the sales network a t any one time, and from 1978 the scheme was expanded to 
encompass about 2900 workers at any one time.8 Pascale and Rohlen estimate the savings 
in labour costs to Toyo Kogyo at 30 billion yen over the seven years that the scheme 
operated.9
Sumitomo Bank also mobilised support for Toyo Kogyo among other group firms. 
The two Sumitomo banks and Sumitomo Corporation set up special sections in their 
firms to promote the sale of Mazda vehicles among their customer firms and employees. 
Sumitomo also obtained cooperation from key suppliers in the group such as Sumitomo
82
Metal, Nippon Sheet Glass, Sumitomo Electric, and Sumitomo Corporation in continuing 
to supply material inputs on favourable terms. As a result of the various measures, and 
aided by an upturn in the export market, Toyo Kogyo’s position improved markedly with 
profits being registered in October 1976 and each year thereafter.
Sumitomo completed the reorganisation of Toyo Kogyo by installing a competent 
Toyo Kogyo executive as president (in late 1977) and by arranging for Ford to take a 25 
per cent capital holding in the Japanese auto-maker in 1979. Sumitomo had, in its 
capacity as main bank, nearly succeeded in forging a capital tie-up between Toyo Kogyo 
and Ford in 1972 after three years of careful negotiations, but the president, M atsuda 
Köhei, turned down the Ford offer. However, Toyo Kogyo did have an agreement to 
supply small trucks to Ford from 1971 and by 1975 these sales represented 15 per cent of 
Toyo Kogyo’s total exports. Sumitomo regarded a strengthening of the ties with Ford as 
essential to Toyo Kogyo’s long-term viability and Sumitomo executives made several 
trips to Detroit in an effort to secure Ford’s capital involvement. Sumitomo’s assurance of 
continued support for Toyo Kogyo was tan tam oun t to an implicit guarantee of Ford’s 
investment. At the same time tha t  Ford obtained a 25 per cent holding in Toyo Kogyo at 
an outlay of 30 billion yen, Sumitomo group firms increased their total holdings to around 
15 per cent.
D A I S H O W A  P A P E R  M A N U F A C T U R I N G 10
Daishowa Paper Manufacturing, the second largest pulp and paper manufacturer in 
Japan , is another large firm which has undergone reorganisation under the main-bank 
management of Sumitomo. Unlike Toyo Kogyo, however, Daishowa belonged to a 
structurally depressed industry, which was undergoing rationalisation within a public 
policy framework. Thus, while Daishowa was participating in a recession and scrapping 
cartel with other paper makers, Sumitomo Bank was restoring managerial efficiency 
through its intervention in the firm, which centred on efforts to dispose of unprofitable 
assets, to reduce borrowings and to overhaul managerial and organisational structures.
Like Toyo Kogyo and a great many successful Japanese firms, Daishowa was a 
family-dominated enterprise. Saito Ryoei, eldest son of the founder of Daishowa, became 
president in 1961 and presided over a major and highly successful expansion of the 
company’s pulp and paper business. Saitö also engaged the company in a large-scale 
program of diversification into real estate and leisure facilities in the early 1970s. The two 
oil price hikes and the domestic recession resulted in structural depression in the pulp and 
paper industry, and Daishowa faced the added burden of its unprofitable investments in 
real estate and leisure facilities after the speculative boom of the early 1970s passed. In 
1981 Daishowa and its affiliates had debt totalling nearly 500 billion yen (US$ 2 billion),
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much of which was related to these unprofitable investments. In April 1981 Sumitomo 
Bank, the paper manufacturer’s main bank, sent in two of its directors to manage the 
firm: Tamai Hideji as vice-president and Ogami Nobuyuki as managing director. 
Sumitomo also set up a special team, the Number Two Investigative Section (Eigyö  
sh insa  dainibu),  to deal exclusively with the Daishowa reorganisation, as it did in the 
A taka  and Toyo Kogyo cases.11 The bank also despatched a number of younger bank 
executives to assist the senior directors in the assessment of Daishowa’s problems and in 
the implementation of rationalisation measures.
Sumitomo’s first move was to set up a president’s office to formulate and coordinate 
the implementation of Daishowa’s rationalisation.1  ^ The team comprised ten younger 
Daishowa executives from the key departments of finance, accounting, sales, and 
corporate planning, and five officers from Sumitomo Bank. At the same time Sumitomo 
established a ‘managerial conference’ (keiei kaigi) comprising Tamai and the other vice- 
presidents to take the final decisions on the measures proposed by the president’s office. 
These moves effectively removed the president, Saitö, from the frontline of decision­
making in the company, while providing the opportunity for promising younger 
executives in Daishowa to work in tandem with the bank in restoring the affairs of the 
company.
Sumitomo’s move into Daishowa also signalled an important shift in the company’s 
a tt i tude  to its involvement in industry-wide restructuring. Daishowa had been refusing 
to join eight other paper makers in a recession cartel in the paper industry, despite strong 
pressure from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and from industry 
leaders. However, Sumitomo emphasised cooperation with other firms in industry 
rationalisation together with improvement of the firm’s finances and modernisation of
i  o
management practices as the three keys to Daishowa’s revival.10 Pressure from Sumitomo 
made Daishowa, which had a 20 per cent market share, join the official recession cartel in 
August 1981, paving the way for smoother adjustment for the industry in scrapping some 
40 to 50 per cent of capacity under the structurally depressed industries law.11
Under Sumitomo management, Daishowa carried out a large-scale program of asset 
disposals, which allowed it to reduce its bank borrowings by 260 billion yen (US$ 1.0 
billion) in two years.15 At the same time, a thorough overhaul of Daishowa’s group of 
affiliates was implemented, to improve organisational efficiency and the competitiveness 
of the group. Assets disposed of included large amounts of real estate, four of the group’s 
seven golf courses, and shareholdings, including seven million shares in Sumitomo Bank.16 
Par t  of the rationalisation involved reducing Daishowa’s more than fifty affiliates to less 
than half tha t  number through consolidation and restructuring.1^  For instance, in May 
1982 four affiliates involved in the production and sales of paper bags were merged,
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leading to the closure of three plants and the disposal of the land, with the funds 
generated being used to reduce borrowings; and in April 1983 Daishowa absorbed three of 
its major subsidiaries.10
An important aspect of Sumitomo’s role in reorganising Daishowa involved 
removing the grip of Saitö Ryöei on the control of the decision-making and the assets of 
the company. In February 1982, Sumitomo arranged for Saitö to resign as president, 
although effectively he had been president in name only since the bank assumed control a 
year earlier, and for his younger brother, Saitö Shigetoshi, at tha t  time a member of the 
Diet and the previous Minister for Construction, to take over the presidency of 
Daishowa.19 At the same time, an a ttem pt was made to improve managerial efficiency by 
moving managers to new positions and by delegating decision-making functions 
previously in the hands of the president to other directors and department ch ie fs /  Then, 
as part  of the rationalisation of affiliates, Sumitomo arranged for Saitö Ryöei to set up 
three companies to purchase for about 10 billion yen real estate and other assets owned 
by Daishowa affiliates with strong Saito family connec t ions /1 At the time that 
Sumitomo took control of Daishowa’s affairs, Daishowa’s 54 affiliates held about 32 per 
cent of the parent firm’s shares. The Saitö family directly owned large portions of the 
affiliates, and therefore owned Daishowa indirectly, through this convoluted web of cross- 
shareholdings. In the course of the rationalisation, affiliates disposed of about 25 million 
of Daishowa’s shares, reducing their combined holdings to about 16 per cent. These shares 
were directly placed with Daishowa’s major business partners, so as to maintain stable 
shareholding arrangements in the internal capital market. Some 21 million shares were 
taken over by financial institutions, with Sumitomo and Daishowa's second-line main 
bank, Asahi Mutual Life Insurance, each taking 3.1 million shares to bring their 
shareholdings to the 5 per cent m a r k .^  Thus, the effect of Sumitomo’s intervention in 
Daishowa was not only to restore competitiveness to its finances, management and 
production, but also to convert it from a family-dominated to a managerial firm in the 
mould of the typical Japanese group firm.
After recording operating losses of 1.4 billion yen in the 1980 financial year (FY) 
(ending in March 1981) and 7.9 billion yen in the 1981 FY, Daishowa posted an operating 
profit of 3.5 billion yen in 1982. In December 1982, W ada Shinzö, Senior Managing 
Director of Sumitomo Bank, entered Daishowa to replace Tamai as vice-president and to 
take charge of the second phase of Daishowa’s rationalisation and recovery/ In March 
1983, a new two-year plan was announced, involving further asset disposals and a 70 
billion yen reduction in borrowings by March 1985, and the expansion of the managerial 
conference from five to fifteen members to include divisional general managers and 
directors from the president’s office in the firm’s highest level decision-making b o d y / '1
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J A P A N  L I N E 25
Japan  Line is one of Japan ’s largest overseas shipping companies and has the largest 
tanker division in the world. The Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ), as the main bank of 
Japan  Line, has played a major role in assisting Japan  Line to adjust to the recession and 
structural change of the 1970s. The IBJ is the largest of the three long-term credit banks 
in Japan  and has been a major pillar of industrial finance in postwar Japan.
Japanese policy-makers consider overseas shipping to be of special strategic 
importance, given the reliance of the country on trade and particularly on the import of 
raw materials such as crude oil. The industry has been heavily regulated and fostered by 
the government, particularly by the Ministry of Transport, which has administrative 
jurisdiction over the industry. Shipping, along with other key sectors such as power 
utilities, shipbuilding, and steel, has received large amounts of low-interest government 
finance through the Japan Development Bank (JD B ).2® As in other depressed sectors, 
adjustm ent in the shipping industry has involved the government and the private sector. 
Here the role of the main bank is examined.
The oil crisis in 1973 precipitated a prolonged worldwide recession in the oil tanker 
industry; Japan Line, which specialised in large oil tankers, was severely affected. 
Operating profits declined dramatically from 17.0 billion yen in the 1974 financial year 
(FY) (ending March 1975) to just under one billion yen in the 1975 FY. In the 1976 FY 
the company incurred an operating loss of 1.2 billion yen and the loss in the following 
year rose to 24.7 billion yen (USS 99 million).
The IBJ played a major role as main bank in assisting the rationalisation of Japan 
Line. In 1977, with losses mounting Japan Line faced a major capital shortage and the 
IBJ supported the shipping company by agreeing to expand the supply of long-term 
working capital and, with other banks, to freeze repayments on long-term borrowings. At 
the same time the IBJ helped Japan Line to raise capital and cover losses by agreeing to 
it reducing the level of bank deposits it held and to the sale of its shareholdings/ In 
December 1977 Japan Line applied to the IBJ, the JDB, and eleven other banks to have 
repayments on 49.4 billion yen of long-term borrowings deferred for three years. In what, 
under the informal system of compulsory deposits, amounted virtually to a reduction in 
the effective interest rate, Japan Line was able to reduce its level of bank deposits by 15.2 
billion yen from 24.2 to 9.0 billion yen between March 1977 and March 1978. Japan Line 
also disposed of 8 million shares in the IBJ, in the familiar pattern of firms using shares in 
their main bank to offset losses and raise capital when experiencing financial crisis.
In 1978 the IBJ installed its own management team to supervise the rationalisation 
of Japan  Line. Kitagawa Takeshi, senior managing director at the IBJ, was sent in as 
president and nine of the incumbent director-managers were ousted. In 1980 Kataoka 
Seiichirö, another senior managing director at the IBJ, entered as vice-president.
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The rationalisation carried out at Japan Line under IBJ stewardship was the 
familiar package of streamlining and cost-cutting measures necessary to restore a near­
bankrupt firm to a sound financial and competitive position. The measures included the 
disposal of shares and other assets, reductions in surplus production capacity (in this case, 
ships) and in workforce, and the cutting of administrative and operating costs. The 1978 
rationalisation plan, for instance, aimed at improving cash flow by 24 billion yen through
n o
such m e a s u re s /0 However, the second oil crisis in 1979 further reduced the 
competitiveness of Japan Line’s tanker division, such tha t  by the early 1980s the division
o n
was generating annual losses of 1-1.5 billion yen per tanker. After managing to record 
small operating profits in 1980 and 1981, Japan Line made a 10.3 billion yen operating 
loss in the 1982 FY, bringing its accumulated losses to 28.2 billion yen (US$ 113 million).
By the end of the 1983 FY the level of accumulated losses would have exceeded 
Japan  Line’s capital level of 34.6 billion yen, had drastic assistance measures not been 
taken. A new rationalisation plan was drawn up by the IBJ and explained to the other
o n
banks at the IBJ headquarters in March 1984. This was a strong ‘signal’ to the other 
banks th a t  they could continue to finance Japan  Line on the basis of continued IBJ 
backing for the near-bankrupt shipping company. The following measures were taken. 
Japan Line had 33 tankers, ten of its own, eleven owned by overseas subsidiaries and 
twrelve operated on ten- to fifteen-year leases from overseas owners. In mid-March a paper 
company was set up to take over eleven of the tankers, the ten owned directly by Japan 
Line and one of its subsidiary’s, together with about 50 billion yen of associated debts. 
The IBJ, the JDB and ten other banks are freezing repayments and shelving interest 
payments on these borrowings for a period of four years until the end of March 1988. 
Similar financial assistance involving a reported 50 billion yen is being given to the
9 1
overseas subsidiaries for their ten remaining t a n k e r s / 1 In addition, the IBJ and other 
banks are providing financial assistance to ease the burden associated with the leased 
tankers. This assistance involves up to 16 billion yen to set up an overseas subsidiary to 
purchase four of the tankers for re-leasing to Japan Line, with the IBJ and other banks 
providing interest reductions and deferment of repayments on the funds supplied. 
Paralleling these measures, a third-party share issue was made at the end of March 1984 
to the IBJ and other banks, insurance companies, shipbuilders and other related firms,
on
raising 27 billion yen. The IBJ was reported to be taking one-third of the issue. Shares 
and real estate to the value of 30 billion yen are also being disposed of under the plan.
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C O N C L U SIO N
An im portant finding of the analysis is tha t  the main bank, in its role as a risk­
sharing agent and instrument of monitoring and intervention in the internal capital 
market, has played a major role in the adjustment of large firms to sudden and large 
shifts in competitiveness and demand.
At one level, main banks have provided, and have monitored the effectiveness of, 
various forms of financial assistance to depressed firms, which has served to cushion the 
impact of large-scale structural change and adjustment on the firms and their workforces. 
At another level, main banks have intervened to varying degrees in the management of 
struggling firms and have been instrumental in bringing about major financial, 
organisational and labour adjustments. The involvement of main banks in this way 
reflects their role as risk-sharing agents and instruments of screening, monitoring and 
intervention in internal capital markets, formed by groupings of firms.
The effect of bank assistance appears to be tha t  it has helped to cushion the impact 
of structural change rather than to prevent adjustment from taking place, and to spread 
the costs of adjustment rather than to provide permanent subsidies for inefficient 
production or management. Main banks have not provided financial assistance in a 
blanket fashion, but rather have made their assistance contingent on firms’ carrying out 
major rationalisations. Similarly, although firms are insulated from external capital 
market forces, main-bank intervention appears to produce, via a very different set of 
mechanisms, many of the results of a competitive market for corporate control in terms of 
management-sanctioning and asset reorganisations. The analysis now turns to another 
important aspect of the corporate organisation of internal capital markets in Japan, 
namely the general trading company.
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5
G eneral tra d in g  com p an ies
The general trading company is an important mechanism in the operation of the 
financial corporate grouping as an internal capital market. In close association with its 
main bank, the general trading company performs a major risk-bearing role, internalising 
risk in a highly-diversified investment and transaction portfolio. At one level, the general 
trading company can be viewed as constituting one of several important institutional 
mechanisms for diversifying risks in the high growth period in Japan, in the absence of 
well-developed capital markets. At another level, the general trading company can be 
thought of as representing an mechanism for the implicit insurance of firm risks and 
indirectly for the insurance of the human-capital risks of the ‘lifetime’ employees of the 
firms. Reflecting its risk-bearing role, the general trading company has played an 
im portant part  in absorbing the costs of structural adjustment in Japan since the first oil 
crisis.
D IV E R S IF Y IN G  R ISK S IN THE HIGH G R O W T H  P E R IO D
In Chapter 2, it was argued tha t  the internal capital market formed by groupings of 
firms represents an institutional mechanism enabling firms, as opposed to individual 
investors, to diversify risks and obtain insulation from external capital market forces. It 
was argued tha t  the internal capital market performed an important risk-diversifying role 
in the absence of well-developed external capital markets and that the internal capital 
market could be viewed as representing an ex ante set-up or institutional response on the 
part of firms operating ‘lifetime’ employment systems which allowed them to pool their 
risks. It is argued here that the general trading company (GTC), in close association with 
its main bank, constitutes one of the important mechanisms for diversifying risks in the 
internal capital market.^
Although there are several thousand trading companies in Japan, the distinguishing 
feature of the nine ‘general’ trading companies (sögö shösha ) is their enormous size, their 
high degree of diversification, and their close association with their main banks and 
financial corporate groupings. In the 1981 financial year (FY) (ending in March), the 
combined sales turnover of the six largest general trading companies was 70,191 billion
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yen (US$ 281 billion). This figure represented 20 per cent of Japanese wholesale trade and 
was equivalent to 28 per cent of gross national product.2 General trading companies are 
best known for the important role they play in handling Japan ’s international trade: in 
1981 the six largest GTCs handled about half of J a p an ’s imports and about 40 per cent of
o
her exports. It has not so often been stressed, however, tha t  general trading companies 
also play a major role as intermediaries in interfirm transactions in the domestic market. 
Indeed, historically, it might be claimed th a t  the G T C 's  role in international trade has 
been ancillary to its more basic function in the domestic market.^ At the time of the first 
oil crisis, for instance, about 55 per cent of the sales turnover of the GTCs came from 
domestic transactions, while the other 45 per cent came from export, import and third- 
country trade/'’ A major argument is tha t  the function of the GTC in domestic 
transactions is not so much as a sales and purchase agent or trading company -- although 
this function is im portant in some commodities — as a quasi-financial institution 
providing a major risk-bearing function.
The capacity of the general trading company to diversify economic risks stems from 
the fact tha t  it receives income streams from an extremely large and diversified portfolio 
of transactions and investments.^ At one level the general trading company provides an 
insurance function or risk-buffer in interfirm sales and purchases transactions. General 
trading company intermediation breaks one physical transaction into two financial 
components, allowing the GTC to absorb in a diversified transaction portfolio the default 
risk associated with the extension of large am ounts of trade credit by specialised 
manufacturing firms. At another level, the GTC functions as a quasi-financial institution, 
channelling investment funds and working-capital from recognised financial institutions 
such as city and long-term credit banks to specialised manufacturers. This finance takes 
the form of shareholdings and ‘trading company finance’ (shdsha k i n ’yu), that is, trade 
credit, loans, loan guarantees and stock finance.
The general trading company represents an institutional linchpin in the system of 
large-scale use of trade credit for interfirm transactions in Japan, by serving as a risk- 
buffer between supplier and purchaser firms in intermediate product markets. By 
accepting the mediation of a GTC, supplier firms are able to insure against the risk of 
default on the extension of trade credit to purchaser firms.
Suppliers of intermediate products in Japan  typically extend up to several months’ 
trade credit to purchaser firms, through the use of bills of payment (yakusoku tegata) 
issued by the purchaser to the supplier. In the domestic steel trade, for instance, the 
average length of bill in 1982 was 118 days.0 Supplier and purchaser firms are both 
typically highly specialised in a particular industry or product line and in basic-material 
industries purchasers are often small or medium-sized firms. The reliance on trade credit
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means tha t  potential losses for suppliers from the bankruptcy of purchaser firms can be 
high, carrying the risk that the bankruptcy of purchasers in a downturn in the business 
cycle may trigger their own financial failure.
The general trading company provides a  mechanism for specialised manufacturing 
firms to pool their default risks and particularly for suppliers to insure against the risk of 
default on trade credit. The G TC consolidates these risks and spreads them over many 
transactions with firms in a diverse range of industries. The GTC does this by entering 
the transaction as a financial intermediary between supplier and purchaser, accepting 
payment from the buyer in the form of a bill of payment and issuing its own bill to the 
supplier. The supplier’s extension of credit is to the GTC (or other trading company as 
the case may be) not to the purchaser. Similarly, the liability of the purchaser is to the 
G T C  rather than to the supplier.
Thus the effect of general trading company intermediation is to break a single 
physical transaction -- delivery is usually direct from the supplier to the purchaser and 
does not involve the GTC — into two separate financial components (Figure 5-1). The 
supplier pays commissions to the GTC and a portion of the commission can be thought of 
as constituting an implicit insurance premium against the risk of default. Thus 
commissions tend to vary with the amount of risk attached to the transaction.9 
Sometimes these payments are termed ‘sleeping commissions’ (n e m u n  kosen),  as 
commonly the G TC takes no active part in the transaction at all, but rather receives and 
issues bills as a m atter of course after the physical transaction has transpired and 
notification of despatch and receipt has been received. The term is misleading, however, 
as the payments have a clear economic role, being cross-payments from the manufacturer 
to the GTC for a package of services for which conventional markets do not exist, one of 
which is the risk-bearing function described here.19
Table 5-1 shows that the sales turnover of the GTCs, and therefore the transactions 
which generate the stream of commissions and implicit insurance premiums to the GTCs, 
is highly diversified. The enormous size of the GTC, together with its diversified 
structure, means tha t  there is virtually no risk of default by the GTC on its trade-related 
obligations. This means that, by utilising the services of the GTC, supplier firms can 
reduce the risks they face in supplying output on extended credit terms to specialised user 
firms.
The risk-diversifying function of the general trading company extends beyond its 
role as an institutional mechanism for the insurance of default risks in a trade regime 
heavily dependent on interfirm credit. At another level, the GTC absorbs firm-specific 
risks through its role as a financial intermediary in supplying investment funds and 
working-capital to its business partners. Just as in intermediate product markets the
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Figure 5.1: The role of the general trading company as
a financial risk buffer in intermediate 
product markets
BANK
discounts bill (B) 
to obtain immediate 
finance
pays bill (B) when 
becomes due
pays bill (A) when 
becomes due
. GENERAL
SUPPLIER -- --issues bill (B)--------  TRADING -4— 6--issues bill (A) -------  PURCHASER
COMPANY
orders
delivers
Note: 
Source:
Figures indicate the temporal sequence of events. 
Compiled on the basis of company interviews.
Table 5.1: Analysis by industry of sales turnover of the 
six largest general trading companies, 1980
Industry
Sales turnover 
(billion yen)
Proportion of total 
sales turnover 
(per cent)
Foodstuffs/
agricultural 6,245 11.5
Textiles 3,749 6.9
Mining/petroleum 9,885 18.3
Chemicals 4,914 9. 1
Construction/
basic materials 4,721 8.7
Steel/metals 10,707 19.8
Non-ferrous metals 4,251 7.9
Machinery/equipment 9,625 17.8
Total 54,097 100.0
Source: Shimada Katsumi, 1983: Sogo shosha no kabushiki hoyu
Shöken kenkyü, 67, p.246.
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diversified transaction portfolio of the G TC provides a risk-buffer for specialised 
manufacturing firms, in the capital market the diversified investment portfolio of the 
GTC provides a risk-buffer between the banks and manufacturing firms, particularly 
small and medium-sized firms.
At the same time as insulating suppliers against default risks by purchasers, by 
extending the length of the bills it accepts from purchaser firms, the GTC becomes the 
vehicle for the supply of additional trade credit to these firms. It is common in many 
industries for GTCs to issue 90-day bills to suppliers while accepting 120-day bills from 
the purchasers of the output, thus serving to increase the period of credit by 30 days. 
This role of the GTC is reflected in aggregate figures on trade credit extended by GTCs. 
Taking the 1976 FY as an example, the ten GTCs at the time had some 13,500 billion 
yen (US$ 54 billion) in outstanding trade credit (defined as the total of accounts and bills 
receivable, bills discounted, and advance payments made) and 9,330 billion yen (US$ 37 
billion) in outstanding trade-related obligations (accounts and bills payable, and advance 
payments received), meaning that they were extending some 4,170 billion yen (US$ 17 
billion) in net credit on interfirm transactions at the time.** It should be noted that while 
net trade credit provided by the GTC equals the difference between the lengths of the 
bills received and issued by the GTC, the risk exposure of the GTC is the gross rather 
than net amount of trade credit since even if the purchaser defaults, the GTC generally 
does not have the option of defaulting on its bill to the supplier. Indeed, as the Ataka case 
study showed, even should a GTC fail — a rare event in Japanese business — main-bank 
back-up ensures that the GTC fulfills its debt obligations to supplier firms, thus allowing 
them to avoid any losses.
In addition to the use of trade credit, GTCs invest directly in manufacturing and 
service industries in other ways, such as through shareholdings, loans and loan 
guarantees, and stock finance. At the end of the 1976 FY, the ten GTCs had 2,164 billion 
yen in outstanding loans and a further 3,536 billion yen in loan guarantees; gross GTC 
finance (trade credit plus loans and loan guarantees) amounted to 19,200 billion yen (USS 
77 billion). This figure can be given perspective by noting tha t  gross GTC finance was 
equivalent to some 19 per cent of the total loans outstanding at the time of the 86 major 
Japanese b a n k s .^  Net GTC finance (net trade credit plus loans and guarantees) 
amounted to 9,869 billion yen (US$ 39 billion), an amount equivalent to 10 per cent of 
total bank loans outstanding at the time. These figures highlight the enormous size and 
importance of the GTC as a quasi-financial intermediary and its role as a risk-buffer or 
shock-absorber mechanism in the industrial structure.
The general trading companies have extensive shareholdings in manufacturing 
firms. For instance, at the end of the 1981 FY, the six largest GTCs held shares in 5804
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firms (Table 5-2). As with their sales turnover, the GTCs hold highly-diversified 
portfolios of shares, adding to their capacity to internalise risks (Table 5-3).
The shareholdings of general trading companies fall roughly into two categories. On 
one hand, GTCs have minor shareholdings in a large number of group-related and other 
trading partners. Thus, as Table 5-2 indicates, two-thirds of GTC shareholdings were 
holdings of less than 10 per cent. On the other hand, the GTC also acts as a parent firm 
to its own group of affiliates; in 1982 there were more than 1900 firms in which the six 
largest GTCs had a shareholding of 10 per cent or more, and more than one thousand 
firms in which the shareholding was 25 per cent or more.
Most general trading company affiliates are nominally independent in tha t  they are 
not part  of the internal divisional structure of the GTC and their accounts are not 
consolidated with those of the GTC; nevertheless, it is typically the case tha t  in financial, 
trading and organisational terms they are closely integrated with the corporate structure 
of the parent GTC. Thus, for instance, defining a firm in which a GTC has a 10 per cent 
or more shareholding as a GTC affiliate, the Fair Trade Commission found that 78 per 
cent of affiliates had one or more director-managers from the GTC (an average of 2.5 
GTC managers per firm), tha t  15 per cent had direct loans from the GTC (an average of 
1,680 million yen or US$ 7 million per firm), and tha t  in 77 per cent of cases the GTC 
handled interfirm transactions for the affiliate, with the GTC handling both sales and 
purchases in 58 per cent of cases.15 Thus, many ostensibly independent, specialised 
manufacturing firms are in fact ‘plugged in’ to the diversified structure of the GTC 
through financial, trading and organisational connections.
The risk-diversifying role of the general trading company relates closely to the fact 
tha t  each GTC has a close involvement with a main-bank grouping.14 In particular, each 
of the six largest GTCs is the ‘flagship’ GTC for one of the six major main-bank 
groupings: Mitsubishi Corporation belongs to the Mitsubishi group and has Mitsubishi 
Bank as its main bank; Mitsui & Co., the Mitsui group (Mitsui Bank); C.Itoh, the Daiichi 
Kangin group (Daiichi Kangyo Bank); Marubeni, the Fuyo group (Fuji Bank); Sumitomo 
Corporation, the Sumitomo group (Sumitomo Bank); and Nissho-Iwai, the Sanwa group 
(Sanwa Bank).
The close ties between the GTCs and the major banks, particularly the respective 
main bank, has been central to the financing and risk-bearing role of GTCs. Examination 
of the balance sheet of the GTC reveals a picture of the GTC as a mechanism for 
channelling funds from the banking to the manufacturing sector: in the 1982 FY the total 
bank borrowings of the six largest GTCs totalled 10,214 billion yen (US$ 40.9 billion) and 
the average net-worth ratio was only 5 per cent.15
In the 1950s and 1960s, each of the six largest general trading companies became
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Table 5.3: Analysis by industry of shareholdings in listed firms
by the six largest general trading companies, 1980
Industry
Book value 
of GTC
shareholdings 
(million yen)
Proportion 
of total GTC 
shareholdings 
(%)
(1)
Proportion of total 
stock market value 
accounted for by 
the industry (%)
(2)
Index of GTC 
shareholding 
specialisation 
(1)/(2)
Agricultural/
forestry/marine 1,265 0.2 0.2 1.0
Mining 3,613 0.7 0.8 0.9
Construction 17,295 3.2 4.0 0.8
Foodstuffs 63,755 11.9 3.4 3.5
Textiles 20,336 3.8 2.1 1.8
Pulp/paper 13,187 2.5 0.8 3.1
Chemicals 38,904 7.2 8.2 0.9
Petroleum/ 
coal products 3,898 0.7 3.3 0.2
Rubber products 8,930 1.7 0.7 2.4
Glass/cement 6,464 1.2 2.0 0.6
Steel 49,456 9.2 4.6 2.0
Non-ferrous
metals 17,448 3.2 1.9 1.7
Metal products 5,192 1.0 0.5 2.0
Machinery 32,839 6. 1 4.7 1.3
Electrical
machinery 20,488 3.8 1 1.8 0.3
Transport
equipment 53,715 10.0 8. 1 1.2
Optical/precision
equipment 1,822 0.3 1.3 0.2
Other manufacturing 7,057 1.3 1.3 1.0
Trading 12,190 2.3 8.1 0.3
Finance/
insurance 114,579 22.3 19.9 1 . 1
Real estate 4,663 0.9 1.2 0.8
Transport 26,120 4.9 4.9 1.0
Warehousing 1,280 0.2 0.3 0.7
Electricity/gas 8,931 1.7 5.2 0.3
Services 4,374 0.8 0.8 1.0
Total 537,801 100.0 100.0 1.0
Source: Shimada Katsumi, 1983: Sogo shosha no kabushiki hoyu, Shoken kenkyu, 67,
pp.248-9.
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aligned with, or consolidated a previous alignment with, one of the six major corporate 
groupings.*® Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsui &: Co. re-formed in 1954 and 1959 
respectively from the component companies into which the two giant prewar GTCs had 
been split as a result of postwar deconcentration measures, and became central organs in 
the re-emerging Mitsubishi and Mitsui groups of companies. Firms in the Sumitomo 
group, which unlike the other two major zaibatsu  did not have a GTC before the war, 
combined managerial, financial and organisational forces soon after the war to create a 
group GTC, Sumitomo Corporation, out of the zaibatsu's  real-estate arm (Sumitomo 
Tochi Kömu).*^ The two GTCs, Marubeni and C.Itoh, originated from two of the four 
companies formed by the break-up of the giant Kansai-based textile trader Daiken Sangyö 
under the postwar deconcentration measures. Historically, Marubeni and C.Itoh had 
strong links with the Sumitomo zaibatsu , but with the Sumitomo group actively fostering 
its own ‘in-house’ GTC, they moved to realign themselves with two of the other emerging 
financial corporate groupings. Marubeni used its absorption of Fuji Bank’s struggling 
trading-company affiliate, Takashimaya-Iida, in 1955 to align itself with the Fuyö group, 
and C.Itoh became the number-one GTC for the DKB group, while at the same time 
retaining close links with Sumitomo group firms. In 1968, Nissho, then aligned with 
Daiichi Bank (the present DKB), used its merger with the smaller Iwai Sangyö, a Sanwa 
affiliate, to become the primary GTC for the Sanwa group in its merged form as 
Nissho-Iwai.
As part of this process of alignment with the respective corporate groups and in 
tandem with the high-pitched investment in existing and new industrial sectors which was 
taking place around these emerging group structures, the general trading companies also 
embarked on aggressive campaigns to become diversified ‘general’ trading companies.*^ 
For the big five Kansai-based textile trading companies (Marubeni, C.Itoh, Kanematsu, 
Nichimen, and Toyo Menka), this meant diversifying away from their textile base, 
particularly into machinery and metals areas. Thus, between 1955 and 1965, Marubeni 
increased the proportion of its sales coming from machinery and metals from 11 to 31 per 
cent, C.Itoh likewise from 7 to 23 per cent, Nichimen from 15 to 28 per cent, and Toyo 
Menka from 6 to 31 per cent; at the same time, the proportion of sales coming from 
textiles declined from 67 to 33 per cent for Marubeni, from 71 to 43 per cent for C.Itoh, 
from 57 to 36 per cent for Nichimen, and from 69 to 36 per cent for Toyo Menka. To a 
considerable extent, the textile trading companies used the takeover or absorption of 
specialised trading companies, particularly in the metal and machinery areas, to 
accomplish their diversification into ‘general’ trading companies. Thus, for instance, 
Marubeni took over Daiichi Közai in 1960 and TotsU in 1966; C.Itoh absorbed Morioka 
Kögyö in 1962, Aoki Shöji in 1964 and (in a somewhat different context) Ataka & Co. in
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1977; Kanematsu absorbed Gosho in 1967; Nichimen took over Taikei Kokan and 
absorbed Takada Shökai in 1963; and Toyo Menka absorbed Nankai Kogyo in 1963.
A B S O R B IN G  THE CO STS OF S T R U C T U R A L  A D J U S T M E N T
The general trading company has provided an important mechanism by which the 
costs of adjustment in the industrial structure have been distributed in Japan since the 
First oil shock. While discussion of Japan ’s structural adjustment to date has focused 
almost exclusively on the role of government assistance and policies, this analysis 
highlights the important role played by the general trading company in distributing 
internally the costs of structural adjustment in the economy.
Many of the Firms and industries which were left structurally depressed, or which 
had managerial weaknesses exposed, by the First and second oil price rises and other 
structural changes in the 1970s were afFiliates or transaction partners of GTCs. General 
trading companies have played an important role in assisting these Firms to adjust to the 
changed competitive conditions and in absorbing the losses incurred during structural 
change. It has only been Financial assistance from GTCs which has prevented what 
otherwise would have been certain bankruptcy for many structurally depressed Firms. The 
mounting deFicits of many Firms in structurally depressed sectors have been Financed 
largely, and in some cases entirely, by general trading companies in their capacity as 
parent Firms in such forms as direct loans, loan guarantees, trade credit, and stock 
Finance.
One way to gauge the role of general trading companies in mediating the impact of 
structural change on industry is to look a t changes in GTC Finance. If GTCs are 
functioning as a risk buffer, we would expect trade credit to grow at a faster rate than 
trade obligations in GTC balance sheets, as GTCs adjust Financial transaction terms in 
favour of their business partners. Indeed this is what occurred. Between 1973 and 1977, 
for instance, the period of major recession and slow-down in growth following the First oil 
shock, trade-related obligations of the GTCs to supplier Firms increased by 44 per cent 
(Table 5-4). In the same period, however, the amount of trade credit extended by the 
GTCs to purchaser Firms increased by 60 per cent, reflecting the ‘shock absorber’ role of 
the G TC in time of recession. The increase in net GTC Finance was even larger, 127 per
cent, with loans and loan guarantees increasing by 140 per cent over the period of post-oil 
• 22crisis recession.
Financial assistance and the absorption of losses by general trading companies have 
been important in the adjustment of entire industrial sectors, as in a large number of 
industries many of the Firms are afFiliates of GTCs. This is the case, for instance, in the 
sugar reFining, electric-furnace steel, textiles, paper and pulp, and plywood industries. As
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Table 5.4: Analysis of general trading company finance, 1971-76
(billion yen)
Financial year
Balance-sheet
item 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Trade credit 
extended (1) 7,101 8,439
(19%)
12,811
(52%)
12,579
(-2%)
12,868
(2%)
13,500
(5%)
Trade-related 
obligations (2) 5,418 6,465
(19%)
9,733
(51%)
9,134
(-6%)
9,134
(0%)
9,330
(2%)
Net trade credit 
extended 
(1) - (2) = (3) 1,683 1,974
(17%)
3,078
(56%)
3,426
(11%)
3,734
(9%)
4,170
(12%)
Loans (4) 832 1,024
(23%)
1,211
(18%)
1,560
(29%)
1,933
(24%)
2,164
(12%)
Loan guarantees 
(5) 1,024 1,355
(32%)
1,581
(17%)
2,195
(39%)
2,988
(36%)
3,536
(18%)
Net GTC finance 
(3) + (4) + (5) 3,538 4,353
(23%)
5,870
(35%)
7,181
(22%)
8,655
(21%)
9,870
(14%)
Notes: Figures are for the ten general trading companies in operation
during the period.
Figures in parentheses indicate the percentage increase over 
the value for the previous year.
Source: Shösha kin'yü kenkyükai, 1977: Shösha kin'yü, Chü5 köron keiei
mondai 16(3), p.147.
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Table 5-5 shows, a relatively small number of Firms in these and other structurally 
depressed industries account for a sizeable proportion of the total loans of GTCs. The 
Shösha kin’yü kenkyükai (1977, 141) quotes one bank’s estimate that GTC loans to the 
electric-furnace steel industry (in 1976) stood a t  250 billion yen (US$ 1 billion), with 
loans in the form of stock finance increasing at the rate of 300 million yen a day at the 
time. In the sugar refining industry, the two largest GTCs, Mitsubishi Corporation and 
Mitsui & Co., each had claims of 60 billion yen on their related sugar companies in 1976, 
while Marubeni, Nissho-Iwai, and C.Itoh had claims totalling 10 billion, 15 billion and 3 
billion yen on their respective a ff i l ia te s /0
The earlier analysis of general trading company risk-diversification suggested that 
any losses caused by the default or bankruptcy of downstream purchasers would be 
absorbed by the GTC rather than by the supplier. This mechanism serves to insulate 
supplier firms from some of the effects of external shocks as they might otherwise be 
transm itted  through intermediate product markets. The analogue of this proposition is 
tha t  the GTC absorbs the impact of the shock and incurs any associated costs. An 
examination of their financial accounts confirms that the GTCs have absorbed large 
losses in such forms as claims and loans written off and shareholding losses. The amount 
of losses registered by GTCs in this way rose dramatically after the first oil crisis, 
reflecting the ‘shock absorber’ role of the GTC in the industrial structure. In the period 
between the two oil crises, 1975 to 1979, the four largest GTCs incurred total losses on 
account of bad debts and investment losses in the region of 380 billion yen (USS 1.5 
billion) and in 1979 retained a further 208 billion yen of bad debts in their balance sheets
O  A
in the form of irretrievable c la im s /4
These losses have been incurred in a number of contexts, such as when affiliates 
have scrapped excess capacity or when the GTC has passed managerial control of the 
affiliate to another firm, or on the occasion of the bankruptcy of an affiliate or trading 
partner, which in most cases occurs as a direct result of a managerial decision by the 
GTC not to continue financing the maker’s deficits. Losses incurred because of the 
bankruptcy of affiliates and trading partners for the ten GTCs increased from 2.7 billion 
yen in 1973 to 29.1 billion yen in 1974 with the first oil crisis and, as Japan entered its 
worst postwar recession, bankruptcy-related losses rose to 34.0 billion yen in 1976 and, 
partly reflecting the collapse of a GTC itself (Ataka h  Co.), a massive 56.7 billion yen
or
(US$ 227 million) in 1976/°  Thus, in just the first three years after the first oil crisis and 
even before the structurally depressed industries law came into operation in 1978, the 
GTCs had absorbed at least 120 billion yen (US$ 479 million) in bankruptcy-related 
losses, as part  of an internal private-sector insurance system.
The discussion has focused on the period from the first oil crisis in 1973 to around
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Table 5.5: Major direct outstanding loans by general trading companies
to structurally depressed affiliate firms, 1982
Name of GTC 
(proportion of 
total loans to 
affiliate 
accounted for 
by loans 
listed)
Main-bank
affiliation
Name of 
affiliate
Major line 
of business 
of affiliate
Shareholding 
of GTC (%)
Amount of 
direct loan 
outstanding 
at end of 
1981 FY 
(million yen)
Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Dai Nippon
Corporation Bank Sugar Sugar 56 16,755
(19%) Meiji Sugar Sugar na 6,066
Hakodate
Plywood Plywood 91 180
Guriinu Sales of
Hauza wood products 100 1,000
Yunieisu Spinning 99 2,672
Mitsui & Mitsui Mitsui
Company Bank Sugar Sugar 27 13,500
(23%) Aito Sugar na 4,555
Nittetsu Aluminium
Curtain Wall fabrication 23 12,850
Mitsui Alumina
Alumina refining 20 10,651
Shimura Non-ferrous
Kako metals 31 4,870
Shinya Pulp/paper 48 4,864
C.Itoh Daiichi Aichi Oil
(13%) Kangyo Terminal
Bank (paper Oil-refining
company) depots 100 12,993
Sankö Paper Pulp/paper 68 10,028
Marubeni Fu j i Köa Kögyö Paperboard 35 2,600
(18%) Bank Nagoya Pulp Pulp/paper 61 9,364
Maruju Paper Pulp/paper 32 7,029
Yutani Heavy Construction
Industries machinery 42 7,200
Nissho-Iwai Sanwa Shinmeitö Sugar 25 2,830
(11%) Bank Fuji Sugar Sugar 44 1,800
Toyobashi
Goban Plywood na 1,117
Ube Seiko Electric
furnace steel 49 1,470
Tomen Tokai Tokyo
(13%) Bank Hardboard Plywood 50 1,575
Saitama Electric
Seiko furnace steel na 2,280
Kanematsu- Tokyo Funabashi Electric
Gosho Bank Seiko furnace steel 100 5,780
(19%) Hokushin
Goban Plywood na 2,800
Nichimen Sanwa Sanzen
(42%) Bank Paper Paper 47 1.447
Daijo Paper Paper na 1,300
Töbu Electric
Seitetsu furnace steel 100 1,500
Hokkai Electric
Kögyö furnace steel 45 5,880
Note: na - not available
Keizai chosa ky5kai, 1983: Keiretsu no kenkyü: daiichibu j5j5 kigy5hen, Tokyo, Keizai 
chösa kyökai; Töyö keizai shinpösha, 1983: Kigyö keiretsu söran, Tokyo, Töyö keizai 
shinpösha.
Sources:
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the time of the second oil crisis in 1979. General trading companies have continued to 
play an im portant role in the period since the second oil crisis by financing the 
adjustm ents  of affiliated firms and business partners. As Table 5-6 shows, the six largest 
G T C s wrote off losses on account of affiliates totalling 290.4 billion yen (US$ 1.2 billion) 
in the three years from 1980 to 1982. While discussion of adjustment experience in Japan 
has focused on government assistance and public policy initiatives — and these have been 
im portan t — it is clear also th a t  a considerable part of the losses from structural change 
has been absorbed in the corporate channels of general trading companies.
CASE STUDIES
A series of case studies illustrates the role of general trading companies in helping to 
cushion the impact and absorb the costs of structural adjustment in Japan. The case 
studies cast light on the kinds of mechanisms by which this has occurred, and illustrate 
the importance of cross-subsidisation through corporate organisation in the capital 
market for adjustment in internal managerial and labour markets.
The case studies reveal the wide range of GTC involvement in structural 
adjustment, both with respect to the industries involved — chemicals, paper, petroleum, 
steel, machinery, and sugar — and the nature of the G T C ’s role. The case of Mitsui 
Toatsu provides an illustration of the role of the GTC as a risk-sharing business partner 
in the grouping, both firms being major firms in the Mitsui group and members of the 
Mitsui presidents’ club. The next case study illustrates the role of GTCs as parent firms 
in cross-subsidising losses in the sugar industry, and underscores the importance in the 
analysis of industrial adjustment of going beyond the analytical construct of ‘industry’ to 
the corporate structure. Four case studies of the rationalisation by GTCs of affiliate 
operations illustrate another dimension, alongside main-bank intervention, to the way in 
which corporate asset reorganisations involving large firms are managed in Japan. In at 
least two cases, Funabashi Steel and Toyo Pulp), the close involvement of the main bank 
or banks is also observed.
M its u i  T oa tsu
The case of Mitsui &; Co.’s assistance to Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals is illustrative of 
the type of internal assistance which has occurred between general trading companies and 
their group business partners. Mitsui &; Co. put together a 43 billion yen financial 
assistance package for the ailing chemicals maker in 1982. Mitsui Toatsu was not a direct 
affiliate of the general trading company, which ranked only number nine as a shareholder 
of Mitsui Toatsu with about 2 per cent of its stock. But as the Mitsui group general 
trading company, Mitsui & Co. handled about 600 billion yen (US$ 2.4 billion) of Mitsui
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T o a tsu ’s sales and purchases a year, representing one-third of the G T C ’s total chemicals 
business. In analytical terms, the assistance given by Mitsui & Co. can be understood as 
a pay-out on the implicit insurance-premium component of the commissions which Mitsui 
Toatsu had paid to Mitsui & Co. on this business over many years of close trading 
relations.
The two oil crises dealt a severe blow to the international competitiveness of the 
chemicals industry in Japan, with sections of the industry undergoing large-scale 
scrapping of excess capacity under the structurally depressed industries laws. Like most 
other major producers in the sector, Mitsui Toatsu suffered large losses: in the 1975 FY 
(ending in March) Mitsui Toatsu registered a 10.8 billion yen operating loss and, apart 
from the 1980 FY, has registered large operating losses in each year since. Mitsui Toatsu 
has not paid a dividend since 1975 and, by the end of the 1981 FY, had accumulated 
losses (on an unconsolidated basis) of 11.2 billion yen, more than one-third of its capital 
level of 32.9 billion yen. In addition, many of its affiliates were structurally depressed 
also, with two major affiliates alone having combined accumulated losses of about 12 
billion yen.
The Mitsui Toatsu case highlights the importance of cross-subsidisation in the 
internal capital market of the grouping, centring on the general trading company and 
main bank (in this case Mitsui Bank), for carrying out a program of gradual adjustment 
in the internal labour market of the firm. Mitsui Toatsu had a workforce of 9500 at the 
end of 1976, but by 1981 the number of employees was down to 7000, following the 
implementation of a labour adjustment plan centring on the suspension of annual 
employee intakes and non-replacement of retirees, the transfer of surplus employees to 
some of its 90-odd domestic affiliates and to overseas projects, and voluntary retirements. 
In 1981 Mitsui Toatsu implemented a three-year reconstruction plan involving a further 
1500 reduction in workforce and the rationalisation of unprofitable business lines, a 
rationalisation which involved spinning off deficit divisions (chemical fertilisers and 
dyestuffs), closing plants and cross-licensing the production of certain lines with other 
producers to increase operational efficiencies. In spite of these measures, an operating loss 
of 12.8 billion was registered in the 1981 FY, followed by a further loss of 9.7 billion yen 
the next year; in early 1983, a new' three-year plan was brought forward involving a 
further cut in employment of 1000 to bring the workforce to 4700 during 1983, less than 
half the level of seven years previously.
It was in this context in late 1982 tha t  Mitsui & Co. announced a major package of 
assistance for Mitsui Toatsu involving the injection of 43 billion yen of finance by the 
general trading company. The plan, as it was announced, involved Mitsui & Co., at a 
total outlay of 34 billion yen, buying up three of Mitsui Toatsu’s plants and investing in
108
its central research facility set up as a separate company, and providing a further 9 billion 
yen in the form of stock finance. Stock finance involves the general trading company 
providing finance, typically a t  a subsidised interest rate, to a firm using surplus stocks of 
the firm as a form of collateral. The financing arrangement involving the research facility 
is characteristic of the type of scheme which has been employed in group structures in 
Japan  in recent years. A paper company was set up to purchase the facility (land, 
buildings and equipment), capitalised at 400 million yen, with Mitsui Toatsu holding 50 
per cent of the shares, Mitsui & Co. 40 per cent and another Mitsui affiliate 10 per cent, 
but with Mitsui Co. providing the finance. The ‘sale’ of assets in this way not only 
provided a way for Mitsui Toatsu to obtain low-interest finance from its GTC; it also 
enabled the chemicals maker to register a special profit on the disposal of assets in the 
1982 FY of 30.5 billion yen (US$ 122 million), allowing losses on affiliate operations of 
about 11.2 billion yen to be written off and an operating loss of 9.7 billion yen to be 
converted into a net after-tax profit of 10.6 billion yen.
Mitsui Bank was also closely involved both indirectly as Mitsui & Co.’s main bank
and directly as Mitsui T oa tsu ’s main bank. Thus, for instance, the bank was reported to
be considering reducing the interest rate on its long-term loans to the group chemicals
maker to the short-term rate, in parallel with the implementation of the general trading
9 7com pany’s assistance package /
T h e  su g a r  re fin ers
The sugar refining industry is an example of a structurally depressed industry in 
which losses have been absorbed to a large extent in the diversified corporate structures of 
the general trading companies. Most sugar refining companies in Japan are affiliates of 
general trading companies and the GTCs handle on a commission basis most of the sales 
and purchases (sugar imports) of the industry. The GTCs have financed the deficits of the 
sugar refiners and in the course of industry rationalisation have absorbed large losses on 
their account.
The sugar refining industry has long operated under heavy government regulation, 
cartelisation and protection, and is currently undertaking the mothballing and scrapping 
of 26 per cent of its capacity as an officially-designated structurally depressed industry. 
The focus of attention here, however, is on the role of the general trading companies in 
the adjustment process.
Structural problems in the sugar refining industry date back to the liberalisation of 
trade in 1963 when, after being one of Ja p a n ’s most profitable industries, the industry 
entered a period of chronic excess c a p a c i ty /0 Structural changes in the 1970s, however, 
turned chronic recession into severe structural depression. On the supply side, energy
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price rises and increasing labour costs undermined the industry’s international 
competitiveness, while on the demand side a world-wide shift in consumer demand away 
from sugar and sugar-related products was occurring. Moreover, from 1975 many firms 
had been locked into five-year contracts to take Australian sugar at the 1974 price, which 
by 1977 was 2.5 times the world price. By the end of the 1976 FY the accumulated losses 
of the seven largest sugar makers exceeded their total capital level by about 70 billion yen 
(US$ 280 m il lion ) .^  It was only the financing of these losses by parent-company GTCs 
th a t  prevented the bankruptcy of most of the industry.
The sugar refining industry is closely integrated with GTC corporate structure. 
Most of the firms in the industry form a component of the diversified structure of a GTC 
by virtue of close capital, financial, managerial and trading links. Of the top eleven firms
on
nine are direct affiliates of a general trading company. u Here the Mitsui and Mitsubishi 
group firms are examined.
The M i t s u i  group
The example of Mitsui & Co.’s financial assistance to its 27 per cent owned affiliate 
Mitsui Sugar highlights the importance of general trading companies in absorbing 
through corporate channels losses incurred in this structurally depressed industry.
At the end of 1977 Mitsui Sugar had accumulated losses of 27.0 billion yen (US$ 
108 million), more than eight times its capital level of 3.3 billion yen.'* Only financing of 
its losses by Mitsui &; Co. kept Mitsui Sugar afloat and its 700-odd workforce employed. 
In September 1977 Mitsui Sugar had 17.4 billion in borrowings from the GTC, on which 
interest payments were being exempted, representing an annual interest subsidy of 1.2 
billion yen. It was reported also that Mitsui &: Co. was negotiating with Tomen, another 
group trading company, and Mitsui Bank, the group main bank, the number two and 
three Mitsui Sugar shareholders respectively, for similar interest exemptions on their
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loans to the sugar maker.0
In 1978, Mitsui &; Co. implemented a major package of assistance for Mitsui Sugar. 
The most pressing aim of the assistance was to reduce the excess of Mitsui Sugar’s 
accumulated losses over its capital and so avert what would otherwise have been 
m andatory de-listing from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The assistance package comprised 
the following measures. Mitsui C o . arranged a 60 per cent reduction in Mitsui Sugar’s 
capital. This involved Mitsui &; Co. and other shareholders (mainly other Mitsui group 
firms) incurring investment losses in their accounts and Mitsui Sugar having its 
accumulated losses reduced by 2.0 billion yen (the amount of the capital reduction). This 
was followed by an injection of 11.4 billion yen in share capital in a third-party issue, of 
which 55 per cent was supplied by Mitsui & Co., 5.3 per cent by Tomen, 8.4 per cent by
110
the three Mitsui group financial institutions, and the remainder by eighteen other related
o o
firms. A further part of the package was reported to involve the C T C ’s writing off some 
3-4 billion yen of its claims on Mitsui Sugar and purchasing its ‘Spoon’ brand-name for 
1.7 billion yen, and arranging for another of its subsidiaries, Mitsui Lease, to purchase the 
sugar refiner’s three plants then lease them back, allowing a 5-6 billion yen special profit 
to be registered in Mitsui Sugar’s accounts. The effect of these measures was to reduce the 
com pany’s accumulated losses by the additional 10.4 billion yen necessary for capital to
O A
exceed accumulated losses and for the Mitsui affiliate to remain a listed company. *
The case of Taito, Mitsui Co.’s other major sugar-refining affiliate, provides an 
insight into the importance of general trading company cross-subsidisation of affiliates for 
labour adjustm ent under a Japanese-style employment system. Like other sugar refiners, 
Taito  was structurally depressed and suffered large losses after the mid-1970s. By the end 
of the 1982 FY Taito  had accumulated losses of 3.7 billion yen (US$ 15 million), almost 
twice its capital level of 2.0 billion yen.
An im portant implication of the risk-diversification function of general trading 
companies and other grouping arrangements is tha t  it facilitates the Japanese 
employment and industrial relations system by providing the insurance necessary to allow 
the firm to maintain employment levels during downturns in the business cycle and to 
cushion the impact on the workforce when structural adjustment is necessary. In this 
case, financial assistance by the G T C  enabled Taito  to avoid sudden bankruptcy and 
possible unemployment for its workforce in the face of external market shocks, and 
implement a more gradual program of labour adjustment.
In early 1984 Taito  was operating its two plants at about 50 per cent capacity and 
was carrying excess workforce, as reflected in the fact tha t  when Taito closed its Kanto 
plant to concentrate production at its Kansai plant 116 redundancies resulted. The costs 
of this labour hoarding represented a direct addition to the losses of the parent GTC. 
The manner in which this labour adjustment was carried out was typical of many similar 
cases involving structurally depressed firms in Japan. Fifty-five workers were transferred 
to non-sugar operations in the company and a ttem pts  were made to arrange re­
employment in related firms for the other sixty-one. At the same time, the age at which 
the ongoing early retirement scheme was to apply was lowered from 50 to 45, and the 304 
employees remaining in the firm were to share the adjustment cost burden by undergoing 
reductions in pay, amounting to 20 per cent for directors, 10 per cent for managers, and 5 
per cent for blue-collar workers, with an extension of the working-week from 38 to 42 
hours. ’,5
I l l
The M itsub ish i group
Events in the Mitsubishi group closely parallelled those in the Mitsui group. 
Mitsubishi Corporation absorbed losses totalling 16 billion yen (US$ 64 million) when its 
two sugar-refining affiliates, Dainippon Sugar and Meiji Sugar, underwent rationalisation 
in early 1984. At the time, Dainippon had accumulated losses of 10.9 billion yen in its 
books, almost three times its capital level (4.0 billion yen), and Meiji losses of 7.0 billion 
yen, more than three times the level of its capital (2.0 billion yen). Almost all of the debts 
of the two firms were owing to Mitsubishi Corporation, and the GTC was providing most 
of this finance a t  zero interest. In the course of plant closures and the scrapping of 
capacity and reduction of workforces, Mitsubishi Corporation dissolved the companies 
and transferred the remaining assets and workforces to two new companies, set up as 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, writing off 16 billion yen in claims as losses at the same 
time.°^
R a tio n a lis in g  a ffilia te  op eration s
General trading companies have undertaken large-scale rationalisation of their 
affiliate networks in response to the major changes in competitiveness tha t  have occurred 
in the industrial structure. This has often involved reorganisation of the assets of a 
structurally depressed affiliate by partial or total divestiture to a more competitive maker 
in the same industry. This has typically provided the occasion for the GTC to write off 
large-scale losses on account of the firm in question. A common pattern has been for the 
G T C , often working closely with related main banks or another shareholder firm, to 
arrange for a share-capital reduction and to absorb other accumulated losses in the 
balance sheet and then for the new parent firm to take up shares issued by the 
reorganised firm. These reorganisations have often involved firms in officially-designated 
depressed industries, highlighting the importance of corporate adjustment and risk­
sharing in the structural adjustment process.
Some of the major cases involving the divestiture of affiliates by GTCs and the 
absorbing of associated losses are examined below. These are Marubeni’s divestiture of 
Yutani Heavy Industries, a machinery manufacturer, to Kobe Steel in 1983; C.Itoh’s sale 
of its petroleum-refining affiliates Toa Oil and Töa Kyöseki to Showa Oil and Kyodo Oil 
in 1979; Kanematsu-Gosho’s sale of its wholly-owned electric-furnace steel subsidiary 
Funabashi Steel to Godo Steel in 1984; and the sale of Toyo Pulp to Oji Paper by textile 
maker Toyobo and the two GTCs Marubeni and C.Itoh in 1984.
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Yutani  Heavy Industries
Yutani Heavy Industries, 44 per cent owned by Marubeni and the fifth largest 
hydraulic construction-shovel maker in Japan, was crippled financially by the prolonged
0 7
domestic construction recession and loss of competitive position in the industry. 
Marubeni sent in the general manager of its Number One Machinery Division, Yubara 
Masatake, as president in 1976, meaning tha t  four of the top eight executives were then 
from Marubeni. Despite Marubeni’s efforts to restore Yutani’s competitiveness, the 
affiliate’s position further deteriorated, as public works expenditure was cut and domestic 
shipments of hydraulic constuction shovels dropped by 25 per cent between 1979 and 
1983. Yutani’s sales dropped in value by one-third between the 1980 and 1982 financial 
year (ending in April) and the company registered large operating and net losses from the 
1980 FY on, resulting in accumulated losses of 10.5 billion yen (US$ 42 million) by the 
end of the 1982 FY, 8.5 billion yen in excess of its capital level. Marubeni had kept 
Yutani afloat and its 600-plus workforce employed by financing its mounting losses, 
chiefly with direct loans (7.2 billion yen by 1983). In September 1983 Marubeni passed 
the assets of Yutani over to Kobe Steel, one of J a p a n ’s largest steel and machinery 
makers, after more than a year of negotiations on how much of the crippled affiliate’s 
losses Marubeni would absorb. The divestiture plan involved Yutani reducing its capital 
from 2 billion to 200 million yen and then increasing it back to the 2 billion yen level with 
an investment from Kobe Steel of 1.8 billion yen. At the same time, Marubeni wrote off 
virtually all of its loans and other claims on the firm (about 8.7 billion yen) and withdrew 
its management team.
Toa Oil
The case of Toa Oil and its affiliate Töa Kyoseki provides an example of a general 
trading company absorbing large-scale losses in the petroleum-refining industry, one of
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the industries most seriously affected by the oil shocks of the 1970s.00 C.Itoh gained 
control of petroleum-refiner Toa Oil in 1966, but, like most other firms in the industry, 
Toa-group firms accumulated large losses in the 1970s. T oa’s position was exacerbated by 
two ill-timed investments, namely the construction of a second oil refinery, which 
commenced operations in October 1973, and a 70 billion yen investment in de-sulphuring 
equipment in the wake of the oil crisis, and by the losses from long-term tanker leases 
which had been entered into on the basis of pre-oil crisis demand projections.
C.Itoh implemented a major assistance and rationalisation plan in tandem with 
T oa ’s main bank, the Long-Term Credit Bank, and other business partners in 1976 aimed 
a t  stemming the losses of the oil refiner. This plan involved C .Itoh’s taking a number of 
steps to assist Toa: C.Itoh agreed to Toa Oil transferring its ocean transport division and
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associated losses to a newly-set-up unconsolidated company, Toa Tankers, 30 per cent 
owned by Toa, 25 per cent by C.Itoh, and 45 per cent by three closely related business 
partners; the GTC took over some of Toa’s surplus tankers and negotiated with Japan 
Line and Sanko Steamship to have transport charges reduced; it supplied a 10 billion yen 
shortfall in the 70 billion yen invested in the de-sulphuring equipment and reduced the 
interest rate on its existing 20 billion yen of loans to Toa from 8.5 to 9.0 per cent to the 
short-term  prime rate and later shelved interest payments; and C.Itoh mobilised about 
thirty  personnel to help boost the sales of T oa’s products.
By the end of 1979, however, the accumulated losses of the two affiliates had 
reached about 80 billion yen and C.Itoh passed control of the companies to Showa Oil and 
Kyodo Oil. This move involved the G T C ’s writing off more than 40 billion yen (US$ 160 
million) as losses on Toa-related claims and investments. By the end of the 1983 FY 
total losses incurred by C.Itoh on account of Toa’s petroleum business had reached in 
excess of 116 billion yen (US$ 464 million), as the GTC continued to write off losses on
O Q
ongoing contractual arrangements associated with the oil refiner.
Funabashi Steel
The case of Funabashi Steel shows how costs of adjustment in the electric-furnace 
steel industry, a designated structurally depressed industry in Japan over the 1978-88 
decade, have been absorbed by a general trading company and with main-bank 
invo lvem ent.^  Funabashi Steel, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the number-nine-ranked 
G TC Kanematsu-Gosho, had accumulated losses of 9.9 billion yen by the end of the 1983 
FY, more than four times its capital level of 2.4 billion yen. In April 1984 Kanematsu- 
Gosho sold Funabashi Steel to Godo Steel, the number two electric-furnace steel-maker 
and affiliate of Nippon Steel, under the following arrangement. Funabashi underwent a 70 
per cent share-capital reduction, which Kanematsu-Gosho wrote off as a 1,680 million yen 
loss in its 1984 FY accounts, after which Godo Steel and two related firms took up an 
equivalent re-issue of capital. The GTC incurred a further loss of about 2.3 billion yen, to 
be written off over five years.
The Funabashi case is instructive because of the indirect role played by the G T C ’s 
main bank, Tokyo Bank. Tokyo Bank was Gosho’s main bank and absorbed large losses 
on its account when Kanematsu absorbed the struggling Gosho in a five-to-one merger in 
1967; since th a t  time Tokyo Bank has been main bank to Kanematsu-Gosho, with the 
second-line main bank, Daiichi Kangyo (DKB) and Tokyo Bank each holding ten per cent 
of the G T C ’s shares. Kanematsu-Gosho was severely affected by the structural 
depression which afflicted much of the industrial structure in the 1970s, its involvement 
in the electric-furnace steel industry through Funabashi Steel being just  the largest of a
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number of financial setbacks. In 1977 Tokyo Bank sent in its vice-president, Murase 
Toshinao, as chairman of the GTC and, toget her with DKB and other banks, instituted a 
series of financial assistance measures. The measures centred on the transfer of real estate 
to a separate company and the shelving of interest payments on 20 billion yen of related 
borrowings, and large-scale interest reductions on about 15 billion yen of the 23 billion 
yen of Kanematsu-Gosho’s borrowings at the time associated with the G T C ’s loans and 
other claims on Funabashi Steel. In 1982 Tokyo Bank stepped up its financial and 
managerial back-up of Kanematsu-Gosho by sending in additional directors at the senior 
executive level and, on top of the existing measure of applying the short-term prime rate 
to long-term borrowings, by instituting reductions in foreign exchange charges towards 
the GTC. When Kanematsu-Gosho wrote off a large part of its investments in Funabashi 
Steel as losses, Tokyo Bank assisted by applying interest exemptions on the 2.3 billion 
yen to be cleared by the GTC over five years. As in the Ataka &; Co. case, the 
importance of the main bank in facilitating the absorption of losses by the GTC is in 
evidence. Thus a significant part of the losses incurred in the electric-furnace steel 
industry have been borne through the risk-sharing mechanism of the general trading 
company and main bank.
Toyo Pulp
The case of Toyo Pulp provides a further example of the im portant role played by 
the GTC as the parent firm to a depressed affiliate in tandem with the main bank, and in 
this case a related manufacturing parent firm, in cushioning the initial impact of 
structural change and, in the course of adjustment, in absorbing resulting losses.41 Toyo 
Pulp was jointly controlled by Toyobo, a large textile maker (26 per cent shareholding), 
Marubeni (17 per cent), and C.Itoh (15 per cent). The price rises from the two oil crises 
had a severe impact on this specialist kraft paper maker, w hich by the end of the 1983 FY 
had accumulated losses totalling some 11.3 billion yen or nearly five times its capital level 
of 2.4 billion. Soon after the kraft paper industry was officially designated as structurally 
depressed in 1983, Toyobo and the two GTCs arranged for Oji Paper, the largest pulp 
and paper maker in Japan, to take over the assets of Toyo Pulp under the following 
arrangement. The three major shareholders increased Toyo Pulp’s capital to 3.5 billion 
yen by putting up an additional 1.1 billion yen. Then a 90 per cent capital reduction was 
instituted, followed by an injection of 2.0 billion share capital by Oji to give it two-thirds 
of the new capital level. At the same time, to wipe out remaining accumulated losses, the 
three major shareholders wrote off 6.4 billion yen in claims on the paper maker. Reflecting 
the close involvement of the banks, particularly the main bank, the Industrial Bank of 
Japan, the 22 major banks exempted payment of most of some 2.5 billion in shelved
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interest payments from the previous three years and agreed to continue the financial 
assistance from the 1985 FY onwards.
C O N C L U S IO N
This chapter has focused on the risk-diversifying role of the general trading 
company. Together with other institutions in financial corporate groupings, general 
trading companies have operated so as to diversify risks in the business sector in postwar 
Japan , with capital markets, and stock and bond markets in particular, being poorly 
developed and with firms needing a means of offsetting the risk-costs of the permanent 
employment system.
The general trading company has played an important role in cushioning the impact 
of sudden and large-scale structural change on specialised manufacturing firms. As the 
case studies demonstrate, for many firms in depressed industries close association with 
GTCs as affiliates or business partners has meant that they have been able to undergo a 
gradual course of adjustment in production and employment structures, often culminating 
in a negotiated merger with another maker. It was shown that ,  as with the main bank, 
the general trading company is a major institutional mechanism within the financial 
corporate grouping for distributing the costs of structural adjustment. The extent of this 
cross-insurance effect through GTC diversification is difficult to quantify, but in the 1978 
to 1982 period alone the six largest GTCs absorbed losses on account of affiliates totalling 
400 billion yen (US$ 1.6 billion). This suggest tha t  the general trading company is a 
major channel through which the costs of structural adjustment have been distributed 
internally within the private sector. The role of a third and related aspect of Japanese 
corporate organisation — interlocking shareholdings — in the internal capital market and 
in mediating structural adjustment is examined next.
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N o t e s
1. In the sense of the term as used by Williamson (1975), Spence (1975) and others 
in the internal organisation literature, the general trading company could be viewed as an 
internal capital market. It bears emphasising th a t  here, however, ‘internal capital 
m arke t’ refers to the interfirm organisation of the financial corporate grouping, which 
includes banks, general trading companies, and manufacturing Firms.
2. Kösei torihiki iinkai jimukyoku (1983, 31-2).
3. See, for instance, Roehl (1983a) and Young (1979). The figures quoted are from 
Kösei torihiki iinkai jimukyoku (1983, 31).
4. In this regard, M atsumura (1981, 31-2) notes tha t  domestic transactions have 
provided a more stable and higher level of commission income for GTCs than imports or 
exports.
5. M atsum ura (1981, 32). By the end of the 1970s these proportions had reversed as 
G T C s pursued more aggressive international strategies.
6. The implicit guarantee provided by the main bank and by the associated 
regulatory authorities is also an important factor in increasing the security of the general 
trading company. Yam amura (1976) has stressed the risk-diversifying function of general 
trading companies. See also M atsum ura (1981) and Shimada (1983). The au thor’s 
understanding of the operations of general trading companies owes much to the helpful 
explanations provided by Mr Katsumi Shimada, Mr Mitsuo Yabumoto and Mr Toshihiko 
Ohyabu. For simplicity I ignore trading companies other than the nine so-called ‘general 
trading companies’ (sögö shösha) although much of what is said applies to them also. It 
is the highly-diversified transaction and investment portfolio of the general trading 
company which distinguishes it from other trading companies and which increases its 
capacity to bear risks. The nine GTCs are, in order of sales turnover: Mitsubishi 
Corporation, Mitsui & Co., C.Itoh &; Co., Marubeni Corporation, Sumitomo Corporation, 
Nissho-Iwai Corporation, Toyo Menka Kaisha, Kanematsu-Gosho, and Nichimen 
Company. The ‘ten th ’ GTC referred to in places is Ataka &; Co., which was absorbed by 
C.Itoh in 1977, as described in Chapter 4.
7. It should be noted tha t  the length of the bill understates the period of trade 
credit as interfirm credit takes the form of accounts payable and receivable for anything 
up to one-and-a-half months before a bill is issued by the purchaser firm.
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8. The expectation, given developments in financial liberalisation and corporate 
finance in Japan, might be tha t  trade credit would have diminished in importance. 
However, the proportion of sales in which bills are used and the length of the bills in the 
steel trade, which is generally regarded as a typical sector in which trade credit is used 
and G TC intermediation is prevalent, has been stable over the past twenty or so years, 
after increasing significantly in the early 1960s. From 1952 to 1961, bills were used for 
from 43 to 68 per cent of sales and the average bill-length was in the 84- to 98-day range, 
while from 1963 to 1982, the proportion of sales in which bills were used ranged from 75 
to 80 per cent and the length of bills has been in the 118- to 125-day range (according to 
published figures of the Zenkoku tekkö t o n ’ya kumia i  [National Steel Wholesalers 
Association], kindly supplied by Mr K. Shiinada of Sumitomo Corporation).
9. M atsumura (1981, 28).
10. Another much-noted function is the informational role of the general trading 
company (Roehl, 1983). A portion of the commission can be regarded as an implicit 
payment for informational services, such as finding new customers, provided by the GTC.
11. Shösha kin’yü kenkyükai (1977, 147).
12. Shösha kin’yu kenkyükai (1977, 147). The 86 banks are the thirteen city, 63 
provincial, three long-term credit and seven trust banks.
13. Kösei torihiki iinkai jimukyoku (1983, 36-7).
14. Okumura (1983, 136-48).
15. The figures are taken from the securities reports of the GTCs, kindly supplied 
by Mr M. Otsuki of the Japan External Trade Organisation.
16. See for instance Suzuki (1983).
17. In the prewar period, sales and purchases of Sumitomo group firms were handled 
by a unit of the Sumitomo holding company (Okumura, 1983, 210).
18. See Okumura (1983, 48, 66, 210-11).
19. See, for example, the cases cited in Keizai chösa kyökai (1961) of G T C s’ forging 
capital and trading ties with firms in their particular main-bank group.
20. Yamamoto (1967, 148).
21. Yamamoto (1967, 148).
22. Shösha kin’yü kenkyükai (1977, 147).
23. Shösha kin’yü kenkyükai (1977, 142).
24. M atsum ura (1981, 34-5).
25. Shösha kin’yü kenkyükai (1977, 145).
26. This section is based on information from the following sources: “Konnendo wa 
900nin sakugen Mitsui Toatsu Kagaku (Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals to reduce workforce by 
900 this year)” , N K S , 1 June 1978; “Mitsui Toatsu Kagaku shien no naka no gappei
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jünen: saiken e haisui no jin (A trying ten years for Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals since 
merger: back to wall during reconstruction)” , N K S ,  29 Sept 1978; “Mitsui Bussan Mitsui 
Toatsu o zenmen shien: sögaku de 430 okuen enjo (Full support from Mitsui k  Co. for 
Mitsui Toatsu: total of 43 billion yen assistance)” , N K S , 17 Nov 1982, p.l; “Mitsui 
Bussan no Mitsui Toatsu shien: ‘Kagaku’ saiköchiku e hikigane (Mitsui k  Co.’s support 
for Mitsu Toatsu to trigger re-construction of [Iran-Japan Petro-Chemical])” , N K S , 17 
Nov 1982, p.9; “Mitsui Toatsu shinsaiken keikaku o sakutei (Mitsui Toatsu draws up new 
recovery plan)” , N K S , 4 Jan 1983, p.7; “Mitsui Bussan köjö baishu nado 260 okuen: 
Mitsui Toatsu shien hongimari (26 billion yen from Mitsui k  Co. for purchase of factory 
etc.: support for Mitsui Toatsu formally settled)” , N K S , 31 Mar 1983, p.9; Ozawa (1982); 
Shukan  töyö keizai  (1983a).
27. “Mitsui Bussan Mitsui Toatsu o zenmen shien: sögaku de 430 okuen enjo (Full 
support from Mitsui k  Co. for Mitsui Toatsu: total of 43 billion yen assistance)” , N K S , 
17 Nov 1982, p .l .
28. Such was the extent of the industry’s problems th a t  it became known as the 
‘industry in perpetual recession’ (bannen fukyö  no gyökai).  See Kögin chösa (1971, 2).
29. “Saimu chöka nanahyaku okuen kosu seitö nanasha (Losses of seven sugar 
refiners exceed capital level by 70 billion yen)” , N K S , 9 Feb 1977, p.13.
30. The top eleven firms in order of market share are as follows (the parent 
company and its shareholding, where known, are in brackets): Mitsui Sugar (Mitsui k  
Co.: 27 per cent shareholding); Taito  (Mitsui k  Co.: 26 per cent); Nisshin Sugar (owner- 
controlled); Ensuiko Sugar (Taiyo Fishery Co.: 36 per cent); Dainippon Sugar (Mitsubishi 
Corporation: 56 per cent); Meiji Sugar (Mitsubishi Corporation: 43 per cent); C.ltoh 
Sugar (C.ltoh); Shinmeito (Nissho-Iwai); Kobe Sugar (Marubeni); Toyo Sugar (Marubeni: 
38 per cent); and Fuji Sugar (Nissho-Iwai: 44 per cent). Nisshin and Ensuiko are the only 
non-GTC affiliates among the leading firms.
31. “Saimu chöka 237 okuen Mitsuitö jöjö haishi no kenen (23.7 billion yen excess of 
losses over capital: fear of de-listing for Mitsui Sugar)” , N K S , 3 Dec 1977, p . l l .
32. “Jöjö iji ibara no michi Mitsui Seitö (Maintaining its [stock exchange] listing a 
thorny path for Mitsui Sugar)” , N K S , 23 Mar 1977, p . l l .
33. “Mitsuitö gosen nanahyakuman kabu daisansha wariate: Mitsui Bussan 55% 
hikiuke (Mitsui Sugar 57 million share third-party issue: Mitsui k  Co. to take 55%)” , 
N K S ,  26 July 1978, p.13.
34. “Mitsuitö hachigatsu nimo daisansha wariate (Mitsui Sugar third-party issue in 
August)” , N K S ,  21 July 1978, p.13; “Mitsuitö gosen nanahyakuman kabu daisansha 
wariate: Mitsui Bussan 55% hikiuke (Mitsui Sugar 57 million share third-party issue: 
Mitsui k  Co. to take 55%)” , N K S ,  26 July 1978, p.13.
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35. “Taitö, Kawasaki köjö 3gatsu heisa: Kobe ni shüyaku, j in ’in sakugen (Taito to 
close its Kawasaki plant in March: concentration a t  Kobe and reduction in workforce)” , 
N K S , 22 Sept 1983, p.9.
36. “Dainippon Seitö to Meiji Seitö kaisan shingaisha de saishuppatsu: Mitsubishi 
Shöji ryösha o zenmen shien (Dainippon Sugar and Meiji Sugar to dissolve and restart as 
new company: Mitsubishi Corporation gives both firms total support)” , N K S , 26 Jan 
1984, p.8.
37. Information in this paragraph comes from the following sources: “Yutani Jükö 
baishu marason köshö Shinkö ga nebarigachi (Marathon negotiation over purchase of 
Yutani Heavy Industries: Kobe Steel wins with persistence)” , N K S ,  5 July 1983, p.9; 
“Kobe Seiko Yutani Jükö ni shihon sanka (Kobe Steel capital participation in Yutani 
Heavy Industries)” , Asahi  shinbun,  2 July 1983, p.8; Nihon keizai shinbunsha (1983, 
953); ShUkan töyö keizai (1983).
38. This section is based on information from the following sources: C .Itoh’s 
internal document ‘Töa mondai sökatsu hökoku (An overview report on the Toa 
problem)’ cited in Misato (1984, 51-80); M atsum ura (1981, 34); Nikkei bijinesu (1983, 
166-80); “Toa Sekiyu keiei saikensaku matomaru: kaiun bumon o kirihanashi (Plan for 
managerial reconstruction of Toa Oil comes together: shipping division to be split off)” , 
N K S  26 Sept 1976, p.3; “Töa ketchaku no hamon (Repercussions of Toa settlement)” , 
N K S ,  25 Aug 1979, p.6.
39. Misato (1984, 79-80).
40. These two paragraphs are based on information from the following: 
“Kanematsu Göshö ni kin’yu shien: Tögin Daiichi Kangin noridasu (Financial assistance 
for Kanematsu-Gosho: Tokyo Bank and Daiichi Kangyo Bank make a move)” , N K S ,  28 
Apr 1977, p .l; “Kanematsu Göshö shien o kyöka: Tögin yakuin haken ya kin’yümen de 
(Support for Kanematsu-Gosho being strengthened: Tokyo Bank sending in a director and 
on financial side)” , N K S ,  8 May 1982, p.l; “Kanematsu Göshö ga 340nin sakugen: keiei 
saiken e sozai bumon asshuku (Kanematsu-Gosho to reduce workforce by 340: contracting 
basic-materials division for managerial reconstruction)” , N K S ,  Nov 1982, p.l; “Gödö 
Seitetsu Funabashi Seiko o baishu e (Godo Steel to purchase Funabashi Steel)” , Asahi  
sh inbun , 12 May 1983, p.8; “Denro saihen kiun ni hakusha (Spur to restructuring mood 
in electric-furnance [industry])” , N K S ,  16 Feb 1984, p.9; “Funabashi Seiko e no shusshi 
wa 45% ni Gödö Seitetsu (Godo Steel’s shareholding in Funabashi Steel 45%)” , N K S ,  10 
Apr 1984, p.7; “Kanematsu Göshö kin’yu shien raibaru mo hiyaase (Kanematsu-Gosho’s 
financial assistance: rivals in cold sweat)” , N K S  evening, 17 May 1977, p.2.
41. This paragraph is based on the following: “Töyö Parupu no keiei saiken e: Oji 
Seishi ga kanzen keiretsuka (Toyo Pulp’s managerial reconstruction: Oji Paper to take
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complete control)” , NKS,  26 Mar 1984, p .l;  uTöyö Parupu saiken shido: Ojishi kanzen 
keiretsuka o happyö (Start of Toyo Pulp’s reconstruction: Oji Paper announces will take 
complete control)” , N K S , 1 Apr 1984, p.5; Nihon keizai shinbunsha (1983, 943).
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6
In terco rp o ra te  sh areh o ld in gs
The prevalence of intercorporate shareholdings among related banks and firms, 
based on implicit insider arrangements, is an important aspect of corporate organisation 
in the internal capital market in Japan, and has a major bearing on how structural 
ad justm ent takes place. Two-thirds of the shares of listed Japanese firms are held by 
domestic firms (including banks) and many of these shares are held under reciprocal or 
interlocking arrangements, centring on the major financial corporate groupings. For 
instance, the level of intra-group corporate shareholding in the six major groupings ranges 
from 12 per cent for the Sanwa group to 26 per cent for the Sumitomo group (Table 1-2, 
P-4).
It is possible to identify two important economic functions of intercorporate 
shareholdings, namely, the diversification of firm risks and the insulation of the 
management from the external market for corporate control. The practice of firms’ 
engaging in share interlocks with related banks and business partners can be viewed in 
terms of the setting-up of a mechanism for the pooling or cross-insurance of firm-specific 
risks. From the earlier analysis, it follows tha t  interlocking shareholdings may be an 
im portan t institutional mechanism for distributing the costs of structural adjustment in 
the private sector, as these costs are nothing but ex post manifestations of what, ex ante, 
were economic risks.
A major feature of intercorporate shareholdings in Japan is that they form the basis 
of an implicit cartel between permanent managements of firms. The shares for the most 
part are held under implicit insider or stable shareholding arrangements, rather than as 
‘pure’ financial instruments. These implicit arrangements have an important effect on 
how structural adjustment takes place through the capital market: they prevent the
operation of an active market for corporate control and provide the setting in which the 
internal control mechanisms exercised by the main bank operate.
Thus the effect of the intercorporate shareholdings for a depressed firm is twofold. 
The firm is able to generate funds and offset losses by disposing of the shares it holds in 
its main bank and other business partners. At the same time implicit support from its 
corporate shareholders in continuing to act as stable shareholders means that the
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depressed firm is able to avoid the bankruptcy or corporate takeover which might have 
been its fate in a more ‘competitive’ capital market setting.
THE POOLING OF FIRM RISKS
An important function of the interlocking shareholdings is tha t  they provide a 
mechanism in the internal capital market, alongside main-bank and general trading 
company risk-sharing, through which firms can pool their risks. The term ‘interlocking 
shareholdings’ refers to the practice of Firms directly or indirectly holding a portion of 
each o ther’s shares.* The ownership structure of most large firms in Japan is 
characterised not only by a high level of corporate share ownership, 68 per cent in 1982, 
but also by a dispersed, fractionalised and interlocking pattern of intercorporate 
shareholding, centring on the major financial corporate g roup ings/
A standard result in finance theory is tha t ,  with a well-functioning capital market, 
risk diversification by the firm is of no benefit to investors as they can achieve the same 
diversification of risk directly in their investment portfolios. The literature has recognised, 
however, tha t  risk diversification may benefit other participants in the firm. As was noted 
in Chapter 2, workers may purchase insurance-like services from the firm via the terms 
and conditions of an implicit long-term labour contract, and risk diversification by the 
firm may be important in enabling the firm to offer these contracts to their workers. The 
Japanese employment system in large firms, based on permanent employment practices, 
can be viewed in this implicit risk-insuring framework.
Risk diversification by the firm is likely to be of particular value to the managers.
o
As Arnihud and Lev a rg u e /
the risk associated with managers’ income is closely related to the firm’s risk. 
Quite often, a firm’s failure to achieve predetermined performance targets, or in 
the extreme case the occurrence of bankruptcy, will result in managers’ losing 
their current employment and seriously hurting their future employment and 
earnings potential. Such “employment risk” cannot be effectively diversified by 
managers in their personal portfolios, since unlike many sources of income such 
as stocks, human capital cannot be traded in competitive markets. Risk-averse 
managers can therefore be expected to diversify this employment risk by other 
means, such as engaging their firms in conglomerate mergers, which generally 
stabilize the firm’s income stream and may even be used to avoid the disastrous 
effects bankruptcy has on managers. Thus, conglomerate mergers, while not of 
obvious benefit to investors, may benefit managers by reducing their 
employment risk, which is largely undiversifiable in capital or other markets.
The practice whereby sets of firms engage in share interlocks in Japan can be viewed in 
the same managerial-risk reduction terms. Interlocking shareholdings can be viewed as a 
mechanism which allows firms to pool risks and thereby increase the security of 
employment tenure for ‘lifetime’ employees.
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An examination of the historical and institutional circumstances under which firms 
came to hold each o ther’s shares supports the view of interlocking shareholdings as being 
part of an ex ante risk-pooling set-up.4 The level of both intercorporate shareholdings and 
the more narrowly-defined intra-group shareholdings has increased steadily over the 
postwar period (Table 6-1). While firms relied primarily on bank borrowings for their 
high level of external financing, they were also developing interlocking shareholdings with 
their related banks and business partners. Thus the proportion of total shares of listed 
firms held by domestic firms rose from 36 per cent in 1950 to 57 per cent by 1970, while 
holdings by individuals exhibited a corresponding decline from 61 to 40 per cent. The 
level of corporate holdings continued to increase after 1970, despite increasing capital 
liberalisation and deregulation. In 1982, 68 per cent of the shares of listed firms in Japan 
were held by domestic financial institutions and other firms, while only 28 per cent was 
held by individuals (Table 6-1).
D ata  for interlocking shareholdings in the financial corporate groupings show a 
corresponding trend: between 1966 and 1980, for instance, the level of interlocking 
shareholding increased from 11 to 18 per cent in the Mitsui group, from 17 to 26 per cent 
in the Mitsubishi group, from 18 to 27 per cent in the Sumitomo group, from 11 to 19 per 
cent in the Fuyö group, from 9 to 12 per cent in the Sanwa group, and from 11 to 16 per 
cent in the Daiichi Kangin group.^
The development of interlocking shareholdings can be traced back to the early 
postwar period when the disbanded zaibatsu  began to re-group in altered form as main- 
bank centred keiretsu  groupings.® As part of the antitrust and economic reforms carried 
out in postwar Japan under the direction of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, 
the zaibatsu  business conglomerates were dissolved and their shareholdings and the shares 
of the zaibatsu  families were transferred to a government body, with the aim of 
promoting deconcentration and the democratisation of capital ownership. Shares to the 
value of 18 billion yen were transferred to the body, the Holding Company Liquidation 
Commission (Mochikabu kaisha seiri i in k a i ), which was equivalent to 42 per cent of the
n
paid-up capital of all Japanese companies in 1946.'
The shares were later sold to employees of the firms concerned, securities companies 
and the general public. Employees were recorded as having taken over 38.5 per cent of the 
released shares; 27.7 per cent were disposed of by general sale and 23.3 per cent by 
tender.^ But, according to Okumura, a large proportion of the shares, particularly those 
which were sold to employees and securities companies, were effectively being held on 
behalf of the firms concerned.® Subsequently, these shares to a large extent were placed 
with other related firms, as the prewar zaibatsu  and other firms began to engage in 
interlocking shareholdings centring on the major city banks.
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A similar process of corporate share interlocking occurred following the stock 
exchange crash of 1964-65, with the release of shares which had been frozen by the two 
instrumentalities set up to deal with the crisis.111 In January 1964, Japan Joint Securities 
(N ihon  kyödö shöken) was set up by the fourteen major banks and four securities 
companies and one year later the Japan Securities Holding Association (Nihon shöken  
hoyu k u m ia i ) was set up by the ten major investment trust companies. Both bodies 
received special finance from the Bank of Japan (as did the failed securities company 
Yamaichi Securities) to allow them to buy up and freeze shares in a bid to put a floor on 
falling stock prices. Together they bought up 3,824 million shares or the equivalent of 5.1 
per cent of the total number of shares of first-section listed shares in 1965. Most of the 
shares were in leading companies and were transferred from the investment trust 
companies (töshi sh in taku ) which had been flourishing in the stock market boom of the 
early 1960s.11
The release of the shares by the two instrumentalities in the mid- to late 1960s was 
used by firms as an opportunity to increase their interlocking shareholdings and 
strengthen their main-bank and other grouping arrangements.12 In the case of the Japan 
Securities Holding Association (the only instrumentality for which da ta  are available), 
records show that  only about ten per cent of the shares were sold to individuals, while 
financial institutions purchased 57 per cent and other firms 22 per cent.10 Okumura 
quotes numerous instances of corporate interlocks resulting from the share releases: 
notable cases include an interlock of 5 million shares each between Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries and Isuzu Motor Industries; a Nissan Motor-Nippon Kokan interlock of 3 
million and 2 million shares respectively; and an interlock of 3 million shares each 
between Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Electric.1'1 The two Mitsubishi firms 
acquired a further 5 million of each other’s shares when Japan Joint Securities released its 
shares. ^
The present pattern of interlocking shareholdings centring on the financial corporate 
groupings is a result of firms’ acquiring parcels of each other’s shares in the kinds of 
circumstances described above and then increasing their holdings over time as firms 
expanded their capital in issues a t  par to existing shareholders. As Table 6-2 shows, until 
1970 capital was issued mainly through issues a t par (usually 50 yen) to existing
I  z*
shareholders. Thus with sets of firms becoming interlocked with one another and all 
making periodic share issues to existing shareholders, a significant proportion of corporate 
shareholdings involves no net capital commitment at all.
As Futatsugi has pointed out, interlocking shareholdings to a large extent involve 
little more than the ‘swapping of pieces of paper’ between firms, as the capital flows in
• • I Tone direction are cancelled out by a corresponding flow in the other direction.1 * If firm A
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issues 100 million yen of capital to firm B and firm B issues 100 million yen of capital to 
firm A, no net allocation of capital has been made and nothing on the ‘real’ side of the 
economy has changed. But the balance sheets and the shareholding structures of the firms 
do change, and this results in an altered distribution of risks: essentially each firm is 
exchanging a portion of its uncertain future income stream with tha t  of the other and in 
the diversified groupings in Japan this results in a significant portfolio diversification 
effect for each firm.
Futatsugi estimated th a t  in 1973, for instance, 53 per cent of the interlocking 
shareholdings of Sumitomo group (presidents’ club) firms cancelled out in this way, with 
the figure for Mitsui being 46 per cent and tha t  for Mitsubishi 45 per cent. It can be 
argued therefore that reciprocal shareholding arrangements have little to do with two 
major functions ascribed to a capital market, the allocation of capital resources for 
investment and the diversification of investor risk; to the extent tha t  interlocks cancel 
out, there is no net allocation of capital and in a normal capital market investors are able 
to diversify their risks directly. Rather, interlocking shareholdings can be viewed as 
providing a mechanism through which firms -- and, through their employment 
arrangements, managers and other ‘lifetime’ employees of the firm — diversify their risks 
and, as shown below, through which management teams obtain insulation from the 
external capital market and thus increase the security of their employment tenure.
The case of banks and their corporate borrowers presents perhaps the best example 
of interlocking shareholdings as an instrument for pooling corporate and managerial risk 
and for internalising capital control mechanisms. The financial institutions such as the 
city, trust, and long-term credit banks, and insurance companies are the most prominent 
shareholders in Japan: in 1982 they owned 39 per cent of the capital of listed firms and 
also dominated the top shareholding positions. Table 3-1 (p.40) showed that the main 
bank is usually a major shareholder in its affiliated firms. Further evidence on financial 
institutions as shareholders is presented in Table 6-3, which shows that for 78 per cent of 
first-section listed firms in 1981 at least six of the top ten shareholders were financial 
institutions and tha t  for 42 per cent at least eight were financial ins t i tu tions .^  Thus 
firms tend to have as their major shareholders the banks and other financial institutions 
from whom they borrow funds, particularly but not exclusively group-related financial 
institutions.“^  On the other hand, as Table 6-4 indicates, the major 22 banks in Japan 
are owned basically by domestic firms, particularly non-financial firms. The corporate 
ownership of banks is a t  a much higher level than for non-financial firms: 91 per cent 
compared with 68 per cent. Similarly, non-financial firms have more than twice the 
ownership share in banks as they do in other non-financials: 58 per cent as opposed to 26 
per cent (Tables 6-1 and 6-4). Corporate share interlocking appears to have resulted in
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Table 6.3: Analysis of listed firms in Japan according to the number of financial 
institutions among the top ten shareholders, 1980
Breakdown of first-section listed firms
Number of
financial institutions
among top ten Relative Cumulative
shareholders in Number frequency frequency
listed firms of firms (%) (%)
10 46 5.7 5.7
9 130 16.1 21.8
8 159 19.7 41.5
7 150 18.5 60.0
6 142 17.6 77.6
5 92 11.4 89.0
4 56 6.9 95.9
3 16 2.0 97.9
2 11 1.4 99.3
1 7 0.9 100.oa
Total 809 100.0
Note: a Rounded to 100.0.
Compiled from Kigyo keiretsu soran, 1981: Kigyo keiretsu soran.Source:
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an internal capital market in which to a large extent, and certainly in the top shareholder 
positions, the major banks effectively own and in turn are owned by their major corporate 
clients. In this regard, it is to be remembered tha t  lifetime employment practices also 
operate in the finance sector, suggesting tha t  managers in the major banks also benefit 
from risk-pooling and internalisation of capital control mechanisms in the internal capital 
market.
STABLE SHAREHOLDING ARRANGEM ENTS
An important function of intercorporate shareholdings is that shares are held under 
implicit arrangements which provide insulation from the external capital market and the 
‘market for corporate control’. Interlocking shareholdings in Japan are based for the 
most part  on what Japanese businessmen term ‘stable shareholding arrangements’ (antei 
kabunushi kosaku ). A stable shareholding arrangement is an implicit contract, or even 
explicit agreement, between the managements of firms to hold each other's shares on a 
friendly or insider basis and not to dispose of them without prior consultation with the
o  o
firm and certainly not to potential takeover agents or corporate r a id e r s /0 Thus stable 
shareholding arrangements provide the basis of a managerial cartel in the market for 
corporate control. It is largely because of the operation of stable shareholding 
arrangements or implicit agreements in the internal capital and managerial markets that
or
there is no active external takeover market in J a p a n /"  As argued in Chapter 2, this has 
facilitated the operation of lifetime employment practices for managers and other 
employees.
Stable shareholding arrangements intensified and became more explicit at about the 
time of capital liberalisation in the early 1970s. The prospect of capital liberalisation — 
and the fear tha t  it would result in aggressive and unfriendly takeover a ttem pts by 
foreign corporations — led to a panic mentality among Japanese management and policy­
makers and triggered a concerted effort on the part of firms to increase the proportion of 
their shares in stable hands. Amplifying this fear was the fact tha t  not only would 
foreigners be able to invest more freely in Japan, but with the amendment of the 
Securities Transactions Law in 1971 stock market takeover bids such as are prevalent in 
the United States became possible for the first time in Japan. From 1970 to 1972, in 
particular, there were frequent reports in the financial press of major firms implementing
9 A‘stable shareholding’ m ea su res /0 The report on the stable shareholding strategy of auto-
9 7electrical parts maker, Stanley Electric, captures the essence of these m o v e s / '
The large car-lamp parts maker, Stanley Electric, is negotiating the purchase 
of a total of 3.2 million of its shares by major transaction partners such as parts 
purchasers, Toyo Kogyo and Mitsubishi Motors, and raw material supplier,
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Mitsubishi Petrochemical, as one aspect of shareholding stabilisation measures 
to cope with the [expected] foreign capital offensive. The negotiations are said to 
be proceeding smoothly and it is expected tha t  by the end of this September its 
[share] stabilisation rate will rise from the current 55 per cent to about 65 per 
cent.
The company has been implementing shareholding stabilisation measures since 
about September last year centring on such financial institutions as Mitsui 
Trust, Mitsui Bank and Sanwa Bank, raising its stabilisation rate in one go from 
the previous 41 per cent or so to close to 52 per cent by the end of last March. 
Since then major customer, Honda Motor, purchased 1.2 million shares (its 
holding was zero at the end of last March), taking it straight to the number four 
shareholder position.
o o
Sanyo Electric’s stable shareholding measures were similarly reported as follows. °
Sanyo Electric has a policy to raise its stable shareholding rate as soon as 
possible from the current 52.7 per cent to 60 per cent. To tha t  end, it will 
continue to seek from time to time the cooperation of financial institutions, 
insurance companies and other institutional investors.
According to the company’s calculation, during the [half-year] term to last 
May it placed 24 million shares (4.8 per cent of issued shares) with Sumitomo 
and Kyowa Banks and life and accident insurance companies. As a result, 
holdings by financial institutions rose to 36.37 per cent (31.69 per cent at the 
end of last November). These for the most part were transferred from individual 
shareholders, with the number of individual shareholders declining by more than 
10,000 in the period. As a result corporate holdings rose to 54.04 per cent 
(previously 49.96 per cent), but 52.7 per cent are held by transaction partners 
and other stable shareholders.
The spate of share-cornering attem pts which occurred in the mid- to late 1970s 
threw into sharp relief the operation of stable shareholding strategies in preventing the 
development of a United States-style takeover market, despite capital market 
liberalisation which on the surface seemed to pave the way for such a market to develop. 
In share-cornering attem pts, speculator groups would buy up a portion of a firm’s 
‘floating’ shares, tha t  is, shares held by individuals or organisations not associated 
directly with the firm, and a ttem pt to ‘green-mail’ the company’s m anagem en t/  These 
a ttem pts, which varied in the level of success for the investors concerned, typically ended 
in the firm’s main bank and other group firms and business partners taking over the 
shares in a direct purchase from the speculators outside the stock exchange.
Firms which became the target of cornering and green-mailing by speculator groups 
include Kao Soap Co., Ajinomoto Co., and Oji Paper (cornered by a Hong Kong group), 
Nakayama Steel Works (cornered by the Sasagawa group), Mitsui Mining (cornered by 
the Osano group), and Asahi Breweries (cornered by the Jüzenkai group). In the case of 
Oji Paper, a Mitsui group firm and member of the group presidents’ club, Mitsui Bank, 
Mitsui Trust & Banking, and other Mitsui group firms, and the Industrial Bank of Japan 
took over the shares when the Hong Kong investor group released its 13 per cent 
holding.'"0
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Another case involving the Mitsui group was the cornering in 1976 of Mitsui Mining 
shares by a speculator group backed by the right-wing political figure Osano Kenji. This 
group cornered about 30 per cent of Mitsui Mining’s stock, despite its low profitability 
and prospects (the company had not paid a dividend for twenty years). Ten member 
firms of the Mitsui group presidents’ club, N im oku -ka i , acted as ‘white knights’ in buying 
the shares from the speculator group, thus bringing the combined shareholding of Mitsui
O  1
group firms in Mitsui Mining to 60 per cent.
In the case of Nakayama Steel Works, a member of the Sanwa group presidents’ 
club, the 6.7 million shares released by the Sasagawa group in 1978 were taken over in a 
direct purchase by a group of firms centring on the steel-maker’s five major banks,
o o
including its main bank, Sanwa, which took 825,000 shares. L At the time of the purchase 
of the cornered shares, Nakayama was a structurally depressed firm and had been making 
losses for two years. The Nakayama Steel and Mitsui Mining cases highlight the fact tha t  
implicit risk-sharing and mutual protection against takeover, rather than pure investment 
principles, seem to guide the actions of the main bank and other business partners in 
taking over the shares from the speculator groups.
In a similar vein, in the 1970s the disposal by foreign corporations of large parcels of 
stock in Japanese firms often involved the strategic placement of the shares with business 
partners as part  of internal capital market shareholding arrangements. When, for 
instance, in 1978 the United States glass manufacturer Libby Owens Ford disposed of its 
10 per cent holding in Nippon Sheet Glass, a  key Sumitomo group firm and member of 
the Sumitomo presidents’ club, it was reported that Nippon Sheet Glass arranged for the 
shares to be taken over by eleven Sumitomo group firms and ten transaction partners in a 
direct transfer outside the stock exchange.00 Of the 24 million shares involved, 7 million 
were taken over by Nissan Motor, a major consumer of Nippon Sheet Glass’s output, 
while among Sumitomo group firms Sumitomo Chemical took 2 million, Sumitomo 
Mutual Life Insurance 1 million, Sumitomo Trust h  Banking 900,000 and Sumitomo 
Marine &; Fire Insurance 200,000 shares. Texaco’s sale of its holding in Mitsubishi Oil in 
1984, examined below, is another notable case of a group accomodating the release of the 
shareholding of a foreign firm.
It should be noted that, while it is the private interest of economic agents in the 
internal capital and managerial markets which underpins stable shareholding 
arrangements, the strong backing of the regulatory authorities, particularly the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), has also 
been important. The Minister for International Trade and Industry, Miyazawa Ken’ichi, 
made public M ITI’s view of the necessity for stable shareholding strategies to prevent 
foreign takeovers of Japanese firms in the wake of capital liberalisation in a reply to a
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question during the proceedings of the Committee on Industry and Commerce in the 
Upper House of the Diet on the 3rd of December 1 9 7 0 . Talking specifically of the 
automobile industry, the MITI Minister stated tha t  it would be necessary for Japanese 
firms to secure a proportion of stable shareholders (that is, shareholders who would not 
sell out in a takeover bid or cornering attem pt) sufficient to thwart any efforts by foreign 
firms to take over their management. The Minister also contended tha t  stable 
shareholding arrangements could be formed without introducing a holding company 
system, outlawed under the American-inspired postwar an ti trust  reforms, but by relying 
on the cooperation of related financial institutions.
The most notable example of M ITI’s administrative guidance in promoting stable 
shareholding arrangements was its involvement in the capital tie-up between Isuzu 
Motors and General Motors (GM). MITI imposed strict conditions on GM ’s tie-up with 
the faltering Japanese auto-maker, which involved GM purchasing 34.2 per cent of Isuzu’s 
shares. As well as including a provision in the tie-up agreement effectively requiring 
M ITI’s permission before GM could increase its shareholding above the initial level, MITI 
took the unusual step of requiring more than 400 of Isuzu’s shareholders (related financial 
institutions, transaction partners, and directors) to pledge tha t  they would not dispose of 
Isuzu’s shares, thereby 'freezing7 39 per cent of Isuzu’s stock in existing Japanese
O C
corporate hands .uD Part  of the measure involved the financial institutions, general trading 
companies and other Japanese corporate shareholders transferring their shares 
(amounting to 26 per cent of Isuzu’s shares) and voting rights to a consortium of the 
seven trust  banks and Daiwa Bank. The arrangement was formally terminated in 1978, 
but since then GM has maintained the same level of shareholding. The important point 
here is th a t  the Isuzu-GM case merely represented an extreme and formalised version of a 
practice which was pervasive in implicit form among Japanese firms and their permanent 
managements.
A more recent case of involvement by MITI in facilitating interlocking shareholding 
arrangements occurred when the U.S. oil company Texaco sold its shares in Mitsubishi 
Oil to Mitsubishi group firms. When Texaco took over Getty Oil in 1984, it moved to 
dispose of G e tty ’s 50 per cent shareholding in Mitsubishi Oil. The remaining 50 per cent 
of Mitsubishi Oil’s shares was dispersed mainly among Mitsubishi group firms, although 
the largest single holding by a Mitsubishi group firm was the 3.5 per cent held by Tokio 
Marine and Fire Insurance. Mitsubishi group firms agreed a t  a meeting of the group 
presidents’ club to negotiate with Texaco for the sale of the Getty shareholding to the 
Mitsubishi g r o u p . M I T I  aided the group in this regard by thwarting efforts by Kuwait 
and other prospective foreign buyers to negotiate the purchase of the shares. MITI did 
this by announcing its intention to use Section 27 of the Foreign Exchange Law to block
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any sale to foreign interests. This Section empowers MITI to disallow foreign capital 
investment in Japan if it is thought th a t  it might have an adverse impact on the 
economy. M ITI’s action paved the way for the Mitsubishi group to negotiate the purchase 
of the shares effectively as the sole bidder. 1 After negotiating the purchase of the shares 
from Texaco, senior Mitsubishi group executives set about the task of allocating parcels of 
shares to a large number of Mitsubishi-related Firms, with Mitsubishi Corporation, the 
group general trading company, taking the largest share to become the number-one
O n
shareholder with a 20 per cent holding (previously it has a 1.4 per cent holding).00
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) has provided direct and indirect regulatory support 
for stable shareholding practices. For example, tax rules facilitate interlocking 
shareholdings by making dividends received by a corporation tax-free up to an amount 
equivalent to its own dividend payments and by making only a quarter of dividends above
OQ
th a t  amount subject to tax. Similarly, it is often held tha t ,  by disallowing the use of 
capital gains for annual dividend payouts on insurance policies, Article 86 of the 
Insurance Business Law is conducive to stable shareholding arrangements, in tha t  it gives 
insurance companies a preference for dividend rather than capital gain income.
At another level, MOF has provided support to the management of large firms in 
preventing the development of an active takeover market. It has done this to a large 
degree through its regulation of the stock exchanges and of the conduct and practices of 
the securities companies. In 1978, for instance, MOF was instrumental, in conjunction 
with the Tokyo Stock Exchange, in discouraging the share-cornering activity of the 
investment-cum-speculator groups mentioned earlier, which had been disturbing the 
established order of the stock market. Under guidance from MOF, the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange introduced a number of measures aimed at inhibiting unfriendly takeover and 
share-cornering a c t iv i ty .^  The measures made it mandatory for securities companies 
which were involved in trading on behalf of takeover groups to disclose the details of the 
transactions and required securities companies to make thorough investigations of their 
customers so as not to become involved in takeover or cornering attempts. In cases where 
a securities company could not prove tha t  it had not aided a takeover or cornering
1
a ttem p t it would face sanctioning from the stock exchange for a breach of the exchange’s 
code of ethics. In the case of Oji Paper, mentioned earlier, MOF used its influence over 
the securities companies to frustrate the a ttem pt of the Hong Kong investor group to 
corner the number-one paper-maker’s shares. It was reported that MOF effectively 
directed the eight securities houses with offices in Hong Kong not to handle orders from 
the group to buy Oji’s shares.41
A major implication of stable, interlocking shareholding arrangements for the way 
structural adjustment is managed a t the corporate level in Japan is that firms will as a
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rule continue to hold shares in firms which have become structurally or managerially 
depressed. Thus a t  the same time tha t  depressed firms may receive financial assistance 
from main banks, the general trading company and possibly other business partners, the 
risk is greatly reduced for the firm tha t  it will go bankrupt as a result of corporate 
shareholders attempting to sell off their shares or be taken over by a corporate raider 
aiming to split up the assets or obtain possible tax-shields. At the same time, however, a 
mechanism exists in the form of main-bank intervention which produces similar results in 
terms of asset reorganisation but with less disruption, and arguably fewer costs, to the 
managers and other employees of the firm.
Although firms normally continue to hold shares in a firm which is depressed and 
undergoing adjustment, possibly under the direction of the main bank or a GTC, as is 
seen below the ailing firm itself will dispose of part of its shareholdings as a loss­
countering measure.
N E G O T IA T E D  SH A R E D ISPO SA LS
The disposal of shares held in other related firms has been an important mechanism 
by which Japanese firms have offset losses in the face of large-scale structural change and 
adjustm ent over the past decade. The shareholdings which firms have accumulated in the 
course of engaging in interlocking shareholdings with related banks, trading companies, 
suppliers and purchasers, and other firms have been a major source of finance and book 
profit in times of financial distress and structural depression. Just as in normal times the 
shares are held under implicit stable shareholding arrangements as part of an internal 
capital market, so too does the disposal of shares to offset losses occur in a negotiated 
intercorporate context, with most of the shares being sold directly to other related firms 
in direct transfers outside the stock exchange.
The disposal of shares has two im portant effects. First, there is a cash-flow effect, 
with the revenue from the sale being used to cover the cash-flow shortfall which occurs 
when a firm is making losses or to repay bank borrowings which have been increased to 
make up this shortfall. Second, the sale typically allows the firm to register a substantial 
capital gain or special profit in its profit and loss statement, which serves to reduce the 
level of its accumulated losses.
As explained earlier, the shares held by large firms were generally obtained at face 
value (usually 50 yen) in direct issues to shareholders or in special third-party issues. 
These shares are recorded in the balance sheet at their book or purchase value, but, with 
the substantial rise in share prices, by the 1970s the market value of the shares was 
usually several or many times their book value. On disposal of the shares, the difference 
between the sale and book value — the nominal capital gain — is registered as a special 
profit (tokubetsu rieki) in the profit and loss statement of the f i rm .^
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It is in the nature of stable shareholding arrangements that they place an implicit 
constraint on the freedom of corporate shareholders to dispose of the shares when and in 
what manner they might choose. This does not mean, however, tha t  firms can never 
dispose of the shares; as long as the shares remain in stable hands (or the same overall 
target level is maintained) the disposal of shares is consistent with the aim of stable 
shareholdings, namely insulation from the takeover market. Indeed, the role of 
intercorporate shareholdings as a risk-diversifying device implies that Firms will dispose of 
their shareholdings in times of financial crisis. Thus during recent structural adjustment 
in Japan firms facing financial problems have used the shares they hold in related banks 
and business partners to offset their business losses. The disposal of shares in this way has 
been a major instrument in the private sector through which structural adjustment costs 
have been borne at the corporate level.
Table 3-5 (p.60) shows tha t  between 1974 and 1981 a sample of 350 major Japanese 
firms registered special profits from the sale of securities (mostly shares) of 712.3 billion 
yen (US$ 2.8 billion). This figure considerably understates the actual figure, however, as 
profits from share disposals are also recorded under current assets (also shown in the 
table). In fact, most of the current assets concerned are shares so that the sum of profits 
from current assets and securities is a better estimate of the profits realised by firms from 
the sale of shares. This figure was 1,007.3 billion yen (US$ 6.9 billion) for the same 
period, which is equivalent to 18 per cent of the total net (after tax) profits of the firms in 
the period.
There is much case study evidence at the level of the firm and industry confirming 
the importance of share disposals in helping firms to adjust to structural change, as 
suggested in the aggregate accounting data. The examination of reports in the financial 
press and analysis of the securities reports of specific firms also show that  the disposal of 
shares has been a common response of the large Japanese firm when in financial
i  o
distress. Table 6-5 gives the details of a number of the reported cases of share 
disposals. Most reports in the financial press in the 1970s of large firms suffering business 
losses or implementing rationalisation programs mentioned tha t  the disposal of shares in 
related banks and business partners was to be used to offset part of the losses. This was 
particularly the case with the steel makers, textiles firms and other structurally depressed 
firms.4 * It was also the case with general trading companies and even major banks, when 
they suffered losses on their investments in failed affiliates.
It is a feature of the share disposal programs as summarised in Table 6-5 tha t  the 
disposals have occurred as explicit measures to offset business losses, highlighting the risk- 
diversifying mechanism of intercorporate shareholdings, and that the disposals have 
occurred in an internal capital market context, reflecting the stable shareholding
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arrangements involved. As a rule the share disposals occur when the firm has suffered a 
loss of some kind and generally the disposals take place in what can be termed a 
negotiated intercorporate context. It is rare for the shares to be disposed of in pure 
market transactions on the stock exchange; rather consultations and negotiations usually 
take place between the firm selling the shares, the firm whose shares are being sold, the 
targetted  buyer firms, and other interested parties such as the main bank. Thus shares 
are placed with other firms in direct transactions outside the stock exchange (shijöyai  
to r ih ik i) or in so-called ‘cross’ transactions (kurosu to rih ik i), which occur inside the 
stock exchange but where the terms of the transaction are settled in advance with the 
buyer firm and the transaction is executed by a single securities company. The firm’s 
main bank will also often play a central role, coordinating and in some cases actually 
carrying out the disposal program.
Table 6-6 captures these trends a t  an aggregate level as its shows business 
corporations and individuals as net sellers of shares in every year since 1975 and financial 
institutions as net buyers, although these figures do not include the substantial volume of 
trading which has taken place in direct transactions between firms outside the stock 
exchange.
No published da ta  exists on the direct transactions which occur outside the stock 
exchange, but press reports such as those summarised in Table 6-5 and sample surveys 
suggest th a t  the volume is high and tha t  this is the major route firms use when they 
dispose of shares to offset losses. A survey carried out by the Tokyo Stock Exchange and 
the Ministry of Finance in 1978 revealed substantial dealings outside the m a r k e t .^  The 
survey was of 22 leading firms: seven manufacturing firms, eight insurance companies
and seven banks. Three major reasons were offered by manufacturing firms for engaging 
in direct transactions: first, th a t  it was necessary to find a buyer firm acceptable to the 
firm whose shares were being sold, as a change in shareholding structure was involved; 
second, tha t  secrecy could be maintained; and third tha t  the decline in share price that 
might be expected from the sale of a large block of shares in the exchange could be 
avoided. The banks and insurance companies were almost always buyers of shares, 
stating th a t  they were taking over the shares in response to requests from the firms 
concerned. For insurance companies direct trading represented from several to 10 per 
cent of their total trading in shares in the year surveyed (1977).
Another survey, by a large securities company, of 43 firms known to have disposed 
of shares on a large scale revealed th a t  of about 2 billion shares sold by the firms in the 
year to March 1978 only 33 to 44 million were sold through the stock exchange -- 
including pre-arranged cross transactions -- and the remainder, more than 1.5 billion 
shares, was sold outside the exchange in direct interfirm transactions.'*® One steel-maker
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surveyed had disposed of 70 million bank shares, with 95 per cent of the shares being sold 
outside the market. As regards cross transactions, another form of direct negotiated 
intercorporate sale, these accounted for about 7 to 8 per cent of total stock exchange 
share transactions in the 1976-78 period, a remarkably high figure given the very high 
share turnover rate which obtains among individual investors and investment funds in 
Japan.  ^
C A SE  S T U D IE S
The case studies illustrate the role of negotiated share disposals in helping firms to 
offset losses incurred during their adjustment. They also relate the role of interlocking 
shareholdings more directly to the role of main banks and general trading companies in 
mediating structural adjustment at the corporate level. First, it is shown that  share 
disposals have played a critical role in enabling GTCs to absorb the costs of adjustment 
in their corporate structures in the way outlined in the previous chapter. Then, the focus 
returns to the Ataka Co. failure and reorganisation to show the important role of 
intercorporate shareholdings in dispersing the costs of adjustment in that case also.
G en era l tr a d in g  c o m p a n ie s
General trading companies have disposed of shares on a large scale to offset losses 
incurred during recent structural change and adjustment. The extensive shareholdings 
which the GTCs have accumulated as central entities in their groupings have provided a 
major form of insurance against business losses. While the GTCs were writing off losses 
against bad debts and investments in affiliate operations they were also disposing of 
shares so as to generate profits in their accounts and to finance their cash-flow shortfalls. 
Between 1978 and 1982 the six major GTCs registered 250.0 billion yen in special profits 
from the sale of shares (Table 6-7); this figure offset a major part of the losses incurred on 
account of affiliates in the same period, w'hich totalled 400.3 billion yen (US$ 1.6 billion) 
(Table 5-6, p.106). In the 1974 to 1977 period the top four GTCs similarly registered 
136.9 billion yen (US$ 548 million) in profits from the sale of shares, which cushioned the
A Q
impact of the recessionary losses incurred in tha t  period also. °
As with other firms, the disposal of shares by GTCs has been carried out as an 
explicit measure to offset business losses. The Nihon keizai shinbun  reported tha t  in 
1977 the GTCs disposed of shares held in banks as a recession-countering measure and 
th a t  this was done with the consent of the banks.49 Mitsui &; Co. and Toyo Menka each 
sold 3 million shares in Fuji Bank, and Nichimen Jitsugyo disposed of 1.5 million Chiba 
Bank shares and Sumitomo Corporation 1 million shares in the group-aligned Kansai 
Mutual Bank. The troubled Kanematsu-Gosho disposed of 10 million shares in Tokyo
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Bank and 3.3 million in Daiichi Kangyo, its two main banks. The GTC was receiving 
financial and managerial assistance from its main banks at the time, and the share 
disposals were implemented under the banks’ direction in this context.
A tak a  &. C o. and S u m itom o  B an k
The failure of Ataka &; Co., examined in Chapter 4, highlights the important role 
th a t  share disposals have played in offsetting corporate losses during structural 
adjustment. As was shown in the earlier analysis, Ataka was effectively under the 
management of Sumitomo Bank for the two years prior to its partial absorption by 
C.Itoh in October 1977 and Sumitomo Bank, and to a lesser extent Kyowa Bank, incurred 
enormous losses on its account.
The use of share disposals was im portant a t  two levels in helping to offset the losses 
involved in the Ataka reorganisation. First, as with most large firms, Ataka held 
significant parcels of shares in a large number of related firms and under Sumitomo Bank 
management A taka disposed of a large proportion of these shares in the lead-up to its 
takeover by C.Itoh. As of March 1975, excluding shares in affiliates and subsidiaries, 
A taka held 296 million shares in 649 firms with a book value of 61.2 billion yen.51“* In the 
1975 financial year, Ataka disposed of about one-third of these shares in a measure which 
generated some 33 billion yen in cash inflow and which yielded 13.4 billion yen in profits 
from the sale of shares, thus serving to keep its net loss down to 5.9 billion yen.''*' A taka’s 
largest holdings were its 20.0 million shares in its main bank, Sumitomo, and 11.5 million 
in its second-line main bank, Kyowa, and in the second half of the 1975 FY it disposed of 
all of these shares; it also disposed of shares in Sumitomo Trust Banking (5.5 million) 
and in a number of its major transaction partners including 4.0 million shares in Nippon 
Steel Corporation, 4.5 million in Kobe Steel, 6.5 million in Kubota, and 5.2 million in 
Olympus Optical.5^
According to reports in the financial press, most of the shares were disposed of 
outside the stock exchange in direct placements with other large firms after consulting 
with the firms involved. The Mainichi shinbun newspaper quoted Sumitomo Bank 
sources as saying tha t  the shares disposed of had been “taken over by Sumitomo group
r O
and other related firms” . In the case of the Olympus shares, for instance, Ataka had 4.0 
million shares at the beginning of November 1975; in the last two months of the year it 
sold 1.0 million of the shares through the stock exchange (mainly to European 
institutional investors) and between January and March of 1976 it disposed of the 
remaining 3.0 million shares to eight financial institutions in cross transactions and in 
direct transactions outside the exchange, with Sumitomo Bank taking the largest single 
share (1.0 million shares).54
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A number of considerations were involved which required careful negotiation by 
Ataka or more importantly by Sumitomo Hank in its capacity as ‘unofficial receiver’. 
About 80 per cent of the shares held by Ataka had been used as collateral on its bank 
borrowings, so Ataka could not dispose of these without the approval of the banks.55 The 
involvement of the main banks, Sumitomo and Kyowa, in the management of A taka’s 
reorganisation and in the supervision of the share disposals amounted to an implicit 
guarantee to the other banks and ensuied their agreement in releasing the shares from 
collateral arrangements. Also, as explained earlier, most shares are held under stable 
shareholding arrangements and are used to cement and maintain transactional ties. In 
disposing of the shares it was im portant from the viewpoint of the firm whose shares were 
involved tha t  they be placed with another ‘stable shareholder’.
From Ataka and Sumitomo’s point of view, it was critical tha t  the firm concerned 
did not dispose of the shares it held in Ataka or cease transacting through Ataka, as 
either action would jeopardise the precarious negotiations tha t  were underway between 
Sumitomo and C.ltoh. Thus, rather than just sell off the shares in an anonymous fashion 
in the stock exchange, the agreement of the firms concerned would be obtained first and 
then arrangements made for appropriate firms to take over the stock. Thus, for instance, 
the Nihon keizai shinbun newspaper reported tha t  to accomodate A taka’s disposal of 5.1 
million of its 5.6 million holding in Hasegawa Komuten (a large construction company), 
in which Ataka ranked as number-five shareholder, Hasegawa negotiated with the banks 
and insurance companies to take over the shares; and similarly tha t  T a tsu ta  Electric Wire 
and Cable had given its permission for A taka  to dispose of its holdings in Tatsuta , with 
T a tsu ta  arranging for several of its supplier firms to take over the shares.5  ^ The N K S  
also reported tha t  a condition underlying A taka’s disposal of 1.1 million shares in the 
machinery maker Takum a appeared to be tha t  the close transactional relationship 
between the firms would be maintained and tha t  Takum a would retain its shareholding in 
Ataka. Similarly it was reported tha t  Olympus entered an undertaking not to release 
the 400,000 shares it held in A taka .5®
The disposal of shares in this way was significant in reducing the level of A taka’s 
final losses, but as set out in Chapter 4 the main banks still bore very large losses. By 
disposing of a portion of their own shareholdings the banks were able to reduce 
considerably the impact of the Ataka losses on their financial positions. Sumitomo Bank 
wrote off 113.2 billion yen of its A taka losses in September 1977, but by disposing of a 
portion of it shareholding it was able to register a special profit of 26.2 billion yen. But, 
severe as the Ataka losses were, Sumitomo Bank was far from exhausting all of the 
‘corporate insurance’ it held in the form of shareholdings: the profit from the shares
disposed of to offset the Ataka losses represented only 6 per cent of the potential capital
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gain (kabushiki fu k u m i-e k i ) of 400 billion yen (US$ 1.6 billion) realisable from its 
shareholdings at the time.'1’9
Sumitomo Bank used mainly its shares in key group firms in its share disposal 
program and press reports and other evidence suggests tha t ,  as is typically the case, the 
shares were taken over by related firms and other large firms in directly negotiated 
transactions. As Table 6-5 shows, Sumitomo disposed of 23.0 million shares in Sumitomo 
Metal Industries, 19.2 million in Nippon Electric Corporation, 8.0 million in Sumitomo 
Heavy Industries, 5.5 million in Nippon Sheet Glass, 5.5 million in Sumitomo Chemical 
Industries, 2.0 million in Sumitomo Light Metal Industries, all major industrial firms in 
the group, 5.0 million shares in Sumitomo Trust Banking, 4.8 million in Sumitomo 
Marine Fire Insurance, the two other major listed financial institutions of the group, 
and 2.0 million shares in Sumitomo Corporation, the group trading company. It is clear 
th a t  a large proportion of these shares simply passed hands among related group firms 
and other financial institutions. The significance of these changes is tha t  they were almost 
certainly in response to Sumitomo Bank’s request and were made in the context of the 
Ataka reorganisation, as in normal times the top shareholding structure of listed firms, 
which comprises almost entirely corporate holdings, remains remarkably stable. For 
instance, in the same period, Sumitomo Trust & Banking’s increased its holdings in 
Sumitomo Metal Industries by 13.3 million, Taiyo Mutual Life Insurance by 20.0 million, 
and Nihon Mutual Life Insurance by 3.8 million; Sumitomo Trust &; Banking increased its 
holdings in NEC by 10.9 million, Sumitomo Corporation by 10.0 million and Nihon 
Mutual Life Insurance by 2.4 million; Sumitomo Mutual Life Insurance increased its 
holding in Sumitomo Heavy Industries by 4.5 million shares, Sumitomo Marine Fire 
Insurance its holding by 2.0 million and Nihon Mutual its by 1.2 million; Sumitomo 
M utual’s holding in Sumitomo Chemical increased by 2.5 million and Sumitomo T ru s t’s 
by 1.4 million; Toyota’s holding in Nippon Sheet Glass rose by 4.0 million. In Sumitomo 
Corporation’s case, Sumitomo Bank’s 8.0 million share disposal was exactly matched by 
an NEC increase, with the other top shareholdings remaining basically unchanged. The 
Nihon keizai shinbun  reported tha t  Sumitomo Bank disposed of 2.0 million of its 8.4 
million holding in Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical to Sumitomo Mutual and other Sumitomo 
group firms as part of the Ataka-related disposal program.^9 Kyowa Bank, the other 
bank to sustain major losses from A taka’s failure, carried out a similar program of share 
disposals (Table 6-5).
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C O N C L U SIO N
Intercorporate shareholdings have performed two important functions in the 
internal capital markets in Japan and these have had important implications for the way 
structural adjustment has been managed at the corporate level. On the one hand, 
insulation provided by intercorporate shareholdings has helped to cushion firms from 
external economic shocks as they would otherwise be transmitted through the capital 
market. On the other hand, the disposal of shares in times of depression has enabled firms 
to offset their losses and thus has been one of the important mechanisms serving to 
distribute the costs of structural adjustment within the private sector.
Intercorporate shareholdings have helped to insulate firms and their permanent 
management from external capital market forces, particularly from the so-called ‘market 
for corporate control’. This is because shares are held mainly under ‘stable shareholding 
arrangem ents’ (antei kabunushi kösaku), with firms agreeing to hold each other’s shares 
on a stable, long-term basis. These implicit insider arrangements provide mutual 
protection for firms and their managements from the external market for corporate 
control, thus facilitating the Japanese managerial and employment system in large firms. 
While in normal times interlocking shareholdings tend to prevent the kind of takeover 
activity witnessed in other economies from occurring, in times of financial crisis they 
provide implicit insurance against sudden failure for the firm in that firms continue to 
hold the shares. This back-up from corporate shareholders both facilitates and is 
facilitated by the kind of main-bank financial assistance and internal intervention 
described in the earlier chapters.
W hat appears to characterise the way economic change and external shocks are 
translated into structural adjustment through the capital market in Japan is the 
importance of internal organisational mediation rather than external price mechanisms. 
Thus in the capital market the nexus of share price effects — the firm becomes depressed, 
shareholders trys to sell off their shares, the share price falls, emergency finance is 
impossible to obtain, and the firm goes bankrupt — is broken in the case of most of the 
large corporate sector; rather the share ownership side remains largely in tact around a 
set of implicit agreements and conventions and adjustment (sharing of losses, intervention 
in the firm and so on) takes place through the business structures described in this and 
the earlier chapters.
The other important aspect of intercorporate shareholdings is tha t  they represent a 
mechanism which enables firms to pool and diversify their risks, as each firm obtains a 
diversified portfolio of shares as a result of engaging in share interlocks with a group of 
related firms. A major empirical finding is tha t  the disposal of these shareholdings has 
been an important means by which firms undergoing structural adjustment have
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cushioned their losses. Moreover, the disposal of shares has taken place for the most part 
in a  negotiated intercorporate context outside of the stock exchange so as basically to 
maintain the fabric of an internal capital market based on implicit stable shareholding 
arrangements.
The focus of attention now moves from the analysis of the specific mechanisms of 
corporate organisation — the main-bank system, general trading companies and 
intercorporate shareholdings -- to the aluminium smelting industry, as a case study of the 
role of the financial corporate grouping in the adjustment of a particular depressed 
industry.
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N o t e s
1. Direct interlocking occurs when firm A holds shares in firm B, and B also in 
A. Indirect interlocking occurs when firm A holds shares in firm B, B in C, and C in 
A. There has been much analysis of the structure of intercorporate shareholdings in 
financial corporate groupings in Japan. See, for instance, Futatsugi (1976, 1982), 
Miyazaki (1976), Noguchi (1979), and the annual directories Keizai chösa kyökai (various 
editions) and Kigyö Jceiretsu soran (various editions). The interest here is on the 
economic rationale for these mechanisms, rather than on their structure per se.
2. It is important to note tha t  while interlocking occurs primarily among firms 
belonging to the same grouping it does not occur exclusively so. Analytically this is to 
say th a t  the internal capital markets are themselves interconnected to varying degrees.
3. Amihud and Lev (1981, 606).
4. See Okumura (1968, 1972, 1974) and O bata  (1983) on the postwar development 
of interlocking shareholdings.
5. The figures are from various editions of Keizai chösa kyokai’s publication Nenpö  
keiretsu no kenkyU.
6. On the zaibatsu dissolution and development of keiretsu  groupings, see Hadley 
(1970). See Ichikawa (1981) for a case study of the development of interlocking 
shareholdings involving Sumitomo Corporation in the Sumitomo group.
7. Okumura (1968, 30).
8. Okumura (1974, 29).
9. Okumura (1974, 27-34).
10. This paragraph relies heavily on the account in Okumura (1974, 52-6).
11. Okumura (1974, 53) reports that the proportion of total shares held by the 
investment trusts fell from 10.8 per cent in 1963 to 4.1 per cent by 1966, with most of 
these shares being transferred to the two shareholding instrumentalities.
12. The release of the shares occurred between March 1966 and January 1969 in the 
case of the Japan Securities Holding Association and between 1966 and January 1971 in 
the case of Japan Joint Securities (Okumura, 1974, 53, 55).
13. Okumura (1974, 54). The figure for individuals is 21.5 per cent but the 
Association’s records state tha t  the figure includes several miscellaneous categories of 
purchaser, with the actual figure for individuals being about half.
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14. Okum ura (1972, 61-3; 1974, 55-6).
15. Okum ura (1974, 56).
16. See also Yamaichi Shöken kabushiki kaisha and Yamaichi Shöken keizai 
kenkyüjo (1977) on the development of the stock market in postwar Japan.
17. Futatsugi (1976, 82). See also Futatsugi (1979, 1982).
18. Futatsugi (1976, 82).
19. Banks in Japan have been able to hold up to 10 per cent of a firm’s shares, but 
an amendm ent to the Antitrust Law in 1977 reduced this limit to 5 per cent, with banks 
having ten years to comply.
20. Thus, for example, a Sumitomo group firm will have as its main bank Sumitomo 
Bank but Sumitomo Trust &; Banking, Sumitomo Mutal Life Insurance, and Sumitomo 
Marine & Fire Insurance will also usually have significant loan shares and shareholdings.
21. Manne (1965).
22. See Okumura (1979, 1981a, 1985) and ShUkan töyö keizai (1967).
23. T hat stable shareholding arrangements can be explicit in nature can be inferred 
from the comment by Ishida Taizö, former Chairman of Toyota Motor, a company 
renowned for its ‘stable’ share register:
Even financial institutions are not stable shareholders in the strictest sense. So 
we have an arrangement whereby if for some reason they sell their shareholding 
they will let us know beforehand. In such a case we want the Toyota group to 
take over [the sharesj. In the last resort it is only Toyota group firms) tha t  you 
can depend on and for tha t  reason we leave them so th a t  they are always able to 
hold [our shares (Shükan töyö keizai , 1967, 107).
24. One manifestation of this ‘cartel’ is the tendency for shareholders’ meetings in 
Japan  to be perfunctory affairs — they are generally over in less than twenty minutes 
(Hirata, 1979, 547) — with any business being settled at the informal meeting of major 
shareholders which is generally held prior to the shareholders’ meeting. See Hirata (1982, 
322) who concludes tha t  “the shareholders’ meetings of listed firms in Japan have become 
fossilised and functionless and do not perform any actual function as a decision-making 
organ” .
25. See, for instance, Okumura (1985, 44-6).
26. See, for instance, the following: “Anteikaritsu o 72-3% e: Nihon Käritto (Japan
Carlit: stabilised proportion up to 72-3%)” , N K S  evening, 22 June 1972, p.4; “Kabushiki 
anteiritsu 60% mezasu: Sanyo Denki kin’yu kikan ni hatarakikake e (Aiming for 60%
stable shareholding: Sanyo Electric working on the financial institutions)” , N K S  evening, 
12 July, 1972, p.4; “Sutanrei Denki anteikaritsu 65% ni: Töyökö nado to kabu kaitsuke 
köshö (Stanley Electric towards stabilised rate of 65%: negotiations for purchase of its 
stock by Toyo Kogyo and others)” , N K S  evening, 13 July 1972, p.4; “Antei
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kabunushizukuri sakan kensetsu öte (Large construction firms: stable shareholder-forming 
abounds)” , NKS,  15 July 1972, p.15; “Maruko ‘kabunushi antei’ ni hongoshi (Maruko 
gets serious about ‘stable shareholding')” , N K S , 22 July 1972, p. 15; “Kabushiki antei 
kosaku susumeru: Nishimatsu Kensetsu Fuyö gurupu chüshin ni (Nishimatsu
Construction promotes stable shareholding measures centring on the Fuyö group)” , N K S  
22 July 1972, p.4.
27. “Sutanrei Denki anteikaritsu 65% ni: Töyökö nado to kabu kaitsuke köshö 
(Stanley Electric towards stabilised rate of 65%: negotiations for purchase of its stock by 
Toyo Kogyo and others)” , N K S  evening, 13 July 1972, p.4.
28. “Kabushiki anteiritsu 60% mezasu: Sanyo Denki kin’yü kikan ni hatarakikake e
(Aiming for 60% stable shareholding: Sanyo Electric working on the financial
institutions)” , N K S  evening, 12 July, 1972, p.4.
29. ‘Green-mailing’ refers to the practice whereby a share-raider tries to sell back at 
a profit shares it has cornered to the firm (outlawed in Japan) or to interests friendly to 
the firm (so-called ‘white knights’).
30. “Oji Seishi-kabu: Mitsui gurupu nado katagawari (Mitsui group and others to 
take over [cornered] Oji Paper shares)” , N K S , 17 June 1978, p .l .
31. Nihon keizai shinbunsha (1977a, 174-5).
32. “Sasagawa gurupu Nakayamakö-kabu no kahan höshutsu: Shin Nittetsu ya 
kin’yü kikan ni baikyaku (Sasagawa group releases most of its Nakayama Steel shares: 
sells to Nippon Steel and financial institutions)” , N K S , 14 Feb 1978, p.15.
33. “Ita Garasu Bei Ri-sha to shihon teikei kaishö: Nissan Ji 700 man kabu 
katagawari de Toyota ni tsugi 6i kabunushi ([Nippon] Sheet Glass dissolves capital tie-up 
with American Libby company: with taking of 7 million shares Nissan Motor sixth largest 
shareholder after Toyota)” , N K S , 21 July 1978, p.13.
34. “Antei kabunushi kosaku hitsuyö: Tslisansö toben jidosha no gaishi teikei 
(Stable shareholder measures necessary: MITI Minister’s reply [on] foreign capital 
automobile tie-ups)” , N K S , 4 Dec 1970, p.7.
35. “Isuzu kabushiki töketsu o kaijo e: GM shusshiritsuage mo kan<5 ni (Towards 
the release of Isuzu’s frozen shareholdings: possible for GM to lift its holding)” , N K S , 23 
Feb 1978, p.8; Sumitomo Shintaku Ginko gojünenshi henshü iinkai (1976, 1232).
36. “Bei Gettei hoyü no Mitsubishi Sekiyu kabu Mitsubishi gurupu ga kaimodoshi 
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A lu m in iu m : a d ju stm en t p o licy
The aluminium smelting industry is an important case study of structural 
adjustment in Japan and of the the role of corporate organisation in tha t  process. The 
aluminium smelting industry is representative of Ja p an ’s structurally depressed 
industries. The industry suffered a major decline in international competitiveness as a 
result of the two oil price hikes and yen appreciation in the 1970s. Since 1978 the 
industry has undergone adjustment as an officially-designated depressed industry and has 
scrapped more than 80 per cent of its capacity. Corporate organisation in the industry 
centres on close links between the smelting companies and their affiliated financial 
corporate groupings.
The problems of adjustment in the aluminium industry can be analysed in three 
stages. In this chapter, the public policy framework in which adjustment has taken place 
and the associated financial assistance measures implemented by the government are 
examined. The industry was officially designated as a depressed industry for five years in 
1978 and again in 1983, and adjustment has taken place within the framework of the 
depressed industries laws outlined in the first chapter. The government has directed a 
number of assistance measures at the aluminium industry and the industry appears to 
have received more financial assistance than any other designated industry .1 In the next 
chapter, the role of corporate organisation in the adjustment process is examined, 
allowing an assessment to be made as to the relative importance of internal versus 
external measures in the bearing of adjustment costs in the industry. In the following 
chapter, internal adjustment mechanisms are examined more closely through a case study 
of adjustment in the Sumitomo group.
THE IM PACT OF THE FIRST OIL CRISIS
The oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979 resulted in a major decline in the international 
competitiveness of the Japanese aluminium industry. The aluminium smelting industry 
expanded rapidly in postwar Japan  under supportive government policies and tariff 
protection, and at the time of the first oil crisis Japan accounted for 9 per cent of world 
aluminium production. Between 1960 and 1973 domestic demand for aluminium
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products increased almost ten-fold from 209,333 to 1,994,054 tonnes, reflecting 
particularly the boom in construction industries and their increased demand for 
aluminium products.5 Demand for aluminium increased a t  an average rate of 23 per cent 
between 1965 and 1973, and at the time of the first oil crisis, and for a considerable 
period following it, corporate thinking and public policy-making was still geared to 
expectations of high growth in demand.4 Thus, a t  the time of the first oil crisis the five 
smelting companies had either recently added or were planning to add new capacity on a 
large scale, and the three major aluminium rolling firms — Sumitomo Light Metal, 
Furukawa Aluminium, and Kobe Steel — had plans to build their own smelters to meet 
their growing aluminium requirements.5 Sumitomo Light Metal (SLM) was the only one 
of the three to go ahead with its entry, a decision which was to result in heavy losses for 
the company.
It is difficult to think of an industry more out of line with Ja p an ’s comparative 
advantage and resource endowments than the aluminium smelting industry. Japan  has no 
bauxite and has relatively poor endowments of energy resources. Ja p an ’s aluminium 
industry relied primarily on electricity generated from plant using imported heavy oil and 
even before the first oil crisis the industry was not internationally competitive. In the late 
1960s, for instance, electricity costs in aluminium smelting were 41,900 yen per tonne in 
Japan  compared to 18,500 yen in the United States and 11,900 yen in Canada.^ As Table 
7-1 shows, in the early 1970s more than two-thirds of Japanese smelting capacity was oil- 
based, compared with an average of only 13 per cent for the non-communist world; 
Canada and the United States, Ja p an ’s major competitors, had virtually no reliance on 
oil.
The first oil crisis in 1973 and the appreciation of the yen which followed the 
breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s resulted in a major loss of 
competitiveness for the industry.” The quadrupling in the price of oil exacerbated the 
structural weakness of the oil-intensive Japanese aluminium industry, and although the 
appreciation of the yen during the 1970s partly offset the impact of this price rise it also 
reduced the price competitiveness of domestic aluminium vis-a-vis imports. The slowdown 
in domestic demand as a result of the post-oil crisis recession was a further blow to the 
industry. Demand for primary aluminium in 1974 was 34 per cent down on the previous 
year and did not recover to the 1973 level until 1978, while about 100,000 tonnes of new
Q
capacity continued to be added each year until 1977.° In the 1974 FY the five smelting 
companies began to register heavy losses and by the end of the 1977 FY they had 
combined accumulated losses of 64.3 billion yen (US$ 257 million), almost as much as the 
to ta l share capital in the industry of 74.9 billion yen (Table 7-3).
It is against this background of major deterioration in international competitiveness
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Table 7.1: International comparison of energy sources of aluminium smelting
industries in the early 1970s (per cent)
Country
Energy Source Japan Canada United
States
Europe Average for the 
non-communist world
Oil-based thermal 71.1 0.0 1 11.4 12.6
Hydro power 13.4 100.0 49 47.5 53.2
Coal-fired thermal 6.8 0.0 35 22.4 21.0
Natural gas 8.7 0.0 15 10.5 10.6
Nuclear power 0.0 0.0 0 7.5 2.3
Unknown 0.0 0.0 0 0.7 0.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Information provided by the Japan Aluminium Federation.
Table 7.2: International comparison 
costs in the early 1980s
of per 
(yen)
kilowatt-hour aluminium smelting
Japan Canada United
States
Australia West Germany
Lower range 15.5 1.0 3.5 3.0 5.5
Higher range 17.0 1.5 6.0 5.0 8.0
Source: Kimura Hidehiro, 1983: Arumi seirengyo no tesshu to kongo no kadai,
Chogin chosa geppo, 202, p.ll.
Ta
bl
e 
7.
3:
 
Pr
of
it
 a
nd
 l
os
s 
pe
rf
or
ma
nc
e 
of
 J
ap
an
es
e 
al
um
in
iu
m 
sm
el
ti
ng
 c
om
pa
ni
es
, 
19
76
-8
2 
(m
il
li
on
 y
en!
163
I—! 
© 
-P 0 
E-*
"0 © -p © i—I
p
§oÜ
©
Td
GQ)
-P Pi © fd Q)© > 1  ©0 4-1rH o
o oo orH ro
r"
(N <oI I
o oo oin ro
>H Oco mI I
o oo oro cn
<J\ o
CNI I
oo^p
10 I—1I
roI—1
in0
g O o o o-P -H o o o orH -H CN CN VO
fd 4-1 © P *.
■P 0  © rd CN o lO
0  P  0 © ■©* ■—i CN CN
H  ft ft >i i i 1
o o o O
G o o o O0  -P rH 1—1 CO CN ro
Oi X  rd «. » 1ft Cn -P r*» •'3* ro•H -H CD ■—i 1 i—l
2  ft S i
rooCM
O o oo o o 1 oro CN ftv >> — ftro lO lO ©ro in1 cn Cn1 I td©1 0O o o O XO o o o oCN lO lO•- GCO 1—1 cn 10 •H1—1 iH CN Cn1 1 -w 1 oXU
>1
§
£
4-10
a)
12
© •He © ©3 -H Td•H P O o o o O O o o ©G -p O o o O O o o Pi© -H © O co m l—1 ro o o£ £ 0 h. «. •» V, oo d d r* ro p^ lO i—) in o GX  -H g rH 1 i—1 CN "sPÜ1 <  H 1 1 i —' 0Cn •G0 0Pis ©3 o o o o o O o o 0 P•H o o o o o o o o -P Pi•H G ro rH co r- m 1—l ro in OP -H V, «. 1 P Pi© e ro m lO rH uo lO in CO ,G 1 0-p p 1 i 1 1 i—i CN © x:■H rH i —» ©s  c © G-P ©Pi0 1 oG X-H ©X 1 0© O o o O o o o o & ©•H o o o o o o o o cnx CN ro m O CQ CN ro CN G 1pP -P rH v *. *. © >1© X  <d CN CN ro i—1 00 00 X) P — '-P CP -P 1 1 1 1—1 1—1 ro •H•H *H © 1 1 -—- © ©S  PI s © ©•H•H GP ©P fts P £3 <3 0•H -H O Ua) c © © © © © © o ••^  -H G G G G G G o co 4-1•H S «* CO 0cn cn3 rH 1—1 i—i ©co <3 —' -p». G0 Pp 0•H o£ x: Ü0 P Cn ,_^ © ©£ ft G O O O O O O O o Td0 G ft o O O O O O O o -H Td-P ft 4-> 10 O CO c-1 O i—1 o ro ©ft g rH *. *. *. •» *. «. X£ P © CN in VO ro CN cn CO r- © wP rH £ 1 i rH 1 1—1 tH P •Hco <  co 1 P i—1£ X■H 3ft
rH ©© +J•H © ••o lO CO cn o i—i CN ■—1 wG r* e'­ CO CO CO P © ©© P <n Cn en cn CT\ cn cn £ © uG © i—i i—1 rH rH rH i—i i—i P © p•H © o © pft >i o 0 0© 1—1 CO'—
164
th a t  the Japanese aluminium smelting industry has undergone large-scale structural 
adjustment.® The industry has contracted capacity under three stages of adjustment as a 
designated industry, resulting in the scrapping of about 80 per cent of J a p an ’s smelting 
capacity. In 1978, after several firms, including the new entran t SLM, had added to 
domestic capacity in the wake of the first oil crisis, Japan  had 1,641,000 tonnes of 
smelting capacity operated by six companies a t  fourteen smelters; by 1983 only 337,000 
tonnes or 20 per cent of the 1978 level remained in operation (Table 7-4).*® While in 1978 
government and corporate policy-makers envisaged a contraction of capacity to 1.1 
million tonnes by 1983, in 1981 this target level of capacity to be retained was revised 
downward to 700,000 tonnes and again in 1985 to 350,000 tonnes. In the course of 
adjustment in the aluminium smelting industry the workforce declined from 13,711 in 
1974 to 3772 by 1983.11
THE FIRST PH ASE OF A D JU STM EN T
MITI convened the Aluminium Section of the Industrial Structure Council (ISC), its 
private sector advisory body, in September 1977 to discuss and make recommendations on 
a suitable adjustment plan for the industry. The Aluminium Section of the ISC includes 
in its membership senior figures from the aluminium industry, user industries, banks, and 
general trading companies, and experts from the press and research and academic fields 
(Appendix B). In November 1977 the Aluminium Section recommended to MITI tha t  the 
industry mothball and scrap 390,000 tonnes, about one-quarter of its capacity, during a 
five-year adjustment period. The figure was revised upwards to 530,000 tonnes in a 
further report in October 1978, as conditions in the industry worsened. The Aluminium 
Section envisaged an orderly contraction of capacity to the 1,100,000 tonne level by 1983, 
while investments in overseas capacity were stepped up, and its recommendations formed 
the basis of the government’s adjustment policy toward the industry when it was 
designated as structurally depressed in 1978.
The major government assistance measure for the reduction of capacity to the 1.1 
million tonne level was the ‘tariff-allocation scheme’ (kanzei wariate seido) recommended 
by the Industrial Structure Council in its 1977 report. Under this scheme a portion of the 
revenue from the 9 per cent tariff on aluminium imports was channelled to the smelting 
companies as funds to assist the mothballing and scrapping of excess capacity. The 
scheme was introduced initially for one year but was continued in expanded form in 1979 
and operated as shown in Figure 7-1. In March 1978, a scrapping-cartel instrumentality, 
the Aluminium Industry Structural Improvement Association (A ru m in iu m u  sangyd közö  
kaizen kyökai), was set up to administer the funds to the smelting companies. MITI 
issued import certificates which allowed user firms to import at a reduced tariff rate the
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Figure 7.1: Outline of the tariff-allocation scheme
(a) The tariff schedule
Tariff category 1978 1979
Normal countries
Prevailing tariff 9.0 9.0
Reduced tariff 5.5 4.5
Special preference 
source countries
Prevailing tariff 4.5 4.5
Reduced tariff 2.75 2.25
(b) Outline of the scheme
Ministry of issuance of Importers of
International ---- tariff-allocation— ^ aluminium
Trade & Industry certificates
monitoring and 
supervision
voluntary provision 
of amount equal to 
difference between 
prevailing and reduced 
tariffs!
Aluminium provision of Aluminium Industry
smelting ^ scrapping funds Structural Improvement
companies Association
Source: Information provided by Non-ferrous Metals Section, Basic Materials
Division, Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
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same amount of aluminium as was to be mothballed and scrapped. Under guidance from 
MITI, the user firms then made available the difference between the reduced and the 
normal higher tariff to the Structural Improvement Association as scrapping funds for the 
smelting companies.
The scheme yielded 8.1 billion yen (USS 32.4 million) and this was distributed to 
the smelting companies as scrapping funds in 1978 and 1979 and again in 1981 and 1982. 
The scheme can be viewed as a form of government assistance as the funds represented 
foregone tariff revenue to the government. The feature of the scheme, however, was tha t  
it provided a mechanism for user firms, through their increased imports of cheaper 
overseas aluminium, to generate funds for the scrapping of domestic capacity. In this 
respect, the tariff-allocation scheme resembled a number of other joint public-private 
sector schemes which have been employed in Japan  for redistributing the costs of
adjustment by tying pieces of government and private sector assistance to scrapping
measures. Two other examples are the Special Industries Credit Fund formed in 1978 
with government and private sector funds to finance the scrapping of excess capacity 
under the Depressed Industries Law, and the Shipbuilding Industry Stabilisation 
Association formed in 1978 which used funds from firms remaining in the industry to 
finance the scrapping of capacity by firms leaving the industry.
The tariff-allocation scheme also had overtones of an import-quota system. While 
there was no formal restriction on the amount of imports, it was thought tha t  MITI could 
use administrative guidance to make it difficult for user firms and trading companies
i n
without import certificates to import aluminium. MITI could use the fact tha t  the
industry was undergoing adjustment as a designated industry as a basis for
administrative guidance to ensure tha t  imports did not rise in such as way as to disrupt 
the ‘orderly’ contraction of the industry. Thus the official recommendations of the ISC 
pointed out “the necessity for measures to ensure th a t  the import of the necessary amount 
[of primary aluminium] is carried out appropriately” , a veiled reference to import 
controls.10 It should be remembered that user industries and trading companies, whose 
purchasing decisions largely determined how much aluminium would be imported and 
indirectly therefore the success or otherwise of the adjustment plan, participated in the 
official policy-making process through their representatives on the ISC (Appendix B).
The introduction of the tariff-allocation scheme in 1978 and its extension into 1979 
was the focus of intense policy debate concerning how the costs of adjustment in the 
aluminium industry should be borne. Initially, the smelting companies were pushing 
strongly through their industry association, the Japan Aluminium Federation, for the 
introduction of a special five-year law which would require all aluminium imports to be 
pooled with domestic output before being sold through the smelting companies. This was
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effectively a plan for enforced cross-subsidisation of domestic producers by user industries, 
and predictably drew opposition from user industries and also from MIT1, given tha t  the 
Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations was soon to com m ence.^
MITI, on the other hand, in a policy response reminiscent of its plans for 
rationalisation of the automobile industry in the  1960s, had conceived a plan to use the 
move to the 1.1 million tonne capacity regime as an opportunity to consolidate the six 
companies, and their ten or eleven remaining smelters, into two new firms, one with 
700,000 tonnes of capacity and the other with 400,000 tonnes. In mid-1978, in an a ttem pt 
to gain acceptance for its plan, MITI established the Aluminium Smelting Industry Policy 
Discussion Group (A r u m in iu m u  seirengyö se isaku  kondankai) comprising the Non- 
Ferrous Metals Section of its Basic Industries Division, the six smelting companies, and 
the Japan  Aluminium Federation.15 But there was strong resistance from firms in the 
industry to concentration across group lines and the plan fizzled out, as had an earlier 
proposal to establish joint sales companies.19
MITI and the industry reached a joint position which called for all of the revenue 
coming from the 9 per cent tariff on imports up to the amount of capacity to be scrapped 
to be provided to the smelting companies as scrapping funds for the full five years of the 
official adjustment plan. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) opposed this and the result was 
the compromise plan which provided part of the tariff to the smelting companies for one 
year.
The debate over the extension of the tariff-allocation scheme into 1979 saw MITI 
and MOF again at odds over policy, against a background of intense lobbying by industry 
leaders of Liberal Democratic Party  (LDP) politicians.1  ^ MITI argued for an extension of 
the scheme for three years with the full 9 per cent tariff to go to the smelting companies 
as scrapping funds; MOF opposed any extension of the scheme on the grounds tha t  it 
would be tan tam oun t to an import restriction and that special trea tm ent for the 
aluminium industry was not warranted, with the inter-ministry tussle being played out 
formally in the Tariff Rate Deliberation Council, M O F’s advisory body on tariff policy.1® 
As a compromise, the government decided to extend the scheme into 1979, with the 
portion of the tariff going to the industry being increased slightly (Figure 7-1).19
A major part of the policy to scrap domestic capacity was that overseas smelting 
projects would be accelerated and expanded, allowing the domestic capacity to be cross- 
subsidised with cheaper imports through the corporate structures of the smelting 
companies and their parent companies and affiliated general trading companies. The 
government provided Financial assistance for this policy by providing low-interest 
Financing through the Export-Import Bank. In this context, the Asahan project, initially 
Sumitomo Aluminium Smelting’s project, was upgraded in 1976 into national project
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status, with equal capital participation by the five smelting com panies/  The Export- 
Import Bank normally supplies 60 per cent of the finance for approved overseas projects 
of Japanese firms and access to this finance was im portant in enabling the smelting 
companies to undertake the investments involved in building up an overseas smelting base 
(Table 7-5). An estimate of Export-Import Bank finance, obtained by calculating 60 per 
cent of the Japanese share in the cost of the projects, is of the order of 276 billion yen 
(US$ 1.1 billion).
THE IM PAC T OF THE SECOND OIL CRISIS
The immediate plight of the industry was eased somewhat by the tight world 
market conditions which prevailed in 1979. The appreciation in the yen had counteracted 
some of the impact of rising oil prices on the cost structure of the industry, but at the 
same time had made imports of aluminium cheaper for user firms. The price of imports 
dropped to 270,000 yen per tonne by October 1978, almost 20 per cent less than a year 
before, forcing the quoted domestic price of metal down to 290,000 yen. This was well 
below the average cost of output in the industry, and meant tha t  smelting companies, 
reluctant to lose market share, could only supply their customer firms at a loss (Table 
7 - 4 ) . Wi t h the tight world market and rise in the price of spot imports, however, and 
aided by an upturn in demand in the domestic market and by the fact th a t  mothballing 
and scrapping of almost one-third of the industry’s capacity was underway, the smelting 
companies were able to raise the quoted price of aluminium from 290,000 yen per tonne at 
the end of 1978 to 508,000 yen by April 1980. This allowed the five smelting companies 
to register operating profits of 26.2 billion in 1979 and 33.4 billion yen in 1980, and to 
reduce their combined accumulated losses to 29.3 billion yen by the end of 1980 (Table 
7-3).
International events and corporate responses to them in Japan, however, soon 
overtook the 1978 adjustment plan. The second oil crisis in 1979 resulted in a doubling in 
the price of crude oil and made the aluminium industry even more uncompetitive in 
international terms. The underlying premise of the 1978 plan was tha t  it would be 
possible to retain 1.1 million tonnes of domestic smelting capacity given average
electricity costs of nine yen per kilowatt-hour and cross-subsidisation of domestic output
%
by pooling imports from new overseas development projects with output from the 
remaining domestic smelters. The second oil crisis in 1979 undermined this premise 
completely by pushing average per kilowatt-hour energy costs up to the 15.5 to 17.0 yen 
range, ten times those in Canada and up to five times those in Australia (Table 7-2). By 
early 1980, the proportion of power costs in total smelting costs had risen to 47 per cent 
compared to 38 per cent in 1977 and 24 per cent in 1972, and the smelting cost at a
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smelter using heavy oil as its power source was nearly 500,000 yen per tonne, about 
200,000 yen more than the price of spot-market im p o r t s /0 Only two smelters, Nippon 
Light M eta l’s hydro-powered Kanbara and Mitsui Aluminium’s coal-fired Om uta smelter, 
were left with cost structures anywhere near an internationally competitive level.
At the same time, the world aluminium industry entered a prolonged and severe 
recession. Spot market prices began to fall rapidly as the output of cheap metal from the 
new smelters of emerging producer nations such as Bahrain, the United Arab Emigrates 
and Spain came onto the world market and as the oligopolistic grip of Alcan and the 
other majors on world price loosened with the listing of aluminium on the London Metal 
Exchange. The result was a fall in the price of imports of spot metal to Japan, leading to 
a widening of the gap between the price of imports and the cost of domestic output and to 
even larger losses for the Japanese smelting companies. Large user firms such as the 
electrical goods and automobile makers increasingly by-passed the established supply 
route of the smelters and their affiliated rolling and extrusion firms by directly importing 
cheap spot-market metal and issuing this to the rolling firms on a fee-for-processing
n  j
b a s is /  Table 7-6, showing changes in the source of aluminium inputs for one of the 
large rolling firms, gives an indication of the extent of this practice: by 1982 imported 
metal supplied by user firms accounted for more than haif of the firm’s inputs, whereas 
prior to 1977 the level had been below 10 per cent.
THE S E C O N D  P H A S E  OF A D J U S T M E N T
The five smelting companies suffered operating losses of 56.3 billion yen in 1981 and 
86.3 billion yen in 1982, leaving them with accumulated losses in their balance sheets of 
167.4 billion yen (US$ 670 million) by the end of the 1982 financial year (Table 7-3). By 
the end of 1980, the smelting companies were closing down and scrapping capacity on a 
large scale and the Aluminium Section of the Industrial Structure Council was reconvened 
in April 1981 to formulate a revised adjustment plan. In October, a new plan was 
announced under which 400,000 tonnes of capacity would be scrapped, which would leave 
Japan with just 700,000 tonnes of smelting capacity. To facilitate this further 
contraction of domestic capacity, the government implemented three major assistance 
measures: a tariff-exemption scheme, the freezing of surplus stocks, and assistance for 
energy adjustment.
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T he ta r iff-ex em p tio n  schem e
The cornerstone of the government’s assistance package was a scheme which 
exempted smelting companies from the 9 per cent tariff on 400,000 tonnes of their own 
imports. As with the earlier tariff-allocation scheme, the ‘tariff-exemption scheme’ was 
the focus of an intense policy debate, amidst lobbying by industry leaders. MITI wanted 
the 9 per cent tariff exempted for three years on both imports by the smelting companies 
and imports, other than spot purchases, by user firms and trading companies, with two- 
thirds of the revenue from the latter category also to go to the smelting companies as 
scrapping funds.25 The Ministry of Finance (MOF) opposed this plan, ostensibly on the 
grounds th a t  it would contravene Japan ’s agreement along with the other major 
industrial nations at the O ttaw a Summit in July 1981 not to give subsidies to declining 
industries; rather, in what appeared more of a bargaining ploy than  a realistic policy 
proposal, MOF advocated raising the tariff for a certain period to stem the flood of 
imports.26 Amid intense lobbying of key LDP figures by industry leaders, MITI and MOF 
agreed on a compromise proposal, namely the exemption of the tariff on imports by
97smelting companies for the remaining three years of the official adjustment p l a n /
F reez in g  o f  su rp lu s stocks
The tariff-exemption scheme was worth 37 billion yen to the smelting companies 
over the 1982-84 period. The tariff revenue diverted to the smelting companies as 
scrapping funds in this way was revenue which the government would not even have 
received had it been possible to retain the levels of domestic capacity previously 
envisaged. For their part, the industry leaders argued that the exemption of the tariff did 
not constitute a government subsidy. They claimed, not without some logic, tha t  it was 
inappropriate for the smelting companies to have to pay a nine per cent tariff, which had 
been part of a tariff-escalation system designed to protect the domestic industry, on 
imports from the overseas development projects which they had invested in with 
government financial backing as part of the official adjustment plan for the industry. It 
was announced also that the tariff exemption on imports of heavy duty oil by the 
electricity companies would be removed, offsetting partially any reduction in government 
revenue from the tariff exemption on aluminium imports; interestingly, this implied an
indirect cross-subsidisation of the smelting companies’ adjustment costs by the electric 
• 29power companies.
The second major government assistance measure was the freezing of 116,400 tonnes 
of surplus aluminium stocks in late 1982 and early 1983 through an industry cartel 
organisation, the Light Metal Reserves Association (Keikinzoku  bichiku kyökai).  This 
body was established in July 1976 as part of a joint public-private sector scheme to
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Figure 7.2: Outline of the scheme to freeze surplus aluminium stocks
General account of 
National Budget
Industrial Bank of 
Japan & 21 other 
private banks
2% interest 
subsidy
government-guaranteed 
finance at long-term
Aluminium Industry 
Structural Improve­
ment Association
2% interest 
subsidy 
(1982 only)
finance for 3 years 
at 6.05 - 6.75%
Light Metal 
Reserves Association
A
buying up and freezing 
of surplus aluminium 
stocks for up to 3 years
Aluminium smelting 
companies
Tsusho sangyosho sangyo seisakukyoku, 1983: Sankoho no kaisetsu,
p.141.
Source:
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provide interest relief to the smelting companies by subsidising their costs of holding 
surplus aluminium stocks. The Association, effectively an arm of the Japan Aluminium 
Federation, buys up the surplus stocks of the smelting companies, seals them at  their 
source location for up to three years and then ‘sells’ them back to the companies a t the 
purchase price plus holding charges, the latter comprising mainly interest (Figure 7-2). 
The Association obtains its Finance at the subsidised rate of 6 to 7 per cent through the 
Metal Mining Agency (K inzoku  kögyö jigyödan).*^ Funds are channelled to the 
Association from the Industrial Bank of Japan and the 21 other major banks through the 
Metal Mining Agency at the long-term prime rate (without compulsory deposit 
requirements) and with a government guarantee and a 2 per cent interest subsidy from 
the general account of the national budget.
In essence, the scheme provides a way of converting direct bank borrowings to 
indirect, low-interest borrowings. At the same time, by removing a block of stocks from 
the market, policy-makers hoped tha t  the scheme would relieve some of the downward 
pressure on domestic price, particularly when combined with a cartel to restrict domestic 
ou tput,  as occurred in 1978. The scheme was first utilised in August 1976 and again in 
June 1978, but the stocks were released in mid-1979 when domestic market conditions 
unexpectedly became tight (Table 7-7).
The government started to use the Light Metal Reserves Association to freeze 
surplus stocks again in early 1981 and the 1982-83 measures brought the total amount of 
stocks held by the Association to 145,700 tonnes. This involved 55 billion yen (US$ 220 
million) in low-interest government-guaranteed finance for the smelting companies and 
represented an annual interest subsidy of 1,102 million yen (Table 7-7).
E le c tr ic ity -c o st  m easures
The type of assistance sought most by the industry was subsidised electricity to 
enable the remaining domestic capacity to reach an internationally competitive level. It is 
noteworthy tha t  the government resisted the pressure to introduce this blatantly 
protectionist measure. The smelting companies obtained their electricity from three 
sources: their own in-house power stations, facilities jointly owned and operated with the 
electricity companies, and contract purchases from the electricity companies. There were 
five joint facilities and they used heavy oil. Before the first oil crisis they generated 
electricity at less than 3 yen per kilowatt-hour, which at the time was less than the cost 
of bought-in power, but after the second oil crisis the cost rose to 18 to 19 yen, about 3 to
9 0
5 yen more than the cost of bought-in power.
Because the Electricity Industry Law (Denki jigyöho) disallowed the provision of 
electricity at special rates to any particular user industry, a special piece of legislation
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Table 7.7: Details of the freezing of surplus aluminium stocks by the Light
Metal Reserves Association
Date and 
nature of 
measure
Amount of 
aluminium 
involved 
(tonnes)
Price paid 
per tonne 
(yen)
Total
amount paid 
to smelting 
companies 
(million yen)
Total
amount paid 
to Associa­
tion
(million yen)
Total stocks 
held by 
Association 
(tonnes)
Freezing 
Aug 1976
9,600 312,292 2,998 - 9,600
Freezing 
June 1978
12,400 290,161 3,598 - 22,000
Release 
July 1979
22,000 340,155 - 7,483 0
Freezing 
Feb 1981
14,900 416,510 6,206 - 14,900
Freezing 
Mar 1981
7,100 422,817 3,002 - 22,000
Freezing 
Mar 1982
7,300 393,151 2,870 - 29,300
Freezing 
Nov 1982 52,900 378,072 20,000 - 82,200
Freezing 
Mar 1983
63,500 362,283 23,005 - 145,700
Tsusho sangyosho sangyo seisakukyoku, 1983: Sankoho no kaisetsu,
p.142.
Source:
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would have been required in order for subsidised electricity to be made available to the 
aluminium smelting industry. With national security being an important implicit 
justification for retaining 700,000 tonnes of domestic capacity, the industry believed it 
might be able to overcome this legislative hurdle. It was difficult enough, however, for the 
internal bureaus of MITI to reach agreement on a desirable energy policy for the industry, 
let alone for MITI to obtain approval from MOF for another subsidy in the government’s 
budget, particularly given M OF’s fear th a t  the introduction of such a measure would 
result in other depressed industries pressing their claims for similar relief. M ITI’s Basic 
Materials Division proposed that the Electric Power Development Company (Dengen 
K aih a tsu  kabushiki ka isha ), a jo in t government-power industry electricity generation 
authority , or the electricity companies buy up the in-house and joint facilities and then 
supply the smelting companies at the lower normal commercial rate. The Resources and 
Energy Division of MITI opposed this, arguing instead for the conversion of the facilities
o o
to a coal base, in line with the government’s overall energy policy. °
Against this background, MITI implemented two measures to reduce power costs in 
the industry: it provided finance and subsidies for the conversion of oil-fired power 
facilities to a coal base, and arranged for the power companies to give the smelting 
companies the lowest rates possible under the provisions of the prevailing law. Two coal 
conversions took place, namely Sumikei Aluminium’s Sakata smelter and Sumitomo 
Aluminium Smelting’s Toyama smelter, and low-interest finance from the Japan 
Development Bank and government subsidies were provided for this purpose. Even with a 
coal base, however, Japan 's  smelters could not compete with hydro-based Canadian or 
natural gas-fired Middle East smelters and no sooner had the coal conversions been 
announced than the Sakata smelter was closed down. Similarly, even by utilising various 
supply contracts the maximum saving that could be made was about 2 yen per kilowatt- 
hour, a slight alleviation of the cost pressures but not enough to bring smelters using
O  A
bought-in power anywhere near an internationally competitive level.
T H E T H IR D  P H A S E  OF A D JU S T M E N T
As with the earlier plan, the 1981 plan was soon overtaken by changing 
international events and domestic corporate responses to them. Thus the level of imports 
rose from 732,000 tonnes in 1980 to 1.2 million tonnes in 1982 and by mid-1982 stocks 
held by the smelting companies rose to 2-10,000 tonnes, more than four times their normal 
level. By early 1982 Showa Aluminium Industries had reduced its only remaining 
domestic smelter to the 26,000 tonne operating level, just sufficient to meet its wire-bar 
demand, and Sumitomo Light Metal had closed its Sakata smelter. Events in the market­
place and corporate responses to them soon made the 700,000 tonne figure of domestic
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capacity to be retained an unrealistic policy target, and actual output in 1983 declined to 
255,900 tonnes, the lowest production level for twenty years.
In December 1984 MITI reconvened the Aluminium Section of the Industrial 
Structure Council in order to formalise the scrapping of a further 350,000 tonnes of 
capacity to bring the level of domestic capacity to the 350,000 tonne level, with the five 
smelting companies each retaining one smelter in operation. It was decided to continue to 
exempt the smelting companies from the 9 per cent tariff on up to 350,000 tonnes of 
imports — the additional capacity to be scrapped -- meaning an annual tariff cost saving
o r
of 11 to 13 billion yen for the industry.
C O N C L U S IO N
By and large the government in Japan responded to loss of competitiveness in parts 
of the industrial structure in the 1970s by trying to facilitate adjustment in the direction 
of competitive pressures, rather than by permanently subsidising or protecting inefficient 
industries. In the case of aluminium smelting, the government provided a legislative 
framework for private and public sector parties to cooperate in formulating plans for the 
scrapping by 1988 of most of the 1.6 million tonnes of domestic capacity which existed in 
1978.
The issue of how to distribute the costs of adjustment has been central to J a p an ’s 
public policy towards adjustment in the aluminium smelting industry. During the 
1978-84 period, the government provided an estimated total of 368 billion yen (US$ 1.5 
billion) in low-interest finance for overseas development projects and the conversion of 
power facilities to a coal base and as loan guarantees for the freezing of surplus stocks, 
and some 59 billion yen (US$ 236 million) in subsidies via the tariff-allocation and tariff- 
exemption schemes, interest subsidies, and subsidies for research and development and for 
coal conversions (Table 7-8). The feature of this government assistance is that it has been 
tied to specific adjustment measures, such as the scrapping of capacity, and has had the 
explicit aim of providing contributions to absorbing the costs of adjustment. It is 
important to examine the role in the adjustment process of corporate organisation in the 
industry and the role of corporate organisation in bearing the costs of adjustment, and 
this is a ttem pted  next.
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12. Interview with manager of Japanese aluminium smelting company, 1984.
13. Sangyö közö shingikai aruminiumu bukai (1977, 16).
14. “‘Jigyöhö’ seitei yösei e: arumi seiren gyökai yunyu ichiganka mezasu (Demands 
for establishment of Industry Law: aluminium smelting industry aiming for single channel 
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A lu m in iu m :  th e  c o r p o r a te  r e s p o n s e
The analysis of the role of corporate organisation in structural adjustment in the 
Japanese aluminium smelting industry has two major purposes. It seeks to identify and 
examine the mechanisms of adjustment at the corporate level, particularly as these 
involve the financial corporate grouping. It is important to examine what internal 
adjustm ent and assistance mechanisms were operating during the phases of the 
adjustm ent program and how they related to the public policy process. The second 
purpose is to quantify, to the extent possible given da ta  and measurement constraints, 
the relative importance of internal or private sector measures, as compared with external 
or government assistance measures, in helping to absorb the costs of adjustment. The 
focus is on asking what mechanisms were used to absorb the costs of structural 
adjustment in the industry and on quantifying their importance relative to government 
assistance.
C O R P O R A T E  O R G A N IS A T IO N  IN THE IN D U S T R Y
Each of the five smelting companies operating at the time of the first oil crisis was 
associated with a particular financial corporate grouping (Table 8-1). Until the early 
1960s there were three aluminium producers — Nippon Light Metal, Sumitomo Chemical, 
and Showa Denko — all of which had commenced production in the immediate prewar 
period.1 In 1963 Mitsubishi Chemical entered the industry, followed by Mitsui
Aluminium in 1971, so that at the end of the high growth period and the time of the first 
oil crisis five of the six major groupings had their own aluminium smelting arm. Of the 
six major groupings, only the Sanwa group was without an affiliate in the smelting 
industry, and Sanwa would have completed the oligopolisation of the industry along 
group lines had not the oil crisis put paid to Kobe Steel’s plans to build a smelter by 
1976.2
The financial and trading back-up of the respective groups was crucial in 
guaranteeing the success of the entry of Mitsubishi and Mitsui. Mitsubishi group-related 
firms had been obtaining most of their aluminium requirements from Nippon Light Metal, 
but they switched their purchases to Mitsubishi Chemical when it entered, giving it an 18
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per cent share of industry output by 1968 and resulting in a drop in NLM’s share from
o
about 50 per cent in the early 1960s to 33 per cent by 1968.° Mitsui Aluminium and its 
alumina refining arm Mitsui Alumina were set up as joint ventures by three of the group’s 
major industrial firms, and the group main bank and general trading company.
Corporate organisation has played a major part in the industry’s adjustment. 
There has been a series of rationalisation measures at the corporate level, paralleling the 
official adjustment guidelines. Parent firms, banks and other group business partners have 
provided assistance to the smelting companies, in a private sector analogue to the 
government assistance measures. The corporate rationalisations, summarised in Table 
8-2, involve the operation of various internal adjustment and assistance mechanisms, 
which have been important in spreading the costs of structural adjustment within the 
private sector, and reflect the nature of the financial corporate grouping as a risk- 
diversifying corporate organisation.
THE H IV IN G -O F F  OF A L U M IN IU M  O P E R A T IO N S
The importance of corporate organisation in the industry’s adjustment was 
highlighted in 1976 when three of the smelting companies hived off their aluminium 
smelting operations as separate affiliate companies with the assistance and capital 
involvement of group banks, general trading companies and business partners (Table 
8 - 2).4
In March 1976, Mitsubishi Chemical split off its aluminium smelting operations, at 
the time accounting for 10 per cent of the company’s sales, as Mitsubishi Light Metal, 
and reduced its shareholding level to 29 per cent by obtaining capital investments from 
seventeen Mitsubishi group and associated user firms. In the same way, Sumitomo 
Chemical established Sumitomo Aluminium Smelting (16 per cent of its sales) in July 
1976 and reduced its shareholding to 50 per cent when some 37 Sumitomo group and user 
firms invested in the company. Showa Denko followed suit in October 1976, when it 
established Showa Aluminium Industries (27 per of its sales) with a 50 per cent 
shareholding after arranging for an injection of share capital by 25 Fuyö (Fuji Bank) 
group and user firms. The shareholding structure of the three restructured smelting 
companies is shown in Table 8-3, with tha t  of the three other companies.
The hiving-off of the uncompetitive smelting divisions had two important effects. In 
the absence of established consolidated accounting practices, the removal of the deficit 
operations from the parent firm’s internal structure served to minimise the impact of 
losses on its overall performance and to facilitate rationalisations, particularly sensitive 
workforce reductions and wage cuts. It is noteworthy that, although aluminium was one 
of J a p a n ’s major basic-material industries, at the end of 1976 only one smelting company,
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Table 8.3: Shareholding structure of Japanese aluminium smelting companies,
1982 (in percentage terms; capital level in brackets)
Sumitomo Aluminium Smelting
(18.0 billion yen)
Sumitomo Chemical 50.0 
Sumitomo Bank 4.4 
Sumitomo Trust 4.4 
Sumitomo Corporation 4.4 
Sumitomo Metal 4.4 
Sumitomo Light Metal 4.4 
Sankyo Aluminium 4.4 
Toyota Motor 4.4
30 other Sumitomo group 19.2 
and user firms
Mitsubishi Light Metal 
(10.0 billion yen)
Mitsubishi Chemical 29.0
Mitsubishi Metal 14.0
Mitsubishi Corporation 10.0 
YKK Industries 10.0
Mitsubishi H.I. 7.0
Mitsubishi Bank 5.0
12 other Mitsubishi 25.0
group and user firms
Showa Aluminium Industries
(17.0 billion yen)
Showa Denko 50.0 
Marubeni Corporation 15.0 
Showa Aluminium Corp. 5.0 
Fuji Bank 5.0 
22 other Fuyo 25.0
group and user firms
Sumikei Aluminium3 
(18.0 billion yen)
Sumitomo Light Metal 50.0 
Sumitomo Metal 25.0 
Sumitomo Chemical 10.0 
Sumitomo Bank 5.0 
Sumitomo Trust 5.0 
Sumitomo Corporation 5.0
Mitsui Aluminium 
(13.5 billion yen)
Mitsui Mining 11.7
Mitsui Mining & Smelting 11.7
Mitsui & Company 11.7
Mitsui Toatsu 9.4
Nippon Steel 8.9
Mitsui Bank 8.1
14 other group and user 
firms
38.3
Nippon Light Metal 
(18.3 billion yen)
Alcan 50.0
Nihon Securities 3.2
Settlement
Daiichi Kangyo Bank 2.5
Industrial Bank of Japan 2.2 
Furukawa Electric 1.9
Asahi Mutual Life 1.5
a Dissolved in May 1982
b In December 1982 became a 50-50 joint venture between Showa Denko and 
Comalco capitalised at 50.0 billion yen
Sources: Kigyo keiretsu soran, 1983: Kigyo keiretsu soran, p.231; Nihon
keizai shinbunsha, Kaisha sokan mij5j5 kaishaban, 1980, p.769; 
1982, p.979; 1983, p.1068; Nihon kögyö shinbunsha, 1978: Nihon
kogyo nenkan, p.412; "Mitsubishi Kasei wa 29% shusshi: raigetsu
setsuritsu no Mitsubishi Keikinzoku (Mitsubishi Chemical a 29% 
capital investment: Mitsubishi Light Metal set up next month)",
NKS, 30 Mar 1976, p.8; company interviews.
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Nippon Light Metal (NLM), remained listed on the stock exchange.^ Rather, structural 
ad justm ent took place in the context of an internal capital market, involving main banks 
and financial corporate groupings. The second effect, reflecting the risk-sharing aspect of 
group corporate organisation, was for the costs of structural adjustment to be spread 
across a  wider set of related firms. Thus, as can be seen from Table 8-3, the spin-offs 
centred on capital injections from related firms in the same financial corporate grouping 
with the involvement of the main banks and affiliated general trading companies being 
conspicuous.
The role of the main banks is particularly noteworthy. The splitting-off from the 
main part of the firm (honta i) of a struggling division with large accumulated losses and 
bank borrowings requires the close cooperation of the banks, as the transfer and possible 
rescheduling of bank borrowings is involved. The close involvement of the main bank as 
the monitor and residual risk-bearing agent in the internal capital market is critical in 
securing the cooperation of the other banks, even if the latter are not putting up share 
capital. The shareholdings of the main banks, Sumitomo Bank’s in the case of Sumitomo 
Aluminium Smelting, Fuji Bank’s in the case of Showa Aluminium Industries, and 
Mitsubishi Bank's in the case of Mitsubishi Light Metal, provided a clear signal of their 
support. The involvement of the main bank is also evident from the fact that Mitsubishi 
Bank had a representative on Mitsubishi Chemical’s board in the position of auditor- 
director and Fuji Bank had two directors on Showa Denko’s board, one in the position of 
senior executive managing director and the other auditor-director.6
B A N K  A S S IS T A N C E
In earlier chapters, the importance of the main-bank system in cushioning the 
impact of structural adjustment in depressed firms and sectors was stressed. Bank 
assistance has been a major component of structural adjustment in the aluminium 
smelting industry also. At the most basic level, bank assistance involved the cooperation 
of the banks in rolling-over existing short- and long-term borrowings as they became due 
and the provision of finance to cover the cashflow shortfall which occurs when losses are 
being made. As Table 7-3 shows, the smelting companies have registered large operating 
losses in every year since 1976 (in fact since 1974 but figures are available only for NLM); 
cooperation from banks in allowing loan repayments to be deferred and in providing 
deficit financing has been critical in enabling them to withstand the impact of the oil 
shocks and to carry out adjustments. Thus, at the end of the 1981 FY the five major 
smelting companies had accumulated losses of 70.9 billion yen, just short of their 
combined capital level of 76.9 billion yen, and outstanding bank borrowings of about 900 
billion yen (US$ 3.6 billion).
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As an example, at the end of the 1973 FY, when NLM began to register losses, it 
had bank borrowings of 136.2 billion yen, but by the end of the 1981 FY these had more 
than doubled to 302.2 billion yen. NLM had the strong backing of its main banks, Daiichi 
Kangyo Bank (DKB) and the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ), together with the 50 per 
cent shareholder Alcan; not only did the two banks together account for one-third of 
NLM’s borrowings (in 1981), they were also major shareholders in NLM (Table 8-3) and 
each had two director representations, including the position of vice-president 
(subsequently chairman) in DKB’s case and senior executive managing director 
(subsequently vice-president) in IBJ’s case.
The examination of unpublished figures for another smelting company revealed a 
heavy reliance on bank borrowings to cover accumulating losses. The figures showed that 
the company had a level of bank borrowings nine times th a t  of its share capital and that 
a little more than 70 per cent of the borrowings were in the form of short-term borrowings 
or long-term working capital. As was argued in Chapter 3, it is the implicit guarantee of 
the main bank, rather than its nominal loan share, which serves to hold together the 
otherwise delicate fabric of bank confidence so important in keeping struggling affiliates 
afloat during a period of structural adjustment. Thus, for instance, although two-thirds of 
the company’s short-term borrowings were from regional banks and resident foreign 
banks, interviews with bank executives indicated tha t  it was the backing of the main 
bank and associated parent companies which lay behind this apparent high-risk deficit-
Q
financing by minor banks.
As with other depressed firms and industries, interest rate reductions have formed a 
major component of bank assistance for the aluminium smelting industry and the 
respective main banks have figured prominently in these measures. It appears that, 
centring on the main banks, banks provided significant interest relief measures to the 
smelting companies from 1978.° In the case of Nippon Light Metal, for instance, the 
N ihon  keizai shinbun  reported in January  1978 tha t  DKB, IBJ and Alcan had formed a 
‘business reconstruction committee' (keiei saiken i in k a i ) with NLM, comprising top 
executives of the four corporations, and tha t  the possibility of interest reductions was one 
of the major items for consideration.10 Later in the year, the DKB representative on the 
committee, Mori Ryütarö (a senior executive managing director in the bank), entered 
NLM as vice-president, and it wras reported tha t  the two main banks together with Asahi 
M utual Life Insurance, another DKB group member, had instituted interest reductions 
towards the smelting company, representing an annual interest subsidy of some 900 
million yen.11 It was reported tha t  these assistance measures were terminated in 1980-81 
following the upturn in corporate performance, but interviews with bank executives 
confirm that  these measures, and similar measures involving other smelting companies, 
were continued with the worsening of structural depression in the industry at tha t  tim e.1^
195
In 1977 seven Mitsui group firms (three major industrial firms, the G TC and three 
financial institutions) established a similar committee to assist and supervise the 
rationalisation of their joint venture, Mitsui Aluminium, and instituted interest rate
i o
reductions and subsidies as a loss-sharing measure.10 Initially, the assistance was for a 
period of three years from September 1979, but it was renew ed.^ In a similar vein, 
Showa Denko set up a ‘Fuyö group aluminium discussion group’ in February 1978 with 
Fuji Bank, Marubeni (the group GTC) and other group members to assist Showa 
Aluminium Industr ie s .^
The Aluminium Section of the Industrial Structure Council (ISC) urged this kind of
private sector assistance in its formal policy recommendations. The 1978 report stated
th a t  “it is necessary for the smelting companies to request the cooperation of the financial
institutions in providing reductions in finance costs and additional funds needed during
the structural improvement period” .*® Similar sentiments were expressed in the 1977 and
1981 reports.1' However, it would be mistaking the direction of cause and effect to
conclude tha t  the banks provided interest subsidies and other financial assistance because
of the ISC recommendations. The banks have considerable input into the policy
recommendations of the ISC, both directly via their representation and indirectly via
their position as main banks to and shareholders in the smelting companies. The banks
are represented on the Aluminium Section of the Industrial Structure Council through the
membership of senior figures from the Industrial Bank of Japan and the Long-Term
Credit Bank of Japan (Appendix B). It appears th a t  these two major long-term credit
banks, particularly the IBJ, play an important role in representing the interests of, and
1 8adjudicating among, the banks and other private sector parties in the policy process. 
The references to financial assistance in the ISC reports was probably a reflection of the 
willingness of the banks to provide assistance, rather than being the cause of it.
C O R P O R A T E  A D J U S T M E N T  A N D  A S S IS T A N C E
In the early 1980s, a number of major rationalisation and assistance measures were 
implemented a t  the corporate level, as part of the further contraction of capacity and in 
tandem  with the associated government assistance measures (Table 8-2). This period saw 
a number of private measures implemented which had the effect of distributing more 
widely the costs of adjustment in the industry.
In the Sumitomo group, Sumitomo Light Metal (SLM) closed down its Sakata 
smelter and this was transferred to a paper company set up by its parent company for 
mothballing and eventual scrapping (Table 8-2). At the same time, Sumitomo group 
firms provided financial assistance to SLM by setting up a paper company to take over its 
main Nagoya plant in a lease-back arrangement. Sumitomo Aluminium Smelting (SAS)
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transferred the excess capacity it was to scrap under the 700,000 tonne policy framework 
to a paper company with the assisance of its parent company and other Sumitomo group 
firms. These measures are examined in more detail in the next chapter.
In the Mitsubishi group, the Naoetsu smelter of Mitsubishi Light Metal (MLM), 
which was to be scrapped under the 1981 industry plan, was hived off as a Mitsubishi 
Chemical subsidiary (Table 8-2). In 1982, a new company was set up by Mitsubishi 
Chemical to take over the remaining operating capacity of MLM, with MLM becoming a 
sleeping company to be used for the gradual scrapping of the excess capacity and clearing 
of associated losses. Similarly, Nippon Light Metal split off the excess capacity of its 
Tomakomai smelter as a separate company for scrapping outside the parent company’s 
internal corporate structure (Table 8-2).
In the Mitsui case, Mitsui Aluminium and Mitsui Alumina merged in 1982, 
providing the occasion for Gove Alumina, the foreign interest in Mitsui Alumina, to 
withdraw; earlier Mitsui Aluminium had split off its power plant as a joint venture with 
one of its shareholder companies, Mitsui Mining (Table 8-2). Showa Aluminium 
Industries (SAL), on the other hand, was restructured as a joint venture with the 
Australian aluminium company, Comalco, as it contracted its capacity (Table 8-2).
P a r e n t  c o m p a n ie s
From around 1981, parent companies and group banks and business partners 
implemented a number of measures which had the effect of spreading and cushioning the 
costs of structural adjustment in the industry (Table 8-4). Parent firms and other 
shareholder firms wrote off losses totalling 166.2 billion yen (US$ 665 million) between 
1981 and 1983. Thus, for instance, Sumitomo Aluminium Smelting underwent share 
capital reductions in 1982 and 1983 and, although not shown in the table, again in 1984. 
Share capital was also written off by parent and other shareholder firms in the case of 
Mitsubishi Light Metal, Showa Aluminium Industries, Mitsui Aluminium, and Sumikei 
Aluminium. As Table 8-5 shows, parent firms and related business partners also injected 
some 128 billion yen (US$ 512 million) into the declining industry between 1981 and 
1984. These capital injections were more in the nature of contributions to absorb the cost 
of adjustment than normal capital investments, in many cases being written off 
subsequently as losses after share-capital reductions or being capital for the various paper 
companies tha t  were established to take over excess capacity (Tables 8-2 and 8-5).
In Mitsui Aluminium’s case, a number of capital-related measures were instituted 
by the related Mitsui group firms to assist the smelting company’s adjustment, in 
addition to the interest subsidies mentioned earlier. In 1980 Mitsui Mining invested in 
Mitsui Aluminium’s power plant in a joint-venture arrangement as part of an agreed-
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Table 8.5: Injections of share capital by parent companies and shareholder
firms to aluminium smelting companies and associated paper 
companies, 1981-84
Name of aluminium 
smelting company/ 
associated paper 
company
Financial
year
Firm(s) providing 
share capital
Amount
(million yen) 
(sub-total ir 
brackets)
Sumitomo Aluminium 1982 Sumitomo Chemical 9,000
Smelting 1983 Sumitomo Chemical
other shareholder 
firms
9,000
5,500
(23,500)
Sumiaru Kösan* 1982-83 Sumitomo Aluminium 
Smelting,
Sumitomo Chemical, 
Sumitomo Bank, 
Sumitomo Trust, 
Sumitomo Corporation 
and Sumitomo Metal
2,000
Nagoya Kosan* 1982 Sumitomo Metal,
Sumikin Bussan,
Sumitomo Corporation, 
Sumitomo Hitetsu Hanbai, 
Sumitomo Bank,
Sumitomo Trust,
Sumitomo Mutual Life, 
Sumitomo Marine & Fire
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Sakata Kanzai* 1982 Sumitomo Metal 400
Kasei Naoetsu 1981 Mitsubishi Chemical 3,000
Ryoka Light Metal 1983 Mitsubishi Chemical 4,000
Mitsubishi Light 
Metal Sales
1983 Mitsubishi Chemical,
Mitsubishi Corporation
Mitsubishi Metal, 
Mitsubishi Bank 
and Mitsubishi Trust
2.250
2.250 
500
(5,000)
Arumi Kaihatsu 
Jigane Hanbai 
(sales company of 
Mitsui Aluminium)
1984 Five Mitsui group 
firms below and 
Mitsui Aluminium
400
Mitsui Aluminium 1984 Mitsui Mining,
Mitsui Mining & Smelting, 
Mitsui & Co.,
Mitsui Toatsu,
Mitsui Bank
13,500
(planned)
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Name of a l u m i n i u m F i nancial Firm(s) p r o v i d i n g Amou n t
s m e l t i n g  compa n y / year share capital (million yen)
a s s o c i a t e d  p a p e r (sub-total in
company brackets)
S h o w a  A l u m i n i u m 1981 S h o w a  Denko 1,000
I n d ustries S h o w a  A l u m i n i u m  Corp. 1,000
1982 S h o w a  Denko 35,000
Comalco 25,000
(62,000)
N i p p o n  L i ght M e tal 1983 Alcan 7,000
D a iichi K a n g y o  Bank, 
I n d u s t r i a l  B a n k  of J a p a n  
and o t h e r  sha r e h o l d e r
7,000
c o r p o r a t i o n s
(14,000)
T O TAL 128,000
*Paper company
Sources: Published accounts of companies (Yuka shoken hokokusho);
press reports; company interviews.
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upon Mitsui group assistance plan, allowing the smelting company to record a special 
profit of 8.7 billion yen on the ‘sale1 and reduce its excess of accumulated losses over 
capital of almost 10 billion yen (1979) (Table 8-2). In 1982 Mitsui Alumina underwent a 
74 per cent share-capital reduction as part of a merger with Mitsui Aluminium. At the 
end of the 1983 FY Mitsui Aluminium’s accumulated losses stood a t  26.9 billion yen, 
almost twice its capital level, and it had about 80 billion yen in loans and loan guarantees 
from its five major group shareholders, Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Co., Mitsui Mining, Mitsui 
Toatsu, and Mitsui Mining & Smelting. In 1984, the five group firms made a major 
injection of capital by setting up a sales company which purchased Mitsui Aluminium’s 
import rights for 4 billion yen and by putting 13.5 billion yen into the ailing firm in a 
th ird-party  share issue.19
Showa Denko provided similar support for Showa Aluminium Industries (SAL). 
Showa Denko absorbed SAL’s losses by implementing a 100 per cent reduction in SAL’s 
17 billion yen capital after buying up the shares of other firms at face value and by 
writing off loans to the smelting company. Unlike the case of Sumitomo and Mitsubishi, 
the group firms which invested in Showa Denko’s aluminium smelting operations in 1976 
did not incur a capital loss, but as SAL paid no dividends their investments were 
equivalent in effect to six-year interest-free loans. Showa Denko injected 25 billion yen in 
share capital and 10 billion yen as a capital reserve when SAL was restructured as a joint 
venture with Comalco in 1982. Showa Denko also provided financial assitance by buying 
up several tens of thousands of SAL’s surplus aluminium stocks in 1982, a t  about the time 
of the MITI-arranged freezing of s to c k s /
Nippon Light Metal’s restructuring at this time centred on the hiving-off of the 
excess capacity of its most uncompetitive smelter as a separate company in June 1983, a 
14 billion yen injection of share capital centring on parent firm Alcan and Daiichi Kangyo 
Bank, the Industrial Bank of Japan  and other banks and business partners in September 
1983, and the sale of its head-office building to raise some 25 billion yen (Tables 8-2 and 
8-5). These measures were taken as part of a reconstruction plan devised in close 
cooperation with the main banks and the banks played an important role in securing the 
cooperation of the other firms in the capital injection, which was effectively a conversion 
of loans to equity from the banks’ point of view, and in arranging the financing of the 
purchase of the head-office by the Japan Recruitment C e n t r e / 1
In addition, parent companies assisted the adjustment of the smelting companies by 
providing large amounts of subsidised finance, particularly when setting up the various 
paper and sleeping companies (Table 8-2). As Table 8-6 shows, five of the major parent 
firms had a total of 195 billion yen (US$ 780 million) in direct loans outstanding at the 
end of the 1983 FY and a further 209 billion yen (US$ 836 million) in loan guarantees.
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Mitsubishi Chemical, for instance, had 59.8 billion yen of loans to its three related firms 
(only one of which was an operating firm) and a further 70.6 billion yen in loan 
guarantees. Sumitomo Chemical’s loans to SAS and Mitsubishi Chemical’s loans to MLM 
and Kasei Naoetsu were interest-free, and it is likely tha t  this was generally the case for
o o
the loans. The interest subsidies placed a large cost burden on the parent firms, but 
company interviews revealed tha t  in several cases group banks provided special finance to
oo
the parent firms and interest subsidies on this f in a n c e /0 Again, this is likely to have been 
typically the case. The involvement of the group banks as direct shareholders in the paper 
companies is also indirect evidence tha t  special bank assistance was involved.
M ain  banks
While the banks were providing the back-up for the assistance measures of the 
parent companies, they were also intensifying the level of their direct assistance to the
O Asmelting co m p an ies /4 It was reported in 1982 tha t  Nippon Light Metal and Mitsui
n r
Aluminium obtained interest reductions of 1 to 3 per cent from their b a n k s / 0 Another 
smelting company received a 4 per cent interest subsidy from 1983 for three years in the 
form of a reduction of the interest rate on all borrowings to the short-term prime rate 
without compulsory d e p o s i ts /0 On the basis of a number of pieces of published and 
confidential information, it is possible to arrive at a conservative estimate of bank 
interest subsidies to the smelting companies of about 19 billion yen (US$ 76 million) for 
the three years from 1983.
Bank assistance at this stage, as at earlier stages, centred on the respective main 
banks. For instance, Table 8-7 shows the changes in loan shares that occurred when bank 
assistance to a smelting company was stepped up in 1982: resident foreign banks removed 
their finance completely at this point, with the share of the main bank and associated 
group trust bank rising in a corresponding fashion. Thus it was the group main banks 
which bore the brunt of the additional financial burden involved in providing interest 
reductions to the smelting company.
Another smelting company at the same time obtained substantial interest
97reductions from its main banks, the group city and trust banks.
G eneral trad in g  com p an ies
General trading companies (GTCs) have played an important role in assisting the 
adjustments of their affiliated smelting companies, reflecting their risk-diversifying role in 
the grouping. GTCs invested capital in the three smelting companies which were formed 
in 1976 and in the paper companies and sales companies formed since 1982. Marubeni 
took a 15 per cent share in Showa Aluminium Industries, Sumitomo Corporation 4.4 per 
cent in Sumitomo Aluminium Smelting (and also 5 per cent in Sumikei Aluminium), and
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Table 8.7: Changes in bank loan shares after interest reductions given to
a Japanese aluminium smelting company
Type of bank Proportion of bank 
loans before 
assistance measures 
introduced
Proportion of bank 
loans after 
assistance measures 
introduced
Change in 
loan share
Main city bank 11.9 20.3 +8.4
Main trust bank 9.6 11.7 +2.1
Other city banks (4) 7.3 8.4 +1.1
Other trust banks (6) 9.6 6.7 -2.9
Long-term credit 
banks (3)
20.2 21.4 +1.2
Prefectural banks (16) 14.0 17.2 + 3.2
Group-affiliated 
life insurance 
company
3.3 4.0 +0.7
Other life insurance 
companies (3)
4.6 3.0 -1.6
Group-affiliated 
marine & fire 
insurance company
1.0 1.3 +0.3
Government banks (2) 5.2 5.9 +0.7
Resident foreign 
banks (7)
13.1 0.0 -13.1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
Source: Company documents.
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Mitsubishi Corporation 10 per cent in Mitsubishi Light Metal (Table 8-3). As major 
shareholders, GTCs have absorbed losses during the course of corporate rationalisation 
(Table 8-4). GTCs have also provided organisational and financial back-up in overseas 
development projects (Table 7-5).
GTCs have also cross-subsidised the output of domestic smelters with cheaper 
imports. In the Mitsubishi group, a joint-venture sales company was set up in 1983 for 
the reported purpose of “making intra-group sales of aluminium more efficient’’ (Table
o o
8-2). The involvement of Mitsubishi Corporation as a 45 per cent shareholder, together 
with the group main banks, is suggestive of internal cross-subsidisation, establishing as it 
does the corporate infrastructure for allowing cheaper imports from overseas development 
projects to be pooled with the output from the scaled-down but uncompetitive domestic 
smelter (40,000 tonnes at Sakaide) (Table 8-2). The use of the GTC to pool imports with 
domestic output is also observed in the case of Mitsui Aluminium. Mitsui &; Co., the 
giant G T C  of the Mitsui group, is a major shareholder in Mitsui Aluminium and is its 
sole sales agent. Mitsui & Co. used imports from its joint-venture investment project in 
the United States to cross-subsidise the smelting company’s domestic output, as well as 
providing other forms of assistance such as interest reductions (Table 7-5). Company 
interviews revealed tha t  general trading companies have also assisted their affdiated 
smelting companies by engaging in ‘stock finance’ at subsidised interest rates on a 
significant scale, a private sector analogue to the MITI-sponsored scheme described 
earlier.*^
S h a re  d isp o sa ls
It was argued in Chapter 6 tha t  interlocking shareholdings represent an important 
risk-diversifying mechanism in the internal capital market and tha t  the disposal of these 
shares has allowed depressed firms to offset their costs of structural adjustment. The 
smelting companies and their parent firms have offset their losses to a significant degree 
by disposing of shareholdings in group-related firms. Table 8-8 shows tha t  the listed 
aluminium smelting company (NLM) and five major parent firms related to the industry 
have registered large profits from the sale of shares since the mid-1970s, particularly in
o  1
the early 1980s when large-scale scrapping of capacity took place. 1 Since 1977 the six 
firms have registered a total of 203 billion yen (US$ 812 million) in profits from the 
disposal of securities, with 171 billion yen of that amount being since 1981. The 
companies have also offset part of their losses by disposing of other assets, particularly 
land. Since 1978 the same six companies have registered 119 billion yen (US$ 474 million) 
in special profits from the sale of land (Table 8-9).
The case of Mitsubishi Chemical illustrates the use of interlocking shareholdings in
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main banks and group business partners to offset losses. Mitsubishi Chemical registered 
profits totalling 31.3 billion yen in the 1981-83 period from the sale of shares, thus 
enabling it to absorb the financial impact of the losses it incurred in subsidising MLM’s 
adjustments (Table 8-8). Shares were sold on a large scale in 1983 when losses from MLM 
were particularly heavy. Thus, in 1983 Mitsubishi Chemical incurred a loss in its profit 
and loss statement of 18.8 billion yen on account of MLM (Table 8-4), but this was offset 
with profits from share disposals of 18.2 billion yen (Table 8-8). As can be seen from 
Table 8-10, showing which shares were disposed of and in what amounts, the disposal 
program centred on the sale of shares in Mitsubishi group firms and other business 
partners, particularly the main banks, Mitsubishi Bank (5.1 million shares in 1982 and 
11.1 million in 1983) and Mitsubishi Trust h  Banking (5.5 million and 2.3 million), and 
key industrial firms, Mitsubishi Mining and Cement (10.8 million in 1983) and Mitsubishi 
Rayon (5.0 million).
LABOUR ADJUSTM ENT
The analysis has focused on corporate organisation in the internal capital market, in 
keeping with the primary focus of the study. It is of interest also to look briefly at 
adjustment in the internal labour market. As was noted in Chapter 7, the level of 
employment declined in the aluminium smelting industry by about 10,000 in the 1974-83 
decade to 3772 by 1983. A feature of labour adjustment in the industry is tha t  much of 
the adjustment has taken place in the context of internal labour markets. Thus the 
smelting companies implemented a variety of labour adjustment measures including intra­
firm transfers, transfers to overseas projects such as the Asahan project, transfers to 
parent or other related firms, and voluntary retirement schemes, worked out in
oo
consultation with the enterprise u n i o n . T a b l e  8-11, presenting data  on labour 
adjustment at a single smelter, gives a picture of significant adjustment occurring through 
the internal labour market. At this particular smelter, most of the adjustment in the 
labour-force was handled via the mechanism of transfers to the parent firm or its 
affiliates.
INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE
The aluminium smelting industry has been one of the worst-hit of Ja p an ’s depressed 
industries and structural adjustment has centred on the gradual scrapping of most of the 
domestic capacity which existed in 1978 and the expansion of overseas smelting capacity. 
Previous analysis of adjustment in the aluminium smelting industry and other depressed 
industries in Japan has focused on government assistance and adjustment policy, while 
little attention has been given to the role of corporate organisation. A common perception
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Table 8.10: Major share disposals by Mitsubishi Chemical in 1982 and 1983
Shares 
disposed of
Number of 
shares (face 
value of 50 
yen)
Book value 
per share 
(yen)
(1)
Lowest 
recorded 
share price 
(yen)
12) (2)/(1)
Estimated 
accounting 
profit regis­
tered from 
sale (million 
yen)
1983
♦Mitsubishi Bank 11,136,000 70 497 7.1 4,755
♦Mitsubishi Mining & 10,820,000 118 231 2.0 1,223
Cement
Nippon Credit Bank 5,060,000 74 235 3.2 815
♦Mitsubishi Rayon 5,047,000 59 280 4.8 1,115
Daiichi Kangyo Bank 4,340,000 142 481 3.4 1,471
Industrial Bank of Japan 4,334,000 50 397 7.9 1,504
♦Mitsubishi Gas Chemical 3,713,000 115 220 1.9 390
♦Asahi Glass 3,678,000 229 500 2.2 997
♦Mitsubishi Estate 3,557,000 287 440 1.5 544
♦Mitsubishi Electric 2,562,000 163 340 2.1 453
Long-Term Credit Bank 2,506,000 116 313 2.7 494
Hachijuni Bank 1,875,000 72 345 4.8 512
Sumitomo Trust 1,725,000 85 272 3.2 323
♦Mitsubishi Corporation 1,681,000 342 500 1.5 266
♦Tokio Marine & Fire 1,550,000 269 450 1.7 281
♦Kirin Brewery 1,524,000 357 383 1.1 40
♦Mitsubishi Trust 2,270,300 181 271 1.5 204
Fukuoka Bank 1,446,000 82 288 3.5 298
Yokohama Bank 1,438,000 77 249 3.2 247
Joyo Bank 1,402,000 104 245 2.4 198
Mitsui Trust 1,310,000 202 302 1.5 131
Shizuoka Bank 
1982
1,031,000 170 250 1.5 82
♦Mitsubishi Trust 5,490,000 181 295 1.6 626
♦Mitsubishi Bank 5,130,000 70 480 6.9 2,103
Industrial Bank of Japan 4,700,000 51 390 7.6 1,593
Long-Term Credit Bank 4,000,000 116 290 2.5 696
Meiwa Trading 3,136,000 43 128 3.0 267
Daiichi Kangyo Bank 2,851,000 142 466 3.3 924
Sekisui Chemical 2,742,000 64 222 3.5 433
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Table 8.10 (contd)
Shares 
disposed of
Number of 
shares (face 
value of 50 
yen)
Book value 
per share 
(yen)
(1)
Lowest 
recorded 
share price 
(yen)
(2) (2) / (1)
Estimated 
accounting 
profit regis­
tered from 
sale (million 
yen)
Nippon Mining 2,290,000 93 161 1.7 158
Unitika 2,000,000 67 98 1.5 62
Nagase 1,640,000 115 402 3.5 471
Odakyu Electric Railway 1,350,000 221 200 0.9 -28
Kumiai Chemical 1,098,000 124 380 1.7 281
Marubeni Corporation 807,000 347 260 0.7 -70
Furukawa Electric 730,000 460 280 0.7 -92
Lion 704,000 213 329 1.5 82
Meiji Milk Products 500,000 288 225 0.8 -32
Toho Sanso 450,000 125 175 1.4 23
Seiyu Stores 434,000 691 600 0.9 -39
Yokohama Bank 140,000 78 241 3.1 23
Nissho-Iwai 100,000 269 240 0.9 -3
Shinwa Bank 980,000 154 321 2.1 164
Tokyo Bank 890,000 171 289 1.7 105
Yamaichi Securities 771,000 186 378 2.0 148
Nikko Securities 551,000 225 400 1.8 96
Nomura Securities 530,000 287 592 2.1 162
Fujitsu 499,000 970 871 0.9 -49
Meiji Seika 330,000 556 518 0.9 -13
Hitachi 200,000 816 737 0.9 -16
*Member firm of Mitsubishi group presidents' club Kinyo-kai.
Sources: Compiled from published accounts (Yuka shoken hokokusho) of Mitsubishi Chemical;
Keizai chosa kyökai, 1984, 1985: Keiretsu no kenkyü: daiichibu joj5 kigyShen;
Tokyo shoken torihikisho chosabu, 1983, 1984: T5sh5 t5kei nenp5.
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has been of MITI as the ‘pilot agency’ of industrial policy directing events in the private 
sector and bringing about adjustment in the industrial structure. The analysis of 
adjustment in the aluminium smelting industry has placed the role of government 
assistance and policy in the context of the internal assistance and adjustment mechanisms 
which have operated through the corporate structures of the financial groupings.
In closing, it is possible to make a heuristic comparison of the general orders of 
magnitude involved in internal versus external loss-sharing mechanisms. The comparison 
of internal and external assistance is subject, however, to a number of qualifications. 
First, the estimates are not exhaustive, as some forms of assistance are difficult to 
measure (for example, price rise effects because of government-sanctioned cartels or 
assistance by affiliated purchaser firms via the quantity and price terms of transactions 
during the adjustment period) or difficult to obtain for reasons of confidentiality (for 
instance, bank and trading company financial assistance). Second, internal and external 
assistance are not so easily separable; rather they are closely related aspects of the same 
issue, namely that of who bears the costs of structural adjustment. As was shown in the 
previous chapter, several of the government assistance measures involved private sector 
parties such as banks and user firms, which makes it difficult to distinguish accurately 
private from public sector contributions to loss-sharing in the industry. Moreover, 
numerical magnitudes may not reflect the significance of a piece of assistance. It may be, 
for instance, as Japanese policy-makers appear to believe, that a small amount of 
government assistance is able to have a major effect in eliciting assistance from associated 
private sector parties. Third, interpretation of the results is complicated by incentive 
effects. The setting-up of risk-sharing mechanisms may shift incentives for the managers 
and firms concerned towards over-investment in certain industries and thus increase the 
magnitude of the losses which are subsequently incurred. These qualifications 
notwithstanding, it is possible to gauge the relative orders of magnitude of internal 
private sector and external public sector assistance.
The major components of internal private sector assistance and loss-sharing are as 
follows: parent and other shareholder firms absorbed direct lo sses totalling 166.2 b illion  
yen  (US$ 665 million) from 1981 to 1983, and provided fresh cap ita l in jection s of 
128.0  b illio n  yen  (US$ 512 million) from 1981 to 1984 (Tables 8-4 and 8-5); at the end 
of the 1983 FY parent firms had 194.7  b illion  y en  (US$ 779 million) in loans to their 
affiliated smelting companies and associated paper companies and loan  gu aran tees of 
208 .7  b illion  yen  (US$ 835 million), a large proportion of which were potential losses 
(Table 8-6); in the 1978-83 period parent firms and the smelting company for which 
figures are available registered special profits from the sa le o f  shares totalling 181.9  
b illio n  y en  (US$ 728 million) and profits from the sa le o f  land of 118.5 b illion  yen
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(US$ 474 million) (Tables 8-8 and 8-9); in terest su b sid ies from banks from 1983 to 
1986 are estimated conservatively at 19 b illion  yen  (US$ 76 million); and in terest  
su b sid ies  by general trading companies through stock  finan ce cannot be estimated but 
are believed to be significant. At the end of the 1981 FY the industry had about 900  
b illion  y en  (US$ 3.6 billion) in direct bank borrow in gs.
On the other hand, direct govern m en t su b sid ies to the industry in the 1978-84 
period came to about 59 b illion  y en  (US$ 236 million), of which 45 billion yen was in 
the nature  of government-arranged cross-subsidisation of the smelting companies by user 
Firms, and the government provided up to 368 b illion  yen  (US$ 1.5 billion) of 
lo w -in terest finan ce (Table 7-8).
Thus the case study highlights the relative importance of internal assistance in the 
private sector in absorbing the costs of structural adjustment in the industry. A rough 
way to see this is to note tha t  the level of losses in the industry written off by parent and 
other shareholder firms in the 1981-83 period was some three times tha t  of government 
subsidies in the 1978-84 period. It is possible to conclude tha t  the apparent effectiveness 
of government policy in facilitating large-scale adjustment in the industry reflects to a 
considerable extent the operation of mechanisms within the private sector which have 
served to cushion the impact and distribute the costs of structural adjustment.
The following case study of adjustment experience in the aluminium smelting 
operations of the Sumitomo group allows a closer examination of the working of these 
internal mechanisms.
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aluminium in 1934. Sumitomo Chemical, a key industrial in the Sumitomo group, began 
producing aluminium in 1936. Nippon Light Metal was formed in 1939 as a fifty-fifty 
jo in t venture between Furukawa Electric Co., Ltd. and Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. 
During the postwar reconstruction of the industry Alcan became a 50 per cent 
shareholder of Nippon Light Metal, with most of the remaining 50 per cent being held by 
Daiichi Bank group firms (including Furukawa group firms) and business partners. 
Furukawa Electric split off its light metal division in 1959 as Furukawa Aluminium in the 
context of forging a technical and capital tie-up with Alcoa; it continued, however, to rely 
on Nippon Light Metal for the supply of aluminium for its rolling operations.
2. Kögin chösa (1972, 43).
3. Interview at Nippon Light Metal in March 1984; Echigo (1973, 67-8).
4. Nihon kogyö shinbunsha (1978, 412).
5. NLM’s corporate structure, and its response to structural depression, differed 
from tha t  of the three chemical firms. NLM was completely specialised in primary 
aluminium production and fabrication, whereas for the chemical makers aluminium 
smelting was just one of several major lines of business. Thus for NLM restructuring by 
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maximise the potential for cross-subsidisation through vertical integration by merging 
with its downstream fabricating and sales affiliates (Nikkei Aluminium in 1974, Nikkei 
Rolling and Nikkei Aluminium Sales in 1978 and the construction materials sales affiliates 
in 1977-78) (Nihon kögyö shinbunsha, 1979, 403; 1980, 403).
6. Nihon keizai shinbunsha (Kaisha  nenkan)  (1977, 350, 360).
7. The figures are taken from confidential documents supplied by the company to 
the banks.
8. Interview with officers of major Japanese bank, 1984.
9. Interview at research divisions of two major Japanese banks in March 1984; 
Nihon aruminium renmei (1983).
10. “Nikkeikin shien e saiken’i: Daiichi Kangin Arukyan nado (Reconstruction
committee to support Nippon Light Metal: DKB, Alcan and others)” , N K S ,  20 Jan 1978,
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11. “Nikkeikin suichoku tögö kyöka de saiken e: lOgatsu keieijin mo sasshin
(Nippon Light Metal reconstructing by strengthening vertical integration: reform of 
management team in October)” , N K S , 16 May 1978, p.7; “Daiichi Kangin nado Nikkeikin 
ni kin’yü shien: puraimu reito tekiyö (Financial assistance for Nippon Light Metal from 
DKB and others: prime rate to be applied)” , N K S , 12 Aug 1978, p .l.
12. “Nikkeikin saiken kidö ni: k in’yü shien jitai o moshiire (Nippon Light Metal 
reconstruction in orbit: notice given declining financial assistance)” , N K S , 18 April 1980, 
p .l;  “Nikkeikin kin’yü shien o kaijo (Nippon Light Metal financial assistance 
term inated)” , N K S , 4 July 1981, p.6; interviews at research divisions of two major 
Japanese banks in March 1984.
13. “Fuyö gurüpu arumi kondankai ga hatsukaigö (First meeting of Fuyö group 
aluminium discussion group)” , N K S , 9 Feb 1978, p.7.; “Mitsui Arumi saiken’an ösuji geh 
gurüpu 7sha to (General agreement among seven group firms on Mitsui Aluminium 
reconstruction plan)” , N K S , 25 Aug 1979, p.7.
14. “Mitsui Arumi kin’yu shien o enchö Mitsui gurüpu kettei (Mitsui group decides 
to extend financial assistance for Mitsui Aluminium)” , N K S , 1 Oct 1982, p.9; “Mitsui 
Arumi j in ’in sakugen ya chingin töketsu: keiei hatan kaihi e görika (Workforce reduction 
and wage freeze by Mitsui Aluminium: rationalisation to avoid managerial failure)” , 
NKS,  19 Mar 1983, p.6: company documents.
15. “‘Arumi kon’ setsuritsu o Fuyö gurüpu de: Shöden ga hatarakikake (Showa 
Denko moves to set up aluminium discussion group in Fuyö group)” , N K S , 22 Jan 1978, 
p.3; “Fuyö gurüpu arumi kondankai ga hatsukaigö (First meeting of Fuyö group 
aluminium discussion group)” , N K S , 9 Feb 1978, p.7.
16. Sangyö közö shingikai aruminiumu bukai (1978, 8).
17. Sangyö közö shingikai aruminiumu bukai (1977, 16); Sangyö közö shingikai 
(1981, 21).
18. This view was offered by an executive of an aluminium smelting company in an 
interview in January 1984. As an example of the IBJ’s role in policy, the scheme to 
provide financial relief to the industry by freezing surplus aluminium stocks (outlined in 
Chapter 7) was devised by the Industrial Research Division of the IBJ a t  the request of 
MITI (interview with IBJ official, March 1984). It appears tha t  the IBJ and LTCB are 
able to play this role partly because, as special long-term financing banks, they typically 
figure after the city and trust banks as the banks with the largest loan shares vis-a-vis 
each of the five smelting groups, and therefore are able to take a broader industry 
perspective than the respective group banks. Thus, for instance, in the 1977 FY the IBJ
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Sumitomo Bank (10.6 per cent), the Norin Chukin Bank (10.5 per cent) and Sumitomo 
Trust Banking (9.7 per cent); the IBJ had a loan share of 6.0 per cent and the LTCB 
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LTCB 6.4 per cent in Mitsubishi Chemical after Mitsubishi Trust Banking (9.1 per 
cent) and Mitsubishi Bank (8.4 per cent) (Kigyd keiretsu söran, 1978, 102, 149; Nihon 
keizai shinbunsha [Kaisha nenkan ], 1977, 360). In at least one case known to the author, 
the two long-term credit banks participated along with the city and trust banks in special 
interest reduction measures towards a smelting company (bank interviews, September 
1984).
19. “Jigane hanbai o betsugaisha ni: Mitsui Arumi saiken e chikaku zöshi mo (Metal 
sales to a separate company: capital expansion imminent in Mitsui Aluminium’s 
reconstruction)” , N K S , 15 June 1984, p.10; “Mitsui gurupu 5sha Mitsui Arumi saiken o 
shien: baigaku zöshi ni öjiru (Five Mitsui group companies support Mitsui Aluminium’s 
reconstruction: agree to doubling of capital)” , N K S , 9 Dec 1984, p.4.
20. “Shöwa Keikinzoku no jigane zaiko kaiage: Shöwa Denkö ga shiensaku (Showa 
Denko supports SAL by buying up its metal stocks)” , N K S , 19 Oct 1982, p.9.
21. Bank interviews, March 1984.
22. The 1983 published securities reports (YUka shöken hökokusho) of the firms.
23. Bank interviews, March 1984; company interviews, 1983-84.
24. Bank and company documents. See also Kimura (1983, 20-2); “Arumi kyüsai e
yüshidan: Kögin nado hensei junbi hajimeru (Financing consortium for aluminium rescue: 
IBJ and others begin restructuring preparations)” , N K S , 2 Sept 1982, p.3; “Seiren 5sha 
arumi saiken’an katamaru: köjö bunri genshi ya kinri genmen (Reconstruction plans of 5 
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e arumi seiren gosha (Five aluminium smelting companies to submit reconstruction plans 
to M ITI)” , N K S , 1 Nov 1982, p.7; “Arumi seiren keiei saiken’an: 59 nendo ni wa
kurojika (Aluminium smelting financial reconstruction plans: in the black by 1984 FY)” , 
N K S  14 Nov 1982, p.4; company interviews, 1983-84.
25. “Seiren 5sha arumi saiken’an katamaru: köjö bunri genshi ya kinri genmen 
(Reconstruction plans of 5 aluminium smelting companies decided: splitting off plants, 
capital reductions and interest reductions/exemptions)” , N K S , 14 Sept 1982, p .l .
26. Company documents.
27. Company documents.
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announcement of establishment of Mitsubishi Light Metal Sales)” , N K S , 10 Mar 1983,
p. 10.
29. Interview at general trading company, March 1984.
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32. See, for instance, Kaigin chösa (1982, 77-8), Kimura (1983, 20).
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A lu m in iu m : th e  S u m ito m o  ex p er ien ce
The Sumitomo group made substantia] investments in new aluminium smelting 
capacity at the time of the 1973 oil crisis and in its wake, resulting in major structural 
adjustment problems for the group, particularly after the second oil crisis. In 1978 the 
Sumitomo group had five domestic smelters, four operated by Sumitomo Aluminium 
Smelting and one by Sumikei Aluminium, totalling 507,000 tonnes of capacity or 31 per 
cent of total domestic capacity (Table 7-4). By the end of 1984 the two firms had 
scrapped 326,000 tonnes or 64 per cent of their combined capacity, representing one-fifth 
of the industry’s total 1978 capacity.
THE A L U M IN IU M  SM E LT IN G  O P E R A T IO N S  OF THE G R O U P
The Sumitomo group came to have two major aluminium smelting operations after 
Sumitomo Light Metal pressed ahead with its plan to construct a smelter in Sakata City 
in Yamagata Prefecture in the mid-1970s. Sumitomo Chemical opposed the plan because, 
as the smelting arm of the group, it supplied almost all of Sumitomo Light M etal’s 
aluminium inputs.
In 1969 the demand for aluminium products in Japan exceeded 1 million tonnes for 
the first time, recording an increase of 28 per cent over the previous year and demand was 
expected to double by the mid-1970s. In this climate, Sumitomo Chemical commenced 
construction of a 180,000 tonne smelter in Toyama in 1969, which was completed in 
October 1973, and in 1970 signed an agreement with Ehime Prefecture to construct a
300.000 tonne smelter at Toyo, and construction began in June 1973.1 In each case the 
smelter was to be the centre-piece of a major industrial complex, being planned by the 
prefectural and local governments. At the same time, Sumitomo Light Metal was 
developing a plan to build its own smelter, to be the centre-piece of a major coastal 
industrial complex at Sakata, a long-cherished industrial development project of the 
Yam agata prefectural gove rnm en t/  This plan envisaged a 113 billion yen investment in a
180.000 tonne aluminium smelter and 350,000 tonne rolling and extrusion plant, to 
commence operation in October 1976.^
Sumitomo Light M etal’s plan to build an aluminium smelter brought it into direct
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conflict with Sumitomo Chemical. Under the traditional ‘one industry, one firm’ (ichigyö 
i s sha ) policy of the Sumitomo group, Sumitomo Chemical engaged in the refining and 
smelting side of the aluminium industry, in addition to having extensive chemical 
interests, and Sumitomo Light Metal (SLM) specialised in the rolling and extrusion side 
of the industry. Sumitomo Chemical supplied virtually all of SLM’s aluminium inputs 
and SLM was Sumitomo Chemical’s largest customer firm. Although they had only minor 
direct capital ties, Sumitomo Chemical and SLM operated somewhat like two divisions of 
a vertically-integrated firm. As key members of the Sumitomo group, the two firms have 
close ties with the same group banks and general trading company and Sumitomo 
Chemical supplied SLM’s two aluminium processing plants by direct hot-charge delivery 
from adjacent smelters.'*
Sumitomo Chemical opposed SLM’s entry into smelting on the grounds th a t  it 
violated the ‘one industry, one firm’ principle, a point on which it had widespread group 
support, and th a t  it would upset market order at a time when other firms in the industry 
were restraining their expansion plans.0 But even Sumitomo Bank, acting in the typical 
role of the main bank as mediator of intra-group conflict, could not dissuade SLM from 
going ahead with its plans. In July 1972, with the two Sumitomo partner firms 
deadlocked and Sumitomo Bank unable to produce a solution, Tanaka Kakuei, as the 
MITI Minister mediated a compromise between the two Sumitomo firms.
This involved SLM going ahead with the Sakata venture but with the size of the 
smelter and the timing of its operation being decided in consultation with Sumitomo 
Chemical, and with Sumitomo Chemical to have a major shareholding and to supply the 
technology and alumina inputs for the project. At the same time, SLM took a 20 per cent 
shareholding in Sumitomo Chemical’s Töyo smelter, which initially had been set up as a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Sumitomo Chemical.^
With the compromise plan worked out, Sumikei Aluminium was set up with 2 
billion yen capital in February 1973, with SLM holding 40 per cent of the shares, 
Sumitomo Chemical 30 per cent, Sumitomo Metal Industries 15 per cent, and the two
n
group banks and general trading company 5 per cent each.
SLM’s decision to press on with the construction of an aluminium smelter, and an 
oil-based power plant for electricity generation, after the first oil crisis is difficult to 
understand. It is probably a fair supposition tha t  in a more competitive capital market 
SLM would not have been able to raise the finance for the project. Sumikei Aluminium 
began smelting operations in January 1977 and by 1979 it was operating at its full 
capacity of 99,000. But the oil crisis in the same year resulted in J a p an ’s newest smelter 
being the most uncompetitive in the country (Table 7-4). In May 1982 the smelter was 
closed down for eventual scrapping and the joint-venture company Sumikei Aluminium 
was dissolved.
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As with SLM, Sumitomo Chemical went ahead with its plans to build a smelter at 
Toyo on Shikoku island after the oil crisis. The company commenced construction in 
June 1973 of what was planned to be a 300,000 tonne smelter to form the nucleus of an 
aluminium industrial complex involving related Sumitomo group user firms. Only the first 
stage, 99,000 tonnes, was built, however, and the first despatch of metal was made in July 
1975. As the prototype for the Sakata smelter, the Toyo smelter too relied on imported 
heavy oil for electricity generation, supplied through a new facility built for the purpose 
by the Sumitomo joint-venture power company (Sumitomo Kyödö Karyoku)..^ The Toyo 
smelter was closed in 1984 and is being scrapped as part  of the contraction to 350,000 
tonnes of domestic capacity.
SUMITOMO ALUM INIUM  SMELTING
The central internal assistance measure in the case of Sumitomo Aluminium 
Smelting (SAS) involved the establishment of a paper company, Sumiaru Kösan, in 1982 
to take over the smelting company’s excess capacity. The company was set up with 2 
billion yen share capital by Sumitomo Chemical and SAS and involved Sumitomo Metal 
Industries, Sumitomo Bank, Sumitomo Trust & Banking, and Sumitomo Corporation as 
shareholders. Sumiaru Kösan paid in excess of 30 billion yen for SAS’s idle assets, 
financed by a 31 billion yen loan from Sumitomo Chemical.9 Although it was Sumitomo 
Chemical which directly financed the move to relieve SAS of its surplus capacity and 
other assets, the involvement of the group banks as shareholders in the paper company 
strongly suggests their indirect involvement in assisting the adjustment measure. There 
is reason to believe tha t  the banks provided special low-interest finance to Sumitomo 
Chemical as its contribution to the loss-sharing, and this is suggested also by the press 
reports at the t im e.19
It is im portant to view this, and the other assistance measures described below, in 
the context of the public policy framework and government assistance for adjustment in 
the industry. The paper company provided an instrument for carrying out the scrapping 
of SAS’s excess capacity, leaving the smelting company with the level of operating 
capacity designated under the 700,000 tonne plan. In this sense, it represented a private 
sector analogue to the various public-private sector schemes and instrumentalities set up 
to assist adjustment in the industry, as described in Chapter 7. The measure effectively 
transferred the costs of adjustment from SAS to Sumitomo Chemical and the other major 
group partners.
During the 1982-84 period, Sumitomo Chemical implemented a number of other 
measures to absorb SAS’s losses as it mothballed and scrapped excess capacity within the 
framework of the industry adjustment program. In mid-1982 Sumitomo Chemical took
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over 16 million shares held by SAS in five related listed firms, most of which were 
themselves structurally depressed, representing an injection of 3.65 billion yen to SAS.11 
At the end of the 1982 FY (December for SAS), Sumitomo Chemical directly absorbed 
8.9 billion yen of SAS’s losses by arranging for a 100 per cent capital reduction of its 50 
per cent shareholding in SAS, followed by a fresh injection of 9 billion yen in share 
capital, thus serving to keep the level of SAS’s accumulated losses below its 18 billion yen 
capital level. In 1983 a similar measure was applied, with Sumitomo Chemical writing 
off its 9 billion yen capital share in SAS and the other shareholders 5.5 billion yen of their 
9 billion capital share, in an 80 per cent share-capital reduction. As in the previous year, 
the measure was combined with a further injection of capital to restore SAS’s 18 billion 
yen capital and bring the level of its accumulated losses below that of its restored
i  o
capital. In 1984 Sumitomo Chemical again absorbed 9 billion yen of SAS’s losses in a 
100 per cent reduction of its shareholding and simultaneous injection of the same amount 
of capital.14 In just  three years then SAS wiped out a  total of 32.5 billion yen (US$ 130 
million) in its capital, with Sumitomo Chemical absorbing 27 billion yen of this amount.
Sumitomo Chemical also absorbed losses in the form of retirement payments to 
workers at the scrapped smelters of SAS amounting to 5.0 billion yen in 1982 and 1983, 
and by giving up 4.6 billion yen of claims on SAS in 1983. As a further assistance 
measure, Sumitomo Chemical made a 35 billion yen interest-free two-year loan to SAS in 
1983.15
Not surprisingly, Sumitomo Chemical posted poor accounting results in the early 
1980s, principally as a result of the SAS-related losses. In 1981 Sumitomo Chemical 
recorded a 2.8 billion yen operating loss and in 1982 a net loss of 7.2 billion yen, and for
I  ^
the First time in 33 years the chemicals maker was unable to declare a dividend.
The role of intercorporate shareholdings as a form of corporate insurance is in 
evidence in this case also. Sumitomo Chemical was able to absorb the impact of the SAS- 
related losses to a large extent by disposing of a portion of the shares it held in group and 
other business partners. In the 1981 to 1983 period Sumitomo Chemical registered 26.1 
billion yen in special profits from the sale of shares, which was about the same amount as 
its losses from SAS in the same period (27.6 billion yen) (Table 8-8). As Table 9-1 
reveals, shares held in group-related business partners, particularly the group banks, 
provided the greatest source of funds. Thus, Sumitomo Chemical disposed of 11.1 million 
shares in Sumitomo Bank and 6.6 million in Sumitomo Trust &; Banking in 1982 and a 
further 11.7 million and 3.7 million respectively in 1983, as well as 5.2 million shares in 
Sumitomo Marine &: Fire Insurance and 4.5 million in Sumitomo Corporation in the same 
year. It is of interest that Sumitomo Chemical was able to increase its holdings in 
Sumitomo Bank by 11 million shares in 1981 when the bank made a 1 to 0.25 share issue
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Table 9.1: Major share disposals by Sumitomo Chemical in 1982 and 1983
Shares 
disposed of
Number of 
shares (face 
value of 50 
yen)
Book value 
per share 
(yen)
(1)
Lowest 
recorded 
share price 
(yen)
(2) (2) /(1)
Estimated 
accounting 
profit regis­
tered from 
sale (million 
yen)
1983
*Sumitomo Bank 11,720,000 79 499 6.3 4,922
♦Sumitomo Marine & Fire 5,241,000 85 210 2.5 655
♦Sumitomo Corporation 4,500,000 90 427 4.8 1,517
♦Sumitomo Trust 3,744,000 105 272 2.6 625
Maruzen Oil 3,240,000 83 262 3.1 580
Iyo Bank 2,384,000 65 309 4.7 582
Long-Term Credit Bank 2,150,000 74 313 4.2 514
♦Sumitomo Electric 2,130,000 86 475 5.5 829
Daikin Industries 2,000,000 55 255 4.6 400
Nippon Shokubai 2,000,000 53 236 4.5 366
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines 1,523,000 100 168 1.7 104
Industrial Bank of Japan 1,003,000 96 397 4.1 302
Nippon Kayaku 612,000 247 520 2.1 167
Matsushita Electric 439,000 346 515 1.5 74
Works
Daiichi Kangyo Bank 310,000 67 481 7.1 128
Mitsubishi Bank 300,000 162 497 3.1 101
Taiyo—Kobe Bank 185,000 125 297 2.4 32
Kyowa Bank 150,000 108 239 2.2 20
♦Nippon Electric 53,000 116 880 7.6 40
Nippon Rinsan 4,800,000 50 - - -
1982
♦Sumitomo Bank 11,123,000 75 495 6.6 4,672
♦Sumitomo Trust 6,560,000 105 295 2.8 1,246
♦Sumitomo Heavy 4,111,000 48 175 3.6 522
Industries
Maruzen Oil 3,000,000 83 151 1.8 204
♦Nippon Electric 1,930,000 98 662 6.8 1,089
Toyota Motor 218,000 688 807 1.2 26
Iyo Bank 150,000 66 296 4.5 35
* Member firm of Sumitomo group presidents' club Hakusui-kai.
Sources: Compiled from published accounts (Yuka shoken hokokusho) of Sumitomo Chemical;
Keizai chosa kyokai, 1984, 1985: Keiretsu no kenkyü: daiichibu jojo kigyohen;
Tokyo shoken torihikisho chosabu, 1983, 1984: Toshö tökei nenpö.
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to shareholders a t  par and similarly its holdings in Sumitomo Trust &; Banking by 4.6 
million shares in 1983 when it made a 1 to 0.3 share issue (0.25 at par and 0.05 a free 
issue).
Information on the buyers of the shares disposed of by Sumitomo Chemical is not 
available, but it is believed tha t  most of the shares were placed directly with other related 
firms outside the stock market or, when disposed through the market, in pre-arranged 
‘cross transactions’. It is possible to obtain an indication of which firms might have 
taken over the shares by examining the changes in the holdings of the top shareholders in 
the firm whose shares were disposed of. For instance, in the case of Sumitomo Bank, 
between March 1982 and March 1983 when Sumitomo Chemical reduced its holdings by 
13.9 million shares, Sumitomo Mutual Life Insurance increased its holdings by 4.6 million, 
Sumitomo Trust &; Banking by 1.3 million, Nippon Electric by 1.0 million, and Asahi 
Chemical by 5.0 million (these being Sumitomo group-related firms) and three life 
insurance companies by 5.7 million shares. Thus, as was argued in Chapter 6, the 
obtaining, holding and disposal of shares in an internal capital market appears to be an 
im portan t mechanism for diversifying corporate risk and spreading the costs of structural 
adjustm ent in the economy.
S U M IK E I A L U M IN IU M
When Sumikei Aluminium was dissolved in May 1982, less than five years after it 
had commenced operations, the company’s accumulated losses totalled about 19 billion 
yen, more than wiping out its 18 billion yen capital, and it had more than 80 billion yen
i o
of outstanding bank borrowings.10 Sumikei Aluminium, as an internal supplier to SLM, 
fell outside the am bit of the public policy framework and received little direct government 
assitance in the adjustment process. Rather, losses from the Sumikei Aluminium venture 
were absorbed through a number of group channels. How this occurred is outlined below.
Sumikei Aluminium had a typical group joint-venture shareholding structure, 
although effectively it was a branch plant of Sumitomo Light Metal with all of its output 
being for the internal use of SLM (Table 8-3). Because of this group shareholding 
structure , SLM bore only half of the investment loss when Sumikei’s share capital was 
wiped out, with SLM’s 28 per cent parent firm Sumitomo Metal Industries, the two major 
group banks, the group general trading company, and Sumitomo Chemical each incurring 
investment losses in their accounts.
As the major direct parent firm, Sumitomo Light Metal had guaranteed Sumikei 
Aluminium’s bank borrowings. The 80 billion yen plus bank borrowings, minus the 
salvage value of Sumikei’s assets, represented losses for SLM. With SLM posting a 6.4 
billion yen operating loss in March 1982, this massive loss would have resulted in SLM’s 
immediate failure had it not received wider group support.
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Two measures were taken which aimed at reducing the immediate extent of 
Sumikei’s dissolution losses. Sumitomo Light Metal set up a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
Sumitomo Aluminium Casting, to take over the assets, borrowings and workforce of the 
casting operations of the Sakata smelter. The other assets of Sumikei, principally the 
smelter and its land, and associated borrowings were transferred to Sakata Kanzai, a 
paper company set up and wholly-financed by Sumitomo Metal. The paper company was 
essentially a device for restructuring potential losses from SLM to Sumitomo Metal, as 
Sumiaru Kösan did between SAS and Sumitomo Chemical. The president of Sakata 
Kanzai was the chief of the Affiliated Operations Department (Kanren jigyöbu) of 
Sumitomo Metal and the steel-maker financed the asset transfer with an injection of 26 
billion yen, 400 million yen as share capital and 25.6 billion yen in the form of a ten-year 
low-interest loan.19
These measures left Sumitomo Light Metal with a loss of 47.3 billion yen from 
Sumikei Aluminium’s remaining bank borrowings. Sumitomo Metal undertook two 
additional measures to absorb the losses and prevent SLM from going into business 
failure. Sumitomo Metal agreed to absorb half of the losses directly, writing off 23.7 
billion yen as a  tax-deductible special loss in its March 1983 accounts.29 SLM wrote off 
23.7 billion yen in its 1983 accounts in a similar manner, on top of an operating loss of 8.8 
billion yen for the year.21
The second measure involved a Sumitomo Metal-sponsored sale and lease-back 
arrangement with seven other Sumitomo group firms to allow Sumitomo Light Metal to 
offset its Sumikei-related losses in its accounts and in its cash-flow position. In June 1982, 
the m onth after Sumikei Aluminium was dissolved, Sumitomo Metal set up Nagoya 
Kösan to purchase the land and buildings of SLM’s main plant in Nagoya for leasing back 
to SLM. The steel maker held 35 per cent of Nagoya Kösan’s shares directly and 15 per 
cent through its 48 per cent owned trading company, Sumikin Bussan; Sumitomo 
Corporation, the group general trading company, had a 30 per cent holding, both directly 
and through its wholly-owned non-ferrous metals sales company; and the four group 
financial institutions each had a 5 per cent shareholding (Table 8-5).
The lease-back arrangement operated as follows. Nagoya Kösan purchased the land 
and buildings of the Nagoya plant for 45.6 billion yen (US$ 182 million), with the 
purchase being financed by a ten-year loan from Sumitomo M etal.22 SLM then leased the 
land and buildings for ten years a t  an annual charge of 3,084 million yen, or in interest 
rate terms at the subsidised rate  of 6.76 per cent.2'* The arrangement also enabled SLM 
to register a 40.9 billion yen special profit in its accounts on the ‘sale’, as the book value 
of the land and buildings was only 4.7 billion yen.2'1 This allowed an operating loss of 8.8 
billion yen and special losses on account of Sumikei Aluminium of 26.0 billion yen in the 
1982 FY to be converted into a  net profit of 6.3 billion yen.
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The sale and lease-back scheme was thus a vehicle for Sumitomo Metal and other 
Sumitomo group firms to assist SLM to absorb the losses from the Sakata smelting 
venture and involved a substantial injection of funds and indirect interest subsidy from 
Sumitomo Metal to SLM. The involvement of the four Sumitomo financial institutions as 
shareholders in Nagoya Kösan strongly suggests that they were closely involved in the 
financial assistance package. According to one source, Sumitomo Bank and Sumitomo 
Trust &: Banking provided a substantial level of special low-interest finance to Sumitomo 
Metal to facilitate its financial assistance towards SLM, and this is consistent with other
or
case study evidence from the alumimium industry and from other industr ie s /  At 
another level, as SLM’s major asset, the Nagoya plant was a major part of the collateral 
for its bank borrowings, and the back-up of the group main banks and Sumitomo Metal 
was critical in providing the implicit guarantee necessary for the other banks to continue 
financing the near bankrupt SLM. It is probably because of such group back-up tha t  SLM 
was able to increase its bank borrowings from 204 billion yen to 231 billion yen between 
1982 and 1983, despite the fact tha t  a major part of its asset base had been removed via 
the sale and lease-back arrangement.
As with Sumitomo Chemical, Sumitomo Light Metal used its shareholdings in group 
firms to offset its losses. As Table 8-8 shows, SLM registered 6.9 billion yen in special 
profits from the sale of shares in the 1981-83 period in a large-scale disposal of shares, 
which offset a significant part of the losses from the Sakata venture. As Table 9-2 shows, 
SLM’s share disposals centred on its major group business partners: in 1981 SLM sold 2 
million of its shares in Sumitomo Bank, its main bank, 800,000 of its shares in the second- 
line group bank, Sumitomo Trust & Banking, and 1.8 million shares in the group general 
trading company, while in 1982, when SLM’s structural adjustment losses were 
concentrated, the share disposals were extended to shareholdings in most of the major 
Sumitomo group firms.
Sumitomo M etal’s comparatively sound financial position enabled it to assist 
Sumitomo Light Metal since, despite the domestic steel recession, it had been making 
large profits on its steel-pipe exports. In 1983, however, Sumitomo Metal suffered a 21 
per cent decline in sales and used its extensive shareholdings in group and other business 
partners to offset its losses. Thus Sumitomo Metal was able to register 38.3 billion yen in 
profits from the sale of shares and reduce what otherwise would have been a 50.0 billion 
yen net loss to an 11.8 billion yen l o s s / 0 As occurred in the other cases, the disposals 
centred on group and other business partners, with Sumitomo Metal selling some 20 
million shares in its main bank, Sumitomo Bank, 9 million in Sumitomo Trust &: 
Banking, 2 million in Sumitomo Corporation, and a total of 15 million in the three long­
term credit banks and a total of 7.3 million shares in six automobile makers (purchaser 
firms) (Table 9-3).
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Table 9.2: Major share disposals by Sumitomo Light Metal in 1981 and 1982
Shares Number of Book value Lowest Estimated
disposed of shares
(50 yen face
value)
per share 
(yen)
(1)
recorded 
share price 
(yen)
(2) (2) /(1)
accounting 
profit regis­
tered from 
sale (million 
yen)
1982
*Sumitomo Metal 2,500,000 93 175 1.9 205
*Sumitomo Corporation 2,488,000 231 471 2.0 597
*Sumitomo Bank 2,182,000 178 495 2.8 692
*Sumitomo Trust 2,119,000 183 295 1.6 237
*Sumitomo Metal Mining 1,200,000 83 408 4.9 390
*Sumitomo Marine & Fire 1,107,000 187 282 1.5 105
♦Sumitomo Cement 1,000,000 139 126 0.9 -13
Tokyo Bank 780,000 118 288 2.4 133
*Sumitomo Chemical 684,000 48 130 2.7 56
*Sumitomo Realty & Dev. 609,000 126 300 2.4 106
*Sumitomo Electric 561,000 209 432 2.1 125
♦Nippon Sheet Glass 500,000 98 290 3.0 96
Daiwa Securities 442,000 170 313 1.8 63
♦Sumitomo Construction 360,000 103 181 1.8 28
♦Nippon Electric 320,000 400 662 1.7 84
♦Sumitomo Heavy 200,000 220 175 0.8 -9
Industries
Sumitomo Ocean Dev. 150,000 53 - - -
Suruga Bank 123,000 228 300 1.3 9
1981
♦Sumitomo Bank 1,999,250 178 392 2.2 428
♦Sumitomo Corporation 1,787,000 242 401 1.7 284
♦Sumitomo Trust 800,000* 183 260 1.4 62
Daiwa Securities 29,000 178 265 1.5 3
*Member firm of Sumitomo group presidents' club Hakusui-kai.
Sources: Compiled from published accounts (Yuka shoken hokokusho) of SLM; Keizai chosa
kyokai, 1983, 1984: Keiretsu no kenkyü: daiichibu j5j5 kigy5hen; Tokyo shoken
torihikisho chSsabu, 1982, 1983: T5sh5 tokei nenp5.
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Table 9.3: Major share disposals by Sumitomo Metal in 1983
Shares 
disposed of
Number of 
shares (-50 
yen face 
value)
Book value 
per share 
(yen)
(1)
Lowest
recorded share 
price 1983 (yen)
(2) (2) / (1)
Estimated 
accounting 
profit reg­
istered 
from sale 
(million 
yen)
*Sumitomo Bank 19,860,000 185 499 2.7 6,236
*Sumitomo Trust 8,990,000 128 272 2.1 1,295
Industrial Bank 
of Japan
6,700,000 132 397 3.0 1,776
Long-Term Credit 
Bank
4,700,000 102 313 3.1 992
Nippon Credit 
Bank
3,700,000 117 235 2.0 437
Toyota Motor 2,500,000 322 950 3.0 1,570
*Nippon Electric 2,349,000 139 880 6.3 1,741
Nissan Motor 2,190,000 325 651 2.0 714
*Sumitomo Corpora­
tion
- 2,000,000 185 427 2.3 484
Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries
2,000,000 101 198 2.0 194
*Nippon Sheet 
Glass
1,656,000 159 320 2.0 267
Toyo Kogyo 1,500,000 313 379 1.2 99
Nanto Bank 1,000,000 281 438 1.6 157
Nihon Hatsujo 1,000,000 157 232 1.5 75
Kiyo Bank 1,000,000 164 411 2.5 247
Shizuoka Bank 1,000,000 68 250 3.7 182
Mitsui Engineering 1,000,000 131 142 1.1 11
Shinagawa Refrac­
tories
1,000,000 219 301 1.4 82
Chiyoda Chem. Eng. 1,000,000 357 650 1.8 293
Toshiba Corp. 900,000 284 295 1.0 10
Mitsubishi Bank 810,000 219 497 2.3 225
Hino Motors 500,000 158 277 1.8 60
Tokyo Bank 500,000 165 289 1.8 62
*Member firm of Sumitomo group presidents' club Hakusi-kai.
Sources: Compiled from published accounts (Yuka shoken hokokusho) of
Sumitomo Metal; Keizai chosa kyokai, 1984, 1985: Keiretsu no
kenkyu: daiichibu jojo kigyohen; Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1985:
Nikkei kaisha jöhö '85-IV shügö.
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IN T E R N A L  V E R S U S  E X T E R N A L  A S S IS T A N C E
It is possible to make a rough comparison of the relative importance of internal 
ad justm ent and assistance measures versus external government measures in absorbing 
the costs of adjustm ent in the Sumitomo group, by drawing on the figures presented 
above and in the previous two chapters. The comparison should be thought of as 
providing an approximate indication of the relative importance of internal and external 
measures in distributing the costs of adjustment, rather than as constituting a precise 
assessment.
In the case of Sumikei Aluminium, the losses incurred in the course of structural 
ad justm ent appear to have been absorbed mainly, if not entirely, in the private sector, as 
Sumikei was not a recipient of any of the major government assistance measures. In 
contrast, as Table 7-3 shows, 65.3 billion yen of Sumikei-related losses were borne 
through group corporate channels in 1981 and 1982, and other losses were accomodated 
through the paper company device as described above. Government finance and subsidies 
were provided for the conversion of the power facility jointly owned by Sumikei 
Aluminium and Tohoku Electric Power Company to a coal base, but as the smelter was 
scrapped, this measure appears to be more in the nature of government assistance for 
energy adjustment rather than assistance for Sumikei Aluminium.
In Sumitomo Aluminium Smelting’s case, internal group assistance has been more 
im portan t than government subsidies and assistance in absorbing the losses incurred. 
This assistance came principally through the parent firm Sumitomo Chemical, but as the 
analysis has shown, group banks, the general trading company and other group firms were 
also involved both directly and indirectly in various ways. Direct government assistance 
to SAS is estimated a t  about 11.6 billion yen, in the form of scrapping funds generated by 
the tariff-allocation scheme (1,790 million yen), interest subsidy equivalents under the 
surplus stock freezing scheme (309 million yen), and the tariff exemptions under the 
tariff-exemption scheme (9.5 billion y e n ) / '  SAS also received an estimated 5.4 billion yen 
in subsidies for the conversion of its joint-venture power plant to a coal base and an 
annual interest rate subsidy equivalent on Japan Development Bank financing of the 
conversion estimated a t 365 million yen. The total of government assistance of a subsidy 
nature in the 1978 to 1984 period then is in the region of 18.1 billion yen (US$ 72 
million).
By comparison, direct losses absorbed in group channels in the 1981 to 1984 period 
(when losses were written off in corporate accounts) totalled 42.0 billion yen (Table 7-3). 
By assuming, on the basis of case study evidence for another smelting company, a  2 per 
cent interest subsidy from banks from 1982, it is possible to arrive at an estimate of 
annual interest subsidies of 4.5 billion yen. Thus, a conservative estimate of internal
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assistance in the 1981-84 period is 55.5 billion yen. A rough comparison suggests then 
th a t  internal assistance was some three times tha t  of external assistance in the case of 
SAS. Taking SAS and Sumikei Aluminium together, internal assistance of 120.8 billion 
yen (US$ 483 million) is almost seven times the level of external assistance.
C O N C L U S IO N
The case study has shown corporate organisation to be an im portant factor in the 
structural adjustment of the aluminium operations of the Sumitomo group. The case 
study adds weight to the conclusion of the previous chapter tha t  the financial corporate 
grouping has provided an im portant context in which adjustment, centring on the 
scrapping of uncompetitive capacity, has taken place at the corporate level and tha t  risk­
sharing mechanisms in the grouping have operated in such as a way as to spread the costs 
of structural adjustment in the private sector. It was found tha t ,  while the amount of 
government assistance was significant, the losses incurred were absorbed mainly through 
internal corporate channels, involving a variety of loss-sharing measures and mechanisms.
While an official adjustment plan for scrapping capacity was in place and the 
government was providing scrapping funds through the tariff-exemption scheme, key 
firms in the Sumitomo group employed a variety of paper companies and corporate 
mechanisms to facilitate this scrapping and to absorb the associated losses. The case 
study has revealed considerable complexity in the way that these intra-group risk-sharing 
arrangements have operated. Thus in the case of Sumikei Aluminium, Sumitomo Light 
Metal absorbed the initial brunt of the losses with the joint-venture shareholding 
s tructure  and group-mediated share disposals helping to spread the impact, and when this 
threatened its viability the residual losses were borne by its 28 per cent parent firm, 
Sumitomo Metal, with backing from group banks; when Sumitomo M etal’s position 
deteriorated, however, it used its own portfolio of group shares to offset its losses and 
generate funds.
It could not be said th a t  corporate decision-makers and government policy-makers 
were quick to react to the impact of the first oil crisis and yen appreciation on the 
competitiveness of the Japanese aluminium smelting industry or th a t  adjustment took 
place very quickly. It was not until 1978 that the industry began to mothball and scrap 
capacity in the official framework and this adjustment, although effectively complete, 
continues formally until 1988. Nevertheless, it is significant tha t  the government has not 
used protectionist measures to prop up the industry against the tide of international 
competitive pressures and tha t  large-scale scrapping of capacity and reduction of 
workforce has taken place in what appears to be a relatively smooth manner, when 
compared to the bankruptcy and sudden decrease in employment which might have been
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the result had the government and the private sector parties involved allowed market 
forces to operate unfettered. The case study of the Sumitomo group provides further 
evidence for the conclusion th a t  the apparent effectiveness of government assistance and 
policies in facilitating and cushioning the impact of large-scale adjustment reflects to a 
large extent the capacity of the private sector to spread the burden of adjustment through 
the internal adjustment and assistance mechanisms of large firm corporate organisation.
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C o rp o ra te  org a n isa tio n  and a d ju stm en t: th e  m ain  issu es
This study sought to examine the role of corporate organisation in Ja p an ’s recent 
s tructural adjustment. Many of Ja p an ’s major industries and firms experienced a severe 
loss of competitiveness due to structural change in the 1970s and large-scale adjustment 
both a t  the level of the firm and the industry has taken place as a result. In other 
studies, discussion and analysis of Japan ’s structural adjustment since the early 1970s has 
focused on the role of government policy and assistance, particularly the program for 
scrapping excess capacity in designated industries. The departure point for this study, on 
the other hand, was an interest in corporate organisation and its role in J a p a n ’s 
s tructural adjustment. The particular focus has been on financial corporate grouping, a 
form of corporate organisation involving financing, shareholding, trading and 
informational ties among financial institutions and trading, manufacturing and service 
firms. This chapter a ttem pts to draw together some of the major findings of the study, to 
relate the findings to conceptual developments, and to suggest possible lines of enquiry for 
future research.
C O R P O R A T E  O R G A N ISA T IO N
The analytical approach has been to follow Nakatani (1984) in viewing the 
phenomenon of financial corporate grouping as a kind of internal capital market, in the 
spirit of recent developments in the theory of economic organisation. The key notion is of 
the financial corporate grouping as an internal capital market which allows firms to pool 
their risks and obtain insulation from the external or competitive market for corporate 
control. Viewing financial corporate grouping in this way highlights the im portant 
interrelationship between corporate organisation in the capital market and in the 
managerial and labour market and allows the major institutional arrangements which 
characterise Japan ’s corporate organisation to be conceptualised in an integrated 
framework.
A key notion is that the internal capital market sits lback-to-back’ with and 
facilitates the operation of the internal managerial and labour market. The management, 
employment and industrial relations system in large firms in Japan can be viewed as a
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kind of internal labour market: it is characterised by such practices as the hiring of 
managerial and other skilled workers upon graduation and the provision of considerable 
in-firm training, by an implicit guarantee by the firm and expectation on the part of the 
employee of security of tenure until the mandatory retirement age, by a seniority-based 
wage system and internal promotion, and by enterprise unionism. The internal capital 
market can be thought of as operating in such a way as to facilitate the internal 
managerial and labour market. There are two external factors which could jeopardise the 
viability of an employment system based on guarantees of permanent employment tenure 
and high levels of firm-specific skills. One is the financial failure of the firm, the other the 
takeover of the management by another firm. The pooling of corporate risks in the 
internal capital market can be thought of as a means by which firms are able to insure 
against business failure, thus increasing the ex ante  security of employment contracts in 
the internal labour market. Insulation from the external market for corporate control is 
im portan t in assuring that the position and tenure of the incumbent management, and 
the employment commitments entered into with the rest of the workforce, is not 
‘d isturbed’ by outside interests such as takeover agents or corporate raiders.
Thus the main bank was thought of as providing a corporate-insurance function vis- 
a-vis its affiliated borrowing firms, most of which are specialised and operate ‘lifetime’ 
employment systems. The general trading company, which is closely associated with its 
main bank, provides an analogous insurance function as a financial intermediary and 
parent firm, particularly in intermediate product markets. In the same vein, the practice 
of firms entering into interlocking shareholding arrangements can be viewed as a risk- 
diversifying institutional set-up. The main bank not only insures risk, it also functions as 
an agent of screening, monitoring and intervention in the internal capital market. 
Similarly, interlocking shareholdings (in which the main bank is also closely involved) are 
based on stable shareholding arrangements which provide an institutional mechanism for 
the managements of firms to obtain mutual protection from the control mechanisms of 
the external capital market.
To stress the interrelationships involved is not to say that one or other of the 
capital market or labour market aspects of corporate organisation is necessarily the cause 
of, or cannot exist independently of, the other. The question of causality, though an 
interesting and important one, has not been addressed in this study. An im portant task 
for the economic historian is to examine the postwar development of corporate 
organisation in Japan in order to identify and trace out the relationships between 
evolving labour market practices and capital market institutions of the kind examined in 
this study. The existing literature on Ja p an ’s postwar economic history has largely 
overlooked this issue.
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T H E  C O ST S OF A D J U S T M E N T
A major interest in the study was in examining and trying to assemble data  on the 
role of corporate organisation in absorbing the costs of structural adjustment. 
Conceptually, the costs of adjustment can be viewed as ex post manifestations of what, ex 
a n te , were risks, suggesting that corporate organisation, to the extent tha t  it involves 
risk-bearing mechanisms, would be important in determining how the costs of adjustment 
are borne in the economy.
The study has brought together a large amount of case study and other evidence 
suggesting that the corporate organisation of the financial corporate grouping has played 
a major part in absorbing the costs of structural adjustment, even in industries 
designated for special policy attention. Chapters 3 and 4 presented evidence on bank 
assistance for depressed firms, consistent with N akatan i’s hypothesis of the bank as “one 
of the principal insurers for the group-affiliated firms” .* The major banks have provided 
significant financial assistance to depressed affiliated firms involving interest rate 
reductions and exemptions over extended periods of corporate adjustment. The main- 
bank system was shown to be central to this bank assistance, with the main bank 
functioning as a quasi-residual risk-bearer in the internal capital market and often 
directly managing the adjustment process of the firms receiving bank assistance.
' As Chapter 5 showed, the general trading company has been a major institutional 
mechanism through which the costs of adjustment have been distributed in the private 
sector in Japan. Between 1978 and 1982 the six largest GTCs absorbed 400 billion yen of 
losses on account of affiliates and most of this was related to investments in depressed 
sectors. Attention to date has focused on the role of the GTC in handling Ja p an ’s 
international trade and in providing information and managerial services to transaction 
partners. This study on the other hand has focused on the role of the GTC as an implicit 
corporate risk-insurance set-up based on a diversified portfolio of transactions and 
investments and close risk-sharing ties with its main bank. Thus the effect of the GTC 
during recent times of rapidly changing competitiveness in the Japanese economy has 
been to function somewhat like a ‘shock absorber’ in the industrial structure, with the 
large-scale losses which were incurred in such industries as electric-furnace steel, sugar 
refining, textiles, plywood and paper, non-ferrous metals, and petroleum refining being 
absorbed internally by the GTCs.
Chapter 6 identified intercorporate shareholdings as another risk-sharing 
arrangement of the financial corporate grouping which has enabled firms to cushion the 
impact of major losses. Large firms have implemented major share disposal programs in 
the course of undergoing adjustment, a fact which highlights the risk-diversifying role of 
corporate share interlocks. At an aggregate level, the importance of this mechanism in
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absorbing adjustment costs is reflected in survey da ta  showing tha t  a sample of 350 major 
firms registered 1,007 billion yen (US$ 4 billion) in special profits from the sale of shares 
and current assets. The case studies showed tha t  share disposals were undertaken 
specifically as measures to offset losses incurred when undergoing adjustment and took 
place in a negotiated intercorporate context, rather than through anonymous stock 
market transactions.
A significant part of the thesis was devoted to a case study of adjustment in the 
aluminium smelting industry. This case study showed that ,  while there has been a 
number of government financial assistance measures involving a significant cross­
subsidisation of the adjustment cost burden, internal cross-subsidisation mechanisms, 
centring on the financial corporate grouping, have been more important in relative 
quantity  terms in absorbing the costs of adjustment.
The feature of the recent policy approach to loss of competitiveness in the industrial 
s tructure  in Japan  has been to accomodate structural adjustment rather than a ttem p t to 
prop up declining industries against the tide of international competitive pressure with 
permanent subsidies or protective tariffs. This public policy process appears to have been 
characterised by a concern with, and capacity to devise solutions to, the problem of how 
to absorb and distribute the costs of structural adjustment, adjustment which in sectors 
such as aluminium and shipbuilding has involved the scrapping of much of the existing 
capacity. Thus, for instance, a number of schemes and instruments have been
implemented by the government or jointly with the private sector which had the explicit 
aim of promoting the scrapping of excess capacity by redistributing the costs incurred. A 
major feature of these schemes is that they have made assistance, or contributions to 
easing the adjustm ent cost burden, contingent on the adjustments actually taking place.
W hat this study has shown is that there has also been an important internal private 
sector dimension to the bearing of the costs of adjustment, which has centred on risk­
sharing mechanisms in the financial corporate grouping. Although a comprehensive 
assessment of all the costs of adjustment and how they were borne has not been 
a ttem pted , the results indicate that in quantity terms these internal loss-distributing 
mechanisms, or what Nakatani has characterised as “implicit mutual insurance 
mechanisms” , have been at least as important as, if not more important than,
o
government assistance in distributing the costs of adjustment.
An implication of the analysis then is that J a p a n ’s experience with structural 
adjustm ent cannot be interpreted solely in terms of public policy inititatives such as the 
depressed industries laws, as has tended to be the case to date. It is necessary to evaluate 
adjustm ent experience in specific sectors not only in terms of the type of government 
policies employed but also with respect to the kind of corporate organisation that
239
characterises the sector and what this might mean for the way in which the costs of 
ad jus tm ent in the industry are distributed.
An important question, which the study has not addressed explicitly, concerns the 
relation between internal adjustment mechanisms on the one hand and external 
government measures on the other. The results of the study suggest tha t  the apparent 
effectiveness of government assistance in promoting structural adjustment has rested in 
large p a r t  on the capacity of the private sector to absorb the costs of adjustment. An 
im portan t  extension of the study would be to examine more closely the political economy 
process surrounding government and private sector interaction in policy formulation and 
implementation, particularly as it involves measures aimed at distributing the costs of 
ad justm ent. It may be, as some Japanese observers believe, that a relatively small 
am ount of financial assistance from the government can be instrumental as a catalyst in 
drawing forth a larger amount of private sector contributions. This interpretation is 
broadly consistent with the view of MITI as a plan-rational pilot agency overseeing and 
directing the adjustment process, as characterised by Johnson (1982) and other writers. 
An alternative and equally plausible hypothesis is tha t  the private sector uses the 
political economy process to extract as high a level of financial assistance as possible from 
the government to minimise its own losses. Viewed this way, M ITI’s role is more reactive 
and the level of government assistance reflects the outcome of a political and budgetary 
process more than any supposed economic rationalism.
It should be noted tha t  the analysis has done no more than a ttem pt to gain an 
understanding of how the economic mechanisms of corporate organisation fit together and 
operate during structural adjustment. An important finding is tha t  corporate organisation 
reflects the operation of a ‘private insurance system’, and that this has played a major 
role in distributing the costs of structural adjustment. It does not follow from this, 
however, tha t  the internal mechanisms described have necessarily resulted in adjustment 
which is lower in its overall social costs than occurs in an economy where adjustment is 
left to external market mechanisms. There is, for instance, the problem of the ‘counter- 
fac tual’: we do not know what results would have obtained in Japan under a different 
policy regime or with a different kind of corporate organisation.
Nor is it possible to judge Ja p an ’s performance with structural adjustment against 
tha t  of other nations in terms of whether social costs were minimised or not, or in any 
such terms: the most careful comparative analysis is required and even then any 
conclusions that may be drawn must be subject to strict qualification. It remains the case, 
however, that much of the discussion in this area is concerned, implicitly if not explicitly, 
with the social costs and benefits of different policy approaches and forms of economic 
organisation, and the study may serve to inform those who wish to, and feel qualified to, 
engage in debate on this more contentious issue.
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T H E  N A T U R E  OF THE C A P IT A L  M A R K E T
One of the striking points to emerge from the analysis of financial corporate 
grouping is the role of the main-bank system, stable shareholding practices and other 
aspects of the internal capital market in providing conditions in the capital market 
conducive to the operation of the Japanese management and employment system. Much 
of the previous literature has asserted th a t  the Japanese management system has 
operated in a certain way, for example, that managers have ‘lifetime’ employment or tha t  
they need not be concerned with short-term profitability, without establishing what the 
conditions and structures in the capital market are which allow this to be the case. In 
con tras t,  this study has a ttem pted  to provide a framework for understanding the 
operation of the Japanese capital market and how it relates to the management system.
It appears th a t  corporate organisation plays a major part in influencing how 
changes in competitiveness and external shocks are translated into structural adjustment 
through the capital market in Japan. In the textbook model and in much economic 
thinking, it is the share price mechanism which ‘drives’ the system. A nexus of share-price 
effects in the capital market is observed: the firm becomes depressed, demand for the
shares fall and with it the share price, emergency finance is difficult to obtain, and the 
firm goes bankrupt. With bankruptcy comes the rationalisation of the assets in a legal 
process of liquidation or reorganisation. Alternatively, the firm may become the target of 
a takeover a t tem p t and the assets rationalised by the takeover agent.
In Japan , on the other hand, a different set of mechanisms appears to be at work. 
The large firm in a  financial corporate grouping is able to avert sudden bankruptcy 
because of the back-up received from its main bank, general trading company or other 
parent firm and because it is able to use its portfolio of shares in related firms to generate 
emergency funds and offset its losses. At the same time, the share ownership of the firm 
remains largely in tact through the implicit risk-sharing and stable shareholding 
agreements of the internal capital market, thus reducing the likelihood of bankruptcy or 
external takeover occurring.
Although mitigating against the operation of the external takeover mechanism or 
asset reorganisation through bankruptcy, the internal capital market has a mechanism in 
the  form of the main bank through which intervention in the internal management of the 
firm is able to take place. A major finding of the study is tha t  the mechanism of main- 
bank intervention has operated on a wide scale since the early 1970s in Japan and has 
been instrumental in bringing about the revival and reorganisation of many major 
depressed firms, paralleling the role of the takeover market in other countries. The effect 
of the main-bank mechanism appears to be to bring about the reorganisation of assets and 
improvement in the efficiency with which assets are managed, functions typically ascribed
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to the takeover mechanism in other economies. A critical feature of the main bank, 
however, is tha t  it intervenes as a ‘friendly’ insider from its vantage point of ‘delegated 
m onitor’ of the firm in the internal capital market and its intervention is limited to times 
when the firm is not performing well. It is unusual in Japan  for a firm to resist or a ttem pt 
to defend itself against intervention by the bank, as often occurs in takeover and proxy 
battles in the United States and elsewhere. Also, while in other countries it is common for 
healthy firms to become the target of takeover a ttem pts, main-bank intervention occurs 
only when the firm is experiencing financial or managerial difficulties. As the case studies 
illustrated, main-bank intervention can be of two major kinds. The main bank may 
intervene to assist the recovery of the firm, as in the Toyo Kogyo case, or it can manage 
the reorganisation of the assets in a process which sees the company disappear, as in the 
Ataka case.
There are economic welfare questions of considerable policy and analytic interest 
associated with the analysis of the internal market for corporate control in Japan. 
Perhaps the most controversial and topical question is whether the insulation provided by
o
the internal capital market is in some sense socially beneficial or not. In the main, 
economists have regarded a competitive market for corporate control as being critical in 
providing ex ante disciplining and ex post sanctioning of managers from the capital 
m arket.4 Indeed, it is mainly the notion of capital market discipline through the operation 
of an active market for corporate control which economists have relied on to refute the 
common claim that  the separation of ownership and control means that managers need 
not, and do not, maximise firm profits, a debate which began with the famous Berle and 
Means study in the 1930s and continues today.'’ Jensen and Ruback’s conclusion from a 
review of the literature and the contributions to a special issue of the Journal o f  
Financial Econom ics on the market for corporate control was that:^
the evidence seems to indicate tha t  corporate takeovers generate positive 
gains, that target firm shareholders benefit, and that bidding firm shareholders 
do not lose. Moreover, the gains created by corporate takeovers do not appear to 
come from the creation of market power. Finally, it is difficult to find 
managerial actions related to corporate control tha t  harm shareholders; the 
exceptions are those actions tha t  eliminate an actual or potential bidder, for 
example, through the use of targeted large block repurchases or standstill 
agreements.
Judged in these terms, most economists would probably deem the internal market for 
corporate control in Japan  as being conducive to inefficient management. It is interesting 
therefore and more than a little ironic th a t  the claim has become widespread in 
journalistic and popular academic writing on Japan (both in Japan and elsewhere) that 
the ability of management in Japan to take a long-term view of investment and of
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adjustm ent w ithout having to be preoccupied with the firm’s short-term profit position, 
its share price and movements or the threat of takeover is a source of competitive edge
7over business in the United States and elsewhere.
It is possible tha t  there is an element of tru th  in both of these seemingly 
contradictory propositions. It may be tha t  the internal capital market eliminates certain 
costs associated with the takeover mechanism, such as the resource costs incurred by 
shareholders or their agents in assessing takeover bids and the incumbent m anagement’s 
response to them, the costs incurred by the firm in fighting off ‘unwanted’ bids (litigation 
costs, m anagem ent’s opportunity cost, and so on), and the possible costs incurred by 
managers or w'orkers who may be displaced from the firm after a successful takeover bid. 
It may be also tha t ,  via its intervention function, the main-bank system reduces the 
deadweight losses associated with corporate bankruptcy and reorganisation, such as might 
come from disputation among creditors, shareholders and other claimants on the firm, the
• Ädissipation of valuable firm-specific skills, and disruption to customers and suppliers. 
But it may be th a t  these benefits are obtained at the cost of there being more managerial 
inefficiency in the system than might occur in a more competitive market. Thus, for 
instance, when it actually took place, main-bank intervention provided a very effective 
mechanism in bringing about the restoration of managerial efficiency at Toyo Kogyo and 
Daishowa Paper, but it is problematical as to whether those inefficient managements 
would have survived for as long as they did in a United States-style capital market 
setting.
M O D E L L IN G  J A P A N ’S C O R P O R A T E  O R G A N ISA T IO N
An im portan t task for future research, and one which may help to clarify the kind 
of issue just raised, is to extend the analysis by developing more formal models of 
corporate organisation in Japan. The analysis of Ja p an ’s corporate organisation in this 
thesis has drawn on various bodies of literature and recent developments in the economics 
of industrial organisation, and these could provide a starting point for more rigorous 
modelling of the economic relationships involved.
D iamond’s model of the bank as a ‘delegated m onitor’ in the capital market seems 
to provide a good departure point for modelling the Japanese ‘main bank ’.9 The growing 
literature on principal-agent relationships in the firm in situations of asymmetrical 
information is also important here, as these phenomena seem to be a t  the heart of the 
corporate organisation in the internal capital and managerial markets in Japan. The 
main bank’s dual role of evaluating and signalling to the rest of the capital market 
information about the firm and its management and of insuring the risk of the firm seems 
to be amenable to modelling in these more general economic frameworks. For instance,
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the role of the main bank in monitoring the firm on an insider basis appears to be 
im portant in enabling the bank to overcome the moral hazard problem of insuring the 
management against their human-capital risks. Diamond and Verrecchia, in modelling an 
optimal employment contract between stockholders (the principal) and managers (the 
agents), conclude tha t  “the many principals ought to delegate the monitoring of the 
agen t’s action (and enforcement of the contract) to a single individual” . 10 The main 
bank in Japan appears to be an example of such an individual monitoring agent.
An extension of the analysis would be to view non-main banks and the main bank in 
principal-agent terms and this might allow certain aspects of the main-bank system to be 
understood better. For instance, one reason th a t  the main bank functions as residual risk- 
bearer among banks may be tha t  this overcomes the moral hazard problem inherent in 
non-main banks (the principals) delegating authority for capital market monitoring and 
intervention to the main bank (the agent). The literature on voluntary disclosure of 
information by managers to the capital market is also instructive in thinking about the 
corporate mechanisms discussed in this thesis . 11 The main-bank system can be viewed as 
a mechanism through which the management of the firm is able credibly, and without 
fear of inducing opportunistic responses, to reveal information to the capital market.
Such modelling of J a p a n ’s corporate organisation may provide a fertile institutional 
setting for the application and further development of these exciting current approaches 
in economic theory. At the same time it may provide a more informed input into the 
continuing debate concerning the special character or otherwise of Ja p an ’s economic 
institutions.
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7. Johnson (1982, 204), for instance, claims that:
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pressured by stockholders, which meant tha t  they could ignore short-term 
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instead on such things as foreign market penetration, quality control, and long­
term product development.
See also Shirai (1983b) and Tsurumi and Tsurumi (1985). Tsurumi (1984, 271) urges tha t  
legislative action be taken to curb hostile takeovers in the United States because “the 
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10. Diamond and Verrecchia (1982, 283).
11. See, for instance, Diamond (1985) and Verrecchia (1983).
A p p en d ix  A
T itle s  u sed  for J a p a n ese  co rp o ra te  officers
k a i c h ö chairman
s h a c h o president
f u k u  s h a c h o vice-president
s e n m u senior executive managing director
jo rr iu senior managing director
t o r i  s  h i m a r i  y a k u managing director
k o m o n advisor-director
k a n s a y a k u auditor-director
b u c h ö general manager
k a c h o section chief
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A p p en d ix  B
T h e m em b ersh ip  o f th e A lu m in iu m  S ec tio n  o f th e  In d u str ia l
S tru ctu re  C ou n cil, O ct 1981
(a) The Aluminium Section
Name Position
Uchida Takao 
(Committee Chairman)
Professor, Tokyo University
Ikuta Toyoaki Head, Institute of Energy Economics
Imai Masao Chairman, Japan Electric Machinery Industry 
Association (President, Meidensha Electric)
Ueno Hiroya Professor, Seikei University
Ogawa Yoshio Chairman, Sumitomo Light Metal Industries
Oki Kazuo Chairman, Japan Frame-Makers Association 
(President, Sankyo Aluminium Industry)
Kadota Shözö Vice-President, Tokyo Electric Power
Komatsu Yügorö Vice-Chairman, Japan Aluminium Federation 
(Vice-President, Kobe Steel)
Suetsugu Katsuhiko Editorial board, Japan Economic Journal
Suzuki Ayao Vice-Chairman, Japan Aluminium Federation 
(President, Mitsubishi Light Metal Industries)
Suzuki Norio Chairman, Showa Denko
Tajima Toshihiro Vice-President, Industrial Bank of Japan
Tsuji Gentarö Director, Japan Motor Industrial Federation 
(Senior Managing Director, Toyota Motor Corp.)
Namiki Hiroshi Executive Representative, Japan Aluminium 
Industry Labour Union Association (Chairman, 
Showa Denko Labour Union Federation)
Haseo Yasuji Vice-President, Mitsubishi Corporation
Matsunaga Yoshimasa Chairman, Japan Aluminium Federation 
(President, Nippon Light Metal)
Mizukami Tokugoro
247
previous Chairman, Japan Electric-Cable
Industry Association (President, Hitachi Cable)
Yamamoto Teruro Chairman, Japan Aluminium Alloys Association 
(President, Daiki Aluminium Industry)
(b) Basic Problems Sub-committee
Ueno Hiroya Professor, Seikei University
(Sub-committee Chairman)
Ikuta Toyoaki Head, Institute of Energy Economics
Imaoka Hajime General Manager, Inspection Division, Long-Term 
Credit Bank of Japan
Urano Yöji Senior Managing Director, Mitsui Aluminium 
Industries
Omachi Shotaro Vice-President, YKK Industries
Kichida Nobuhiko General Manager, Industrial Research Division, 
Industrial Bank of Japan
Kuroda Masataka Vice-President, Nippon Light Metal
Hondo Toshiyuki General Manager, Sales Division, Tokyo Electric 
Power
Suetsugu Katsuhiko Editorial board, Japan Economic Journal
Suzuki Mitsunobu Advisor-Director, Kobe Steel
Harada Hideo Senior Executive Managing Director, Sumitomo 
Light Metal Industries
Higuchi Yasuo General Manager, No.2 Loans Division, 
Export-Import Bank of Japan
Matsuo Kichirö Vice-President, Sumitomo Aluminium Smelting
Yamamoto Ken’ichiro Senior Managing Director, Mitsubishi
Corporation
Source: Sangyö kozo shingikai, 1981: Kongo no wagakuni aruminiumu
seirengyo oyobi sono seisaku no arikata, pp.23-4.
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A p p en d ix  C
C o m p a n ies and organ isa tion s in Jap an  v is ite d  for in terv iew s
Asahi Breweries, Ltd.
The Industrial Bank of Japan, Ltd.
Japan Aluminium Federation
The Japan Economic Research Center
Japan Securities Research Institute
Kansai Economic Federation
The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd.
^Ministry of International Trade and Industry
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
Nippon Light Metal Company, Ltd.
Sky Aluminium Co., Ltd.
Showa Aluminium Industries K.K.
Sumitomo Aluminium Smelting Co., Ltd.
The Sumitomo Bank Ltd.
Sumitomo Chemical Co., Ltd.
Sumitomo Corporation 
Sumitomo Light Metal Industries
Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd.
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N o t e s  to  r e fe r e n c e s
In the single list of English and Japanese references which follows, romanisation of 
Japanese follows the modified Hepburn system, as used by the Kenkyüsha New Japanese- 
English  Dictionary. A comma is not placed between the surname and given name of a 
Japanese author when the work is in Japanese, but a comma is inserted when the work is 
in English in accordance with the normal bibliographic practice. Similarly, macrons are 
not attached to Japanese personal names when the reference is in English.
Annotations to the Japanese journals cited in the bibliography follow.
B ijin esu  rebyu Journal of the Industry and Business
R e s e a r c h  Institute of Hitots u b a s h i  
U n i v e r s i t y
Chögin chösa geppö Monthly r e s e a r c h  report of the L o n g - T e r m  
Credit Bank of Japan
C hü ö  kör on keiei mondai Business journal p u b l i s h e d  by Chüo k ö r o n s h a
Daiwa töshi shiryö Investment r e s e a r c h  report of D a i w a  Bank
Ekonom isu to ‘E c o n o m i s t ’ p u b l i s h e d  by Maini c h i  s h i n b u n s h a
G inko  kenkyü ‘Bank r e s e a r c h ’ p u b l i s h e d  by Ginko k e n k y ü s h a  
(no longer published)
Hitotsubashi ronsö Journal of the H i t o tsubashi Academic
Society of H i t o tsubashi U n i v e r s i t y
Kaigin  chösa Research report of the Japan Dev e l o p m e n t  
Bank
Keiza i hyöron Economics journal p u b l i s h e d  by N i hon 
h y o r o n s h a
Keizai keiei kenkyu Research journal p u b l i s h e d  by the Japan 
D e v e l o p m e n t  Bank
Keiza i kenkyü Journal of the Economic R e s e a r c h  Institute 
of Hi t o t s u b a s h i  U n i v e r s i t y
Keiza i sem inä ‘Economics s e m i n a r ’ p u b l i s h e d  by N i hon 
h y o r o n s h a
K ikan  gendai keizai  
K ika n  riron keizaigaku
‘Co n t e m p o r a r y  e c o n o m i c s ’ p u b l i s h e d  by 
N i h o n  keizai shin b u n s h a
Journal of the Japan A s s o c i a t i o n  of 
E c o n o m i c s  and Econo m e t r i c s
250
Kin'yu keizai Journal of the Institute for Banking and 
Financial Research, Tokyo
K i n ’yu kenkyü Finance journal of the Bank of Japan
K i n ’yü kenkyü shiryö Finance reseaxch journal of the Bank 
of Japan
K i n ’yü zaisei j i jö Journal published by the Finance and
Public Finance Research Association
Kögin chösa Reseaxch report of the Industrial Bank 
of Japan
Kokumin keizai zasshi Journal of Keizai-Keiei Gakkai, Kobe 
University
Kösei torihiki Journal of the Japanese Fair Trade 
Association
Nihon keizai kenkyü 
sentä kaihö
Bulletin of the Japan Economic Research 
Center
Osaka Daigaku keizaigaku Journal of the Faculty of Economics of 
Osaka University
Osaka Shidai ronshü Journal of Economics and Management
Reseaxch Group of Osaka City University
Shaken keizai Journal of the Osaka Division of the
Japan Securities Reseaxch Institute
Shöken kenkyü Journal of the Japan Securities Research 
Institute
Shokun! Current affairs journal published by 
Bungei shunjü
Shükan töyö keizai Weekly economics and business magazine
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